Relative earnings of husbands and wives to their families in urban China, 1988-1999. by Sin, Lai-ting. & Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Economics.
Relative Earnings of Husbands and Wives to Their Families 
in Urban China, 1988-1999 
SIN Lai-ting 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirement for the Degree of 
Master of Philosophy 
In 
Economics 
•The Chinese University of Hong Kong 
August 2003 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong holds the copyright of this thesis. Any person(s) intending 
to use a part or whole of the materials'in the thesis in a proposed publication must seek copyright 
release from the Dean of the Graduate School. 
2 9 APS 201 i l l 
喊 〜 — Qif 
^feSr - university '" 
\^ 5 I^BRARY SYSTEM^^ 
Abstract 
This thesis studies the relative economic contribution of husbands and wives to 
their families in urban China during the urban reform period from 1988 to 1999 
by using the data from the Urban Household Survey of China. The empirical 
research aims at finding out changes in the relative economic importance of 
husbands and wives and the reasons for the changes. Literature usually 
explores this topic by studying working hours, income levels and output levels 
that are provided by husbands and wives. In this thesis, the percentage shares 
of husbands' and wives' labor earnings to total family incomes are studied and 
used as proxy for their economic contributions to the families. 
Contrary to the experience of western countries, this thesis finds that the 
t* 
percentage shares of wives' labor earnings in urban China tend to decline 
slightly over time and the percentage shares of husbands' labor earnings are 
more or less stable. This implies that the relative economic role of urban Chinese 
husbands as the main financial supporters of their families tends to become 
relatively more important over the urban reform period. Besides, a canonical 
correlation analysis is performed on selected characteristics of husbands and 
wives. The result enables us to assume that the mating function of men and 
women is stable in Chinese marriage market over the period concerned. 
Under the assumption that mating function of Chinese men and women is stable, 
this thesis identifies the following factors to account for the strengthening of the 
relative economic importance of husbands in their families in urban China during 
the urban reform period. It is found that the relative economic importance of 
i 
husbands is favored by the enlargement of the positive effect of children 
whereas the opposite holds for wives. Besides, the shrinkage of the positive 
income effect on leisure of urban Chinese husbands is another source for the 
strengthening of the relative economic role of husbands as the financial 
supporters of the families. 
By using Blinder-Oaxaca's decomposition technique, this thesis finds that the 
residual of the economic contribution differential is as large as 90 percent of the 
differential in any given year and the percentage is slightly decreasing over time. 
This residual is regarded as the unexplainable part of the differential and is 
considered to be caused by the stereotype on the role of spouses in urban 
Chinese families. In this sense, although the stereotype on the role of spouses 
which views husbands to be the main breadwinners remains to be serious, it is 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
We are now living in the era of rapid change. Changes in economic condition, social 
system and beliefs happen all the time. The changes in the roles of husbands and wives 
within families have been taking place at an incredible speed over time. 
In America, before World War II, the role of wives was in the home and the role of 
husbands was to take fiill responsibility for the financial support of the family. It was 
asserted that any variation from that norm would threaten the stability of the families. 
Blau (1992) mentions according to the official statistics that there are 84 percent of men, 
but only 19 percent of women and less than 5 percent of married women were reported 
to be in the labor force in 1890 in America. The American society moved away from 
that norm when women were asked to take employment and replace men, who were 
then in the armed forces with World War II. Since then, there has been increasing 
number of women receiving higher education and an increased emphasis on the rights 
of individuals. These social movements have increased the number of wives working 
outside the home for a salary and favored the economic status of wives in households. 
Not only did changes occur in the Western societies\ changes also happened in Chinese 
society. In old China,- families were usually extended families which are composed of 
several generations living together. There was a "head" in each family who was usually 
man. These heads had absolute authority at home and the final decision-making power. 
Also, wives took on all the housework and husbands were the major breadwinners. 
Their living pattern at that time followed a traditional saying "men look after the outside; 
1 More examples would be given in the literature review of Chapter 2. 
1 
women look after the inside". 
However, the status of wives in the cities has changed greatly since 1949. Tsui (1989) 
mentions that the Communist government started to employ the large female labor 
reserve in the city in the 1950s in order to achieve rapid industrial development and 
control the city size. At the same time, Chinese young women have. considered 
employment as part of their life because of the "high employment, low wage" policy. 
Tsui (1989) concludes that the economic independence of Chinese wives increased their 
bargaining power and changed their subordinate position in the family. 
In addition, the economic reform and the open policy of China affect her labor market a 
lot. In New China, after 1978，there are more and more women participate in the labor 
force and earn their own income through work. The share of wives' earnings in total 
family income is rising gradually over time. Tsui (1989) cites with reference to the 
‘Five-City Family Survey which is a family survey that are conducted in the five largest 
cities in China in 1982 that there were 81% of urban Chinese married women were 
working. 
On one hand, the changes in social life and the adjustment of trade structure in urban 
China provided an enormous space and excellent opportunities for wives to go out of 
housework and find jobs in the urban area during the urban reform period. The range of 
jobs open to women has been widened. According to the data from the population 
census, the employment of women increased by 162 percent in the field of finance and 
insurance, 154 percent in the real estates services, 79.6 percent in commerce and 
catering trade, 78.6 percent in organization and offices，42.7 percent in the field of 
public health and welfare and 27 percent in industry from 1982 to 1990. This may have 
2 
led to the social impression that wives in China have been gradually taking up the half 
of the sky during the urban reform period, just like the experience of those in western 
countries. 
On the other hand, the economic reform in China allows people to have greater 
flexibility in choosing the hours of work. Husbands and wives may respond to market 
conditions and incentives. Since wives usually get lower wages than those of their 
husbands, it is possible that husbands may work more and wives may work less in the 
market. As a result, the economic importance of wives to their families could decline. 
How do the economic roles of Chinese husbands and wives fare in the transition process 
of urban reform period? In order to find out the answer, empirical research should be 
done. The objective of this thesis is to analyze the changes in the shares of labor 
earnings of husbands and wives to total family income in urban China during the urban 
reform period from 1988 to 1999. This thesis would also explore the reasons for the 
changes. 
The structure of the rest of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews relevant literature 
and makes further applications of theoretical models. Chapter 3 presents the 
methodology for the analyses. Data and sample will be described in Chapter 4. Chapter 
5，6 and 7 present the empirical results. Lastly, Chapter 8 summarizes the main results. 
3 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review and Application 
Literature is reviewed in this chapter so as to provide some bases for the analysis of the 
relative economic roles of husbands and wives to their families in urban China during 
the urban reform period. The theory of marriage and family formation that are derived 
by Becker is reviewed first, followed with the theory of the allocation of time between 
family members in housework and market work of Becker. Thereafter, this thesis would 
apply Becker's theoretical models and analyze different variables. After the theoretical 
literature review, empirical research on the division of labor between husbands and 
wives over time is reviewed. Meanwhile, the change in division of labor between 
husbands and wives in different countries will be discussed. Lastly, the decomposition 
technique of the wage differential between men and women is introduced. 
2.1) The Theory of Marriage and Family Formation 
Family is defined as consisting of two or more persons, related by blood, marriage, or 
adoption, living in the same household. Family should be treated as an economic unit. It 
is because the decision-making of family members are interdependent. Most people 
construct families by entering into marriage. Becker (1973，1974) claims that people 
decide to get married because they expect that the gains from marriage would be greater 
than the gain from remaining single. Marital decision is made by maximizing the 
expected full wealth over the life time. If the benefits associated with marrying person 
X are greater than the costs associated with marrying X，then marry X; otherwise don't. 
In addition, the potential candidates in the marriage market would search for each other 
until the search cost and search gain equal. Besides, two persons, one male and the other 
female, would remain in the marriage if they expect that the total wealth derived from 
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joint production are greater than the total wealth derived from separate outputs. 
The benefits and costs of marriages include monetary factors of expected monetary gain 
from the arrangement and expected monetary outlay for maintaining the arrangement. 
Moreover, another benefit of marriage is economies of scale in production. In fact, a 
couple can save time and money relative to a single person in several ways. Firstly, it is 
cheaper for couples to buy market goods in bulk. It is because there are volume 
discounts. Secondly, the average fixed costs of capital such as household appliances 
should be lower for families as well as marriage couples. Last but not least, within 
families, persons can specialize in activities and subdivide activities into smaller parts 
that can be done with greater efficiency，thereby increasing total output. So, the 
formation of family can reduce costs of production. 
Furthermore, the ability of a multi-person family to smooth consumption patterns 
• through resource pooling is greater. Also, by pooling funds available for investment, 
family members are better able to diversify their investment portfolio and reduce the 
level of risk to which they are exposed. The benefits of marriage also include psychic 
factors such as love, desire to please and sexual desire. Moreover, the costs of marriage 
include psychic factors such as distrust and annoy of one's parents. 
According to the theory of optimal assortative mating derived by Becker (1973，1974)， 
matching of unlike is optimal if the human characteristic traits are substitutes, such as 
income. On the other hand, if the characteristic traits are complements, such as 
non-human wealth, religion, height, education and age, matching of like is optimal. By 
mating low-wage women with high-wage men and low-wage men with high-wage 
women, men and women with cheaper time would participate more extensively in 
5 
household production. On the other hand, those with expensive time would participate 
more extensively in market production. Then, the gain from the division of labor could 
be maximized. 
2.2) The Theory of the Allocation of Time Between Family Members in 
Housework and Market Work 
In 1960s, Gary Becker was the pioneer to investigate the allocation of time and wealth 
of each family member so as to maximize family well-being. He is the first one to treat 
family as an economic unit and see how the economic benefit of a family can be 
maximized as a whole. He argues that time is a scarce resource for all families. Each 
family self-produces all the consumption commodities and these commodities can be 
summarized as 
Z = Z(Z丨,……,Zm) ’ （2.1) 
where Zi, ,Zm are the various commodities that are consumed by the family 
including the quality and quantity of children, prestige, health, altruism, recreation and 
so on. Furthermore, Becker regards that consumption commodities are the combination 
of market goods, time inputs, household ability, human capital, social and physical 
climate, and other environmental variables. Therefore, each family has a production 
function that can be written as 
Zi =f丨（Xi，tj丨;Ei ) i=l,.•…，m， (2.2) 
where 
Zi: represents 产 commodity and there are "m" consumption commodities 
Xi: represents various market goods and services used to produce the commodity 
tji: represents time inputs of "j" different family members to produce the commodity 
Ei: represents family ability, human capital, social and physical climate, and other 
6 
environment variables to produce the commodity. 
In addition, the time of an adult family member could be measured and valued by its 
opportunity cost. Becker assumes that markets would provide shadow prices for the 
time of people and for the goods and services that are not exchanged in the markets. 
This enables families to rationally allocate the time of family members. Although the 
consumption commodities that are self-produced by each family do not have market 
prices since they are not purchased, they have shadow price that equal to the cost of 
production. The shadow price of commodity can be written as 
兀 + (2.3) 
where 
Pi ： represents the market price of market goods and services in producing commodity 
Wj: represents market wage rate of “j，，different family members 
Moreover, the income constraint of family and the time constraints of each family 
member are regarded as. 
= 2 > j L j + v (2.4) 
and 
Lj + t j = T for all j (2.5) 
- respectively，where 
Lj: represents the time spending working in the market by family member 
V : total family property income 
T : Total time endowment of each family member. 
Also, Becker further defines a full income constraint as the maximum money income 
7 
available for whole family by combining the income and time constraint in equation 
(2.4) and (2.5). The full income can be written as 
S= I > i X , + v = ;^7r,Z, . (2.6) 
The commodities that are self-produced by the families would directly provide utility. 
So, each family has a joint utility function which can be written as 
U = U(Z 丨’......’ZJ, (2.7) 
where Zi, ，Zm are the various commodities that are consumed by the family. In 
addition, Becker assumes that families conform to the model of rational choice. 
Especially, families would maximize joint utility (2.7) subject to the constraints of full 
income (2.6). 
As a result of utility maximization, the optimal condition exists when the marginal 
commodities of the time input for any two family members such as “a’，and "b" 
constitute the following relationship 
dZldto “ MP, w , 
' forall^<t<T (2.8) 
dZldt, MP� 
The above optimal condition implies that families would allocate the time of different 
members according to the relative efficiency of different members at market activities 
and household activities. An increase in the relative market efficiency of any member 
would lead to reallocation of the time of all other members towards consumption 
activities so that the former would spend more time at market activities. In this sense, an 
increase in the relative market efficiency of husband (wife) would cause reallocation of 
the time of wife (husband) towards consumption activities and that of husband (wife) 
8 
towards market activities. ‘ 
Becker (1981) claims that the gender division of labor within family can be explained as 
an economic response to market valuations of the time of family members which in turn 
were assumed to reflect the productivity of individuals in the market. As long as the 
potential earnings of women are relatively lower than that of men's, the time of women 
would have a lower relative value and the cost of their time using in 
consumption-orientated activities and household activities would be lower. 
Moreover, Becker (1981) claims that the comparative advantage of men to perform 
market production and women to perform household production may be socially 
constructed rather than biologically determined. Social norms in the labor market cause 
women taking a larger share of household work and men taking a larger share of market 
work. If men and women make different amounts of specific human capital investment 
in household and market production, their respective productivity in the two sectors will 
diverge over time even if there are no intrinsic difference in productivity between them 
initially. Therefore, specialization results in the formation of a real difference in 
comparative advantage in the two spheres between men and women. And according to 
Becker (1981), the traditional division of labor between husband and wife will not 
necessarily remain in the future since comparative advantage is no longer assumed to be 
- based on biological differences between them. 
Despite the above argument, the pay differential of men and women are still primarily 
based on real productivity differences although these are mainly stemmed from the 
differential in the investment of human capital. And gender difference in employment 
patterns is market's rational response to the differential in comparative advantage. 
9 
Specialized investments and time allocation together with biological differences in 
comparative advantage imply the existence of traditional gender division of labor of 
male breadwinner and female homemaker within family. 
To further extend the theories, Becker (1985) analyzes the production of effort and its 
allocation among market and non-market sectors. Meanwhile, Becker (1985) assumes 
that individual hourly wage rate is a function of the effort level of this individual given 
to an hour of market work, that is 
w (em) . (2.9) 
And, individual hourly wage rate would be positively related to the effort level of this 
individual given to an hour of market work. So, 
w ' > 0 . (2.10) 
After maximizing of household utility subject to time, effort and spending constraints 
and production functions, Becker (1985) finds that the optimal amount of effort or 
energy allocated to an hour of any activity is 
H： a： 
e 丨 〒 广 ， (2.11) 
where 
Ci ： represents the effort per hoiir of activity "i" 
(Ti: represents the effort intensity of activity "i" which is measured by the effort 
elasticity of activity "i" and it is positive constants, therefore 
(J - % change in outputs of activity "i" � ^ 
i % change in effort per hour of activity ” i " � P . 12) 
Hi: marginal utility of time spend on activity “i，，which can be measured by the total 
opportunity cost of this hour in both time and effort 
Ei: marginal utility of effort spend on activity "i" which can be measured by the 
opportunity cost of effort 
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From Equation 2.11, the optimal amount of energy that is allocated to an activity is 
related to the effort intensity of the activity and the marginal utility of time and effort 
spend on that activity. According to Becker (1985), the marginal utility of time and 
effort relate to the opportunity cost of using them which in turn depend on the effort 
intensities of other activities, investment in human capital, property income and the 
allocation of time to other activities. In addition, Becker (1985) also mentions that 
leisure activities depend closely on time but not on effort. Besides, the effort elasticity 
of market work is usually larger than the effort elasticity of housework. 
Moreover, Becker (1985) mentions that the optimal allocation of effort of any family 
member to any two activities satisfies the following relationship: 
Cj Oj(l-CJi) 
‘ ~ = ^ ^ . (2.13) 
Ci Oi( l -Gj) 
By using the above theoretical model, Becker (1985) deduces that household work 
becomes less effort intensity for wives as a result of the improvement in household 
technology and the reduction in fertility. According to the optimal allocation of effort, 
Equation 2.11 and 2.13，the energy spent in market activities by married women would 
raise even if there is no change in their hours of market work. This, in turn, raises their 
hourly earnings and incentive to invest in market human capital. The result could be a 
sizable increase in the relative potential earnings of married women. Then, the 
participation of married women in market work increases. Therefore, Becker (1985) 
claims that the shift away from the traditional gender specialization of labor within 
households can be explained by the increase in married women's potential earnings 
power in the market. 
21 
2.3) Application of Becker's Theoretical Models to Different Variables 
This section would apply Becker's theoretical models into different aspects. By 
applying Becker's idea into age, education, children, co-residents, family non-labor 
income, economic development and stereotype on the role of spouses, the logic of how 
these aspects affect the division of labor between family members will become clearer. 
Also, this will facilitate the analyses of the changes in the relative importance of 
husbands and wives as breadwinners of their families in urban China. 
The previous section shows that Becker contributes a lot in analyzing the division of 
labor between husbands and wives within families. Equation 2.8，2.11 and 2.13 are 
important in Becker's findings. These three equations provide implications on the 
optimal relationship between the housework and market work of different family 
members. With reference to Equation 2.11，the optimal amount of effort or energy 
allocated to an hour of market work (Cm) can be written as^  
u c 
= . (2.14) 
e m 
Similarly, the optimal amount of effort or energy allocated to an hour of housework (eh) 
can be written as^ 
1 "Cm" is the effort per hour of market work, "a^ "is the effort intensity of market work which measures 
the elasticity of earnings with respect to effort per hour of market work and it is a positive constant, 
therefore 
a _ % change in earnings ^ 
m % change in effort per hour of market work 
"Hm" is marginal utility of time spend on market work, is the marginal utility of effort spend 
on market work, em<0. 
2 "eh" represents the effort per hour of housework. "Ch" is the effort intensity of housework which 
measures the elasticity of outputs of housework with respect to effort per hour of housework and it is 
assumed to be a positive constant, therefore 
^ _ % change in outputs of housework > ^ 
h % change in effort per hour of housework 
"Hh" is marginal utility of time spend on housework, i^h<0. "Eh" is marginal utility of effort spend on 
housework, £h<0. 
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- M- h CJ . 
eh . (2.15) 
s h 1 - o h 
Furthermore, following Equation 2.13，the optimal allocation of effort and energy of any 
family member in market and household production satisfy the following relationships: 
p.16) 
Here, age, children, co-residents, education, family non-labor income, economic 
development and stereotype on the role of spouses would be discussed. 
Firstly, age of any individual increases over time and the changes in effort and energy of 
family members over life time would affect the division of labor within the family. As a 
result of the changes in effort, the opportunity cost as well as the marginal utility of 
effort on market activity (em) is different over the life cycle. Then，the amount of energy 
per hour on market work (Cm) would also vary over time for each individual. 
Most likely, individuals could produce greater amount of energy on market work when 
they are at younger ages. The opportunity cost of using effort in housework (eh) would 
be higher for those younger. And, the opportunity cost of effort on market work (Sm) of 
these individuals would be relatively smaller than those who are elder. Then, according 
to Equation 2.14，the amount of energy per hour of those younger individual that can be 
given to market activity (Cm) would be greater. As a result, the wage rate (w) of younger 
individual would be higher too. So, younger family members would allocate more time 
to market work and less time to housework. 
Suppose that the age of elderly "A" increases, holding all other factors constant. Then, 
^ "m" represents market work, "h" represents household production. 
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smaller amount of energy and effort on market work could be produced by this family 
member. And the opportunity cost of effort on market work (8m) of this individual 
would increase. Moreover, the amount of energy per hour to market activity (em) and the 
wage rate (w) of elderly "A" would reduce at the same time. Thereby, the division of 
labor between family member "A" and "B" would deviate from the optimal condition of 
M l ^ . 
Equation 2.8 and the inequality becomes > . In order to restore the optimal 
condition of Equation 2.8, elderly "A" should spend more time on housework and less 
time on market work so that the marginal productivity of household time of elderly "A" 
would reduce. As a whole, family members would allocate relatively less time to market 
work and more time to housework with the increase in their age especially for those 
who are elderly. Therefore, elderly members would contribute less economically to their 
families 
After all, age of individuals is expected to affect the allocation of their time between 
market activity and housework. In fact, the finding of the existence of an inverted-U 
shaped age profile for the earning power of an individual dated back to 1970s. Stein and 
Hedges (1971)，by using the data from the USA Current Population Survey for the years 
from 1959 and 1969，find that the earnings are lower for the youngest men with age 
between 20 and 24. And, they discover that there is a substantial increase in earnings for 
the men in working age from 25 to 34 and a smaller increase for those with age from 35 
to 44. Moreover, the earnings for men with age between 45 and 54 remain stable over 
time empirically before a sharp decline in earnings occur after they reach the age 55 and 
above. 
Secondly, Education is an indicator of skill level and human capital. Different 
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individuals have different skills as well as human capital in different households. These 
skill level and human capital of individuals can generate earning power for the 
households. Mincer (1957, 1958 and 1962) develops the human capital theory which 
becomes the prominent economic theory of wage determination. In addition, education 
constitutes greatly to the modem human capital theory. Researchers find that in order to 
attract a human to give up earnings and have additional schooling, one must be 
compensated by sufficiently higher lifetime earnings. Also, the higher schooled human 
would have greater amount of human capital toward work and should be more 
productive in the labor market than the other lower schooled human so as to be able to 
compete for higher earnings. As a result, higher schooling implies greater human capital 
to earn more. 
With reference to Becker's theoretical models, the increase in educational level of 
family member "A" would push up his/her opportunity cost of using effort in 
housework (eh) and release his/her opportunity cost of using effort in market work (8m). 
Then, the amount of energy per hour to market activity (Cm) and the wage rate (w) of 
“A” would rise at the same time. Thereby, the division of labor between family member 
"A" and "B" would deviate from the optimal condition of Equation 2.8 and the 
inequality becomes ^ ^ ^ < . In order to restore the optimal condition of Equation 
2.8，family member "A" should spend less time on housework and more time on market 
work so that the marginal productivity of household time of family member “A，，rise. 
The higher the educational level those individuals have, the higher would be their 
economic contribution to their families. 
The positive relationship of education to labor supply and income is well documented 
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and subjected to empirical tests. Those earliest empirical tests dated back to 1960s. Two 
of them are Bowen and Finegan (1969) and Oppenheimer (1982). Bowen and Finegan 
(1969) and Oppenheimer (1982) empirically confirm that both husbands' and wives' 
educational levels are positively related to her participation in the labor force. And they 
also confirm that husbands' and wives' educational levels are also positively related to 
their occupational achievement. Furthermore, Stein and Hedges (1971) use sample from 
USA and discover that wives in blue-collar families have lower earnings than wives of 
white-collar workers in 1969. Stein and Hedges (1971) also find that the relative 
difference between the income of the youngest workers and those in the peak income 
group varies widely from one occupation to another. Besides, Cancian, Danziger and 
Gottschalk (1993) point out that the occupation of wife is an important factor to 
determine the relative economic contribution of wives to their families, because 
earnings in certain occupations are generally higher than in others. 
Thirdly, the relationship between economic development and the division of labor 
between husbands and wives are discussed with reference to Becker's theoretical 
models. The economic development in urban China is facilitated by her economic 
reform. Economic development improves people's lives in many different ways. During 
the economic development in China, more hi-tech appliances are developed. These 
appliances contribute greatly in replacing housework. Also，much more household 
commodities are marketed along with the economic development. Child-care is one of 
the examples. Child-care is traditionally considered as housework, but it can be 
obtained in the market easily in nurseries and kindergartens. According to Becker's 
theoretical models, the improvements in household technology throughout the economic 
development is expected to suppress the effort intensity of housework (ah) of wives and 
push up the effort intensity of market work (am) as well as the energy per hour on 
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market activity (Cm) of wives. Then, wage rate w(em) of wives would rise. As a result, 
the economic contribution of wives to their families is expected to rise along with the 
economic development. Moreover, the economic reform stimulates the economic 
development of the state-owned enterprises and the eastern coastal regions of China. 
Men，especially husbands, are encouraged to shift from self-sufficient home production 
to market production. The above discussion shows that the effort intensity of market 
work (am), the energy per hour on market activity (Cm) and the wage rate w(em) of 
husbands would rise. And the economic contribution of husbands to their families is 
also expected to rise along with the economic development. 
Many studies find that there is a "U-shape" relationship between the economic 
development and women's labor participation. Goldin (1995) argues that most of the 
jobs available for women are manual in nature and customs together with norms may 
prevent women from taking these jobs because their husbands will prefer them to stay at 
home at the beginning of the economic development. This provides an explanation for 
the decline in women's labor participation in the initial stage of economic development. 
When women received more education and more white-collar jobs are available, their 
labor participation will then increase in the later stage of economic development. In 
rural China, the contribution of women to household income rise with the level of 
development receives great support from both historical and contemporary studies. 
Studies in this area can be found in Johnson, Parish and Lin (1987), Benjamin and -
Brandt (1995) for the 1930s as well as Mathews and Nee (2000) for the 1980s. In 
particular, Benjamin and Brandt (1995) use the fraction of output marketed to proxy for 
the agricultural commercialization in rural China in 1935. They find that the fraction of 
output marketed, a variable used to proxy for the agricultural commercialization of the 
households, is positively related to the economic role of women to household in old 
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rural China. In other words, women are more' likely to work on the farm and contribute 
more to the households while men are more likely to work off the farm in agriculture 
and contribute less to the households in highly agricultural commercialized villages. 
The relationship between economic development and the economic contribution of 
husbands and wives to their families in urban China would be tested empirically in this 
thesis. 
Fourthly, the effect of children on the division of labor between husbands and wives can 
also be revealed by using Becker's theoretical models. The increase in the number of 
young children would enhance the housework burden as well as effort intensity of 
housework (gh) of wives. Then, the effort intensity of market work (cjm) of wives would 
be pushed down. According to Equation 2.14，the energy per hour on market activity (Cm) 
and the wage rate w(em) of wives would fall as a result. At the same time, the increase in 
the number of young children would enhance the financial burden of husbands. Then, 
the effort intensity of market work (am) of husbands would be enlarged. According to 
Equation 2.14, the energy per hour on market activity (em) and the wage rate w(em) of 
husbands would rise as a result. Moreover, the fall in the wage rate of wives (Ww) and 
the rise in the wage rate (wh) of husbands would lead to the deviation from the optimal 
Ww 
condition of Equation 2.8 and the inequality becomes � . In order to restore 
^ " h Wh 
the optimal condition of Equation 2.8, wives should spend more time on housework and 
less time on market work so that the marginal productivity of household time of wives 
would fall. On the other hand, husbands should spend less time on housework and more 
time on market work so that the marginal productivity of household time of wives 
would increase. As a whole, the economic contribution of wives to their families would 
fall and the economic contribution of husbands to their families would increase as a 
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result of the increase in the number of young children. 
Many scholars examine the relationship between children and the division of labor 
between husbands and wives empirically. Haygue (1973) finds that US young children 
especially those who are preschool age limit the labor force participation of mothers. 
Since then, many other economists also contribute much to this research area. Cain 
(1966), Waite (1980) and Sorensen (1983) claim that the labor force participation of 
women will be negatively related to the number of preschool-aged children. They find 
that after all children reach school age, wives would have more time to participate in the 
labor market. So, economic contributions of wives to households increase. Rexroat and 
Shehan (1987) conduct an analysis for 1618 husbands and wives in the United States of 
America. They find that the housework time of women increase dramatically when they 
become mothers and increase somewhat until their oldest child enters school. Also, the 
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hours for housework of women are relatively stable until the children leave home. On 
the other hand, the housework time of men increase modestly when they become fathers 
and then gradually decline over the life cycle. In addition, Presser and Baldsin (1980)， 
Waite (1980) and Moen and Moorehouse (1983) empirically find that the labor force 
participation of women significantly increases after children leave home. Moen and 
Moorehouse (1983) claim that the rising labor force participation of women after their 
children leave home is linked up with their need to support adolescents and young 
adults. However, other authors, including Presser and Baldsin (1980) as well as Waite 
(1980)，picture it as a natural outcome of the reduction in the time that is required for 
child care. 
The above discussion shows that the effect of children on the economic contribution of 
husbands to their families is different from the effect on those of their wives. In order to 
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allow for the effect of children on the family economic contribution of individual to be 
different for husbands and wives, special model specification would be made for 
analyzing the economic contribution of husbands and wives to their families in urban 
China* 
Fifthly, the effect of adult co-residents on the economic roles of husbands and wives to 
their families are discussed by applying Becker's theoretical models. Large families 
with many generations were usual in the earlier days of China. In this sense, families are 
constituted by many different members in old Chinese families. Co-residents such as 
children, parents, grandparents, grandchildren, other relatives and non-relatives 
including friends would live together with the couples. Moreover, it is reasonable to 
expect that these co-residents have earning power if they are adult. Then, the economic 
contributions of these co-resident adults to the households may influence the economic 
roles of husbands and wives to the families. 
Rosenbaum and Gilbertson (1995) conduct a study to examine whether living with other 
adults would enable married mothers in the New York City to enter the labor force. 
They find that the labor force of wives reduce significantly for those households in 
which there is great increase in the number of co-resident adults. These findings reveal 
that co-resident adults would impose domestic burdens to married mothers and 
suppresses the labor force participation of married mother. 
With reference to the empirical findings of Rosenbaum and Gilbertson (1995), this 
thesis expects that adult co-residents would increase the housework burden and the 
4 Interaction term in which children interact with husband dummy will be introduced in the model 
specification. Details would be discussed in Chapter 3. 
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financial support to the Chinese families. The increase in the number of adult 
co-residents would enlarge the housework burden as well as effort intensity of 
housework (an) of wives. At the same time，adult co-residents would give financial 
support to the families and release the financial burden of husbands. As a result, the 
effort intensity of market work (am) of both husbands and wives would fall. According 
to Equation 2.14，the energy per hour on market activity (em) and the wage rate w(eni) of 
both husbands and wives would than be pushed down. With regard to the relative high 
degree of concentration of husbands to market work, this thesis suspects that the 
reductions in the effort intensity of market work, energy per hour on market activity and 
wage rate that are caused by the increase in the number of adult co-residents would be 
greater for husbands than those of their wives. Then, inequality creates and it is 
^ p ^ . In order to restore the optimal condition of Equation 2.8, both husbands 
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and wives would spend less time on market work and more time on household work so 
that both of their marginal productivity of household time of would reduce. Meanwhile, 
the reduction in time on market work of husbands and the reduction in economic 
contribution of husbands to their families are expected to be greater than those of their 
wives. Due to the expectation on. the differential in the effect of co-resident adult on the 
family economic contributions of husbands and wives, special model specification 
would be taken，. 
It is widely accepted that the relationship between individual non-labor income and 
his/her work force can be both positive and negative. If the relationship between 
individual's non-labor income and his/her work force is negative, leisure is a normal 
5 Interaction term in which adult co-resident interacts with husband dummy will be introduced in the 
model specification. Details would be discussed in Chapter 3. 
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good; that is, as non-labor income increases, an individual is less likely to work. On the 
other hand, leisure is an inferior good if the relationship between individual's non-labor 
income and his/her work force is positive. Assuming that leisure is a normal good to 
both males and females in China, a rise in family non-labor income would induce 
husbands and wives to spend more time and effort on leisure activities. As a result of 
this income effect, this thesis expects that the increase in family non-labor income 
would pull down the effort intensity of market work (am), the energy per hour on market 
activity (Cm) and the wage rate w(em) of both husbands and wives. In order to restore the 
optimal condition, both husbands and wives would spend less time on market work so 
that both of their marginal productivity of household time of would reduce. Meanwhile, 
the magnitude of the reductions in time on market work, marginal productivity of 
household time and the family economic contribution of husbands and wives that are 
caused by the increase in family non-labor income would depend on the sizes of the 
wealth effect of husbands and wives. It is reasonable to suspect that the sizes of the 
wealth effect are different for husbands and wives. 
Benjamin and Brandt (1995) use the relationship between family non-labor income and 
the number of days supplied to agricultural activities as a proxy for the income effect of 
an individual. If the relationship between the family non-labor income and individual's 
work force is negative, leisure is a normal good; that is, as household income increases, 
an individual is less likely to work and contribute less to the household. On the other 
hand, leisure would be an inferior good, if the relationship between family non-labor 
income and individual's work force is positive. Benjamin and Brandt (1995) find that 
leisure appears to be a normal good to both males and females in old rural China. As 
family non-labor income as well as household income increases, both males and 
females are less likely to work either on or off the farm. In addition, the above negative 
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relationship between family non-labor income and individual's work force is greater for 
females than for males in old rural China. The negative relationship between the family 
non-labor income and the economic contribution of husbands and wives to their 
families in urban China would be tested empirically in this thesis. In addition, special 
model specification would be taken^ because of the expected differential in the effect of 
family non-labor income on the economic importance of husbands and wives to their 
families. 
Nevertheless, some of the differential between the economic importance of husbands 
and wives is affected by unexplained factors. One of the unexplained factors is the 
stereotype on the role of spouses within families. There is a strong tradition saying in 
China that "men look after the outside; women look after the inside", which means that 
men should take most or even full responsibility in earning for the families while 
women stay at home for housework. This stereotype on the role of spouses tends to 
cause the effort intensity of market work (am) as well as the energy per hour on market 
activity (em) and the wage rate w(em) of Chinese wives to be less than those of their 
husbands. Then, the time that wives spend on market work would be less than those of 
their husbands. Also, wives would contribute less to their families economically and 
contribute more to the housework. In this sense, the stereotype on the role of spouses in 
China would favor the economic importance of husbands to the families. On the other 
hand, this stereotype would weaken the economic importance of wives. The relationship 
between this stereotype and the economic contribution of urban Chinese husbands and 
wives would be explored in this thesis. 
6 Interaction term in which family non-labor income interacts with husband dummy will be introduced in 
the model specification. Details would be discussed in Chapter 3. 
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The above applications of Becker's theoretical models show that explainable factors 
such as age, education, number of children, number of co-residents, family non-labor 
income and economic development and unexplainable factor such as stereotype on the 
role of spouses would affect the relative economic contributions of husbands and wives 
and the division of labor between them. Meanwhile, the effect of additional child on the 
family economic contribution of husbands is expected to be opposite to the effect of 
additional child on the family economic contribution of wives. Besides, the magnitudes 
of the effects of co-residents and family non-labor income on the economic contribution 
of husbands are expected to be different from those of their wives. In addition, the 
unexplainable stereotype is also expected to have different impacts on the economic 
contribution of husbands and wives. 
2.4) Empirical Review on the Division of Labor between Husbands and Wives 
The importance of the labor income of wives to families was historically different from 
those of their husbands. In addition, the gender role of husband and wife in house work 
and market work is changing over time. To trace how it goes along, this thesis would 
review some of the empirical research in this section. 
Literature before 1990 
Before 1960s, there was not much finding upon the gender roles within family. The 
major study during the 1960s was conducted by Blood and Wolfe (1960)，who examine 
the division of labor, marital power, and marital quality among a random sample of 
married women who are living in Detroit. They observe that the division of labor in 
marriages continued to be traditional at that time. Men were expected to be the primary 
providers, while women took care of the house and children. Even when women were 
employed, they remained mainly responsible for child care and housekeeping. In 
2 4 
addition, much of the research did not have any explicit theoretical base before 1970. 
During the 1970s，gender became a more important social issue. A larger amount of 
research was conducted on gender roles in the family in that period of time. Most 
studies in this area had at least an implicit theoretical framework. There were a few 
studies that were based on exchange theory. And the others were based on the 
assumptions from role theory and resource theory of family power. Moreover, division 
of labor was the topic that received the most attention during the 1970s. 
Nye (1976) obtains data on behavior and attitudes in family roles for a sample of 210 
married couples in Washington. He finds that almost half of the men and women feel 
that the provider role should be shared by the wife, although it is considered to be 
primarily the man's responsibility. In addition, there are over half of both men and 
women say that housekeeping should be a shared responsibility, although it is viewed 
primarily as the woman's responsibility. Also, care of children is seen as somewhat 
more the wife's than the husband's responsibility. However, behavior is found to be less 
egalitarian than attitudes after all. Although there is two-thirds of the men said that they 
should share in household tasks, only one-half of these men actually help with the 
housework. 
- In addition, Berk and Berk (1979) find that the presence of young children affects the 
women much more than the men in American households. And wife's employment or 
the presence of children has little effect on the morning activities of the men. Wives 
typically carry most of the burden for housework and child care, even when they are 
employed full time. 
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‘ During 1980s, exchange theory was the most popular theory that was used to guide the 
research on gender roles between the family and the work force. Much more research 
was conducted in this period than before. Some of them were highlighted below. 
Lupri and Symons (1982) examine data from eleven western nations. They conclude 
that the change in division of labor in which men are doing more housework and child 
care and women work more outside the families have been found in a number of other 
subcultures and cultures. Thornton (1989) confirms that there is a significant trend 
toward more egalitarian gender role attitudes between 1960 and 1985 in America. In 
addition, Lehrer and Nerlove (1984) show that there is a less positive, or more negative, 
relationship between husband's economic status and wife's labor supply among whites. 
Geerken and Gove (1983) empirically trace that two significant differences between »  
dual-earner and single-earner families are that women in dual-earner families would 
spend significantly less time in housework and in leisure. Besides, Bird, Bird and 
Scruggs (1984) study division of labor among 166 couples. They point out that the 
higher the income and job status of the wife, the more likely is the husband to be 
involved in housekeeping and child care. Also, having an employed wife is associated 
with more sharing of child care. 
In addition, Bamett and Baruch (1987) find that predictor of the father's involvement in 
household work vary according to the mother's work status. In duel-earner families, the 
number of hours that the wife works per week is the strongest predictor of father's 
involvement in domestic work. Among the single-earner families, the father's attitude 
toward fathering is a consistent predictor of his involvement. 
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In short, family roles have become more egalitarian with more wives working outside 
the home and more husbands helping in domestic work from 1930 to 1990 in the 
western countries. However, behavioral changes have been much less than attitudinal 
changes. Women continue to do most domestic labor and fewer work forces. 
Literature after 1990 
The contribution to labor force and domestic force of husbands and wives are changing 
over time and the changes become more prominent after 1990. Besides, more 
researchers investigate this topic in different countries from different points of view 
after 1980s. 
Britain 
Machin and Waldfogel (1994) examine the changes in the contributions of husbands and 
wives to overall family income by using the General Household Survey data of United 
Kingdom from 1979 to 1990 and the British Household Panel Survey for the year 1991. 
They find that Britain suffers from great drop in the average share of married men's 
earnings in total family income from 75% in 1979 to 63% in 1991. This is followed by 
rises in the share of wives' earnings from 16% in 1979 to 21% in 1991. Machin and 
Waldfogel (1994) also find that the frequency of zero wives' shares reduces and the 
frequency of zero husbands' shares increases. 
By looking at the distribution of the share of husbands' and wives' earnings in different 
year, Machin and Waldfogel (1994) discover that there is a leftward shift of the 
distribution of British male shares in recent years. Not only there is an increase in the 
frequency of zero husbands' shares in Britain, but also the tendency for male as main 
earners of British families is declining over time. In contrast, the distribution for wives' 
earnings shifts rightward. This implies that both hours of work and the hourly earnings 
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increase for British wives from 1979 to 1991. Nevertheless, 'Machin and Waldfogel 
(1994) point out that the average share of husbands falls in all husband earnings deciles 
groups over time and the magnitude of the fall is the greatest in the lowest husband 
earnings deciles groups. 
Also, Machin, Waldfogel and Harkness (1997) claim and prove that the earnings of 
British women are in fact an important and growing component of family income. The 
female-male pay ratio increase from 63% in 1972 to 75% in 1989. In 1979, there are 
only 30% more two-eamer families than male breadwinner families in Britain. But in 
1989, there are three times more two-eamer families than male breadwinner families. 
This shows that there is prominent increase in the labor force participation of married 
women in Britain. 
Machin and Waldfogel conduct an excellent and throughout investigation of the relative 
earning of husbands and wives in Britain. However, it would be better if their statistical 
finding was supported by some social and political explanations. 
Germany, Netherlands and Sweden 
Gustasson and Bruyn-Hundt (1991) compare the labor market of three countries. These 
are Germany, Netherlands and Sweden. From their macro data analysis, the labor force 
participation rate of married women in Sweden and Holland has been rising enormously 
during the period from 1960 to 1989. The participation rate of Dutch women has 
doubled since 1960s. Moreover, Germany experiences a slight rise in the married 
women participation rate from 47% to 55% between 1960 and 1988. In addition, the 
participation rate of married women in Sweden is the highest among these three 
countries. On the other hand, the labor market participation rates of married men in 
2 8 
these three countries decline during the above period. Besides, Gustasson and 
Bruyn-Hundt (1991) find that Swedish women contribute a much larger proportion of 
family earnings than do women in the Netherlands and Germany. 
United States of America 
Cancian, Danziger and Gottschalk (1993) investigate the changes in the relative 
economic contributions of husbands and wives in the United States of America by 
studying the level and distribution of their family income between 1968 and 1988 with 
the help of the March Current Population Survey. They find that married women are 
more likely to work and are likely to earn more than twenty years ago. The real earnings 
of the typical couple increases by $8173 per year, of which about two-thirds is 
attributable to the increase in the earnings of wives. In fact, the typical wife of the USA 
increases her weeks worked by more than half and earns about one-third more per week 
during the above period. 
With reference to the paper of Cancian, Danziger and Gottschalk (1993), there has been 
a substantial increase in the percentage working of White and Black women in USA 
from 1968 to 1988 and the increase is especially huge among married women. Also, the 
participation of Hispanic women is increasing over time but at an amount lower than 
that of the Whites and Blacks. Besides, there is little change for the labor force 
participation rate of White married men in USA during the above period. Moreover, the 
labor force participation rate of Black married men is declining over time. 
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Italy ‘ 
Boca and Pasqua (2002) perform their research by using the Historical Archive of the 
Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). Boca and Pasqua find 
that the percentage of working husbands declines by 6% in Italy over the 22-year 
horizon. On the contrary, the percentage of working wives increases by nearly 20%. 
Besides, by looking at the mean earning of working wives classified by husbands' 
earning group, the earnings of wives in real terms increase more in the lowest and top 
groups of husband income distribution during the period of observation. They also find 
that the total income distribution would have been more unequal if there is no labor 
income from women. Therefore, the work of wives has an equalizing impact on income 
distribution for Italy from 1977 to 1998. 
China 
Benjamin and Brandt (1995) examine the economic contribution of women in the 
households of Northeast China in 1935. They point out that there is one common 
premise for the role of women in China. The economic contribution of Chinese women 
is limited and is constrained by the social customs and norms. Benjamin and Brandt 
(1995) evaluate this premise by using a household survey data that covers economic 
activity of northeast rural China in 1935. 
Benjamin and Brandt (1995) study the -gross household income, net household income 
and the household crop output. They also investigate the number of days supplied to 
agriculture activities, hired off the farm and participated in home production by men and 
women. They find that both prime age males and females would constitute the highest 
contribution to rural Chinese households in 1935 and the economic contributions of 
prime age females are even greater than that of males. This result generates great 
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contradiction to the premise that the economic contribution of Chinese women is “ 
limited by social customs and norms. Benjamin and Brandt (1995) conclude that, 
contrary to the most popular perceptions, the contribution of women may have been 
underestimated in rural Northeast China in the early twentieth century and they fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that the contribution of men and women are equal. Despite the 
detailed analysis done by Benjamin and Brandt (1995) and their great contribution to 
this research area, their focuses are limited to those men and women in rural China. 
More valuable implications may be conducted if the research is explored into urban 
China. In addition, Benjamin and Brandt (1995) conduct research only on those men 
and women who are not connected by marital relationship. 
The above discussion shows that the economic contribution of wives to their families is 
increasing over time in most of the western countries. Moreover, there is not much 
literature that addresses the changes in the relative economic importance of husbands 
and wives over time in China. This thesis would address the issue. 
2.5) Decomposition of the wage differential of men and women • 
Great attention has been paid to the chronic earnings gap between male and female for a 
long time. Cohen (1971) contents that there is high possibility that the great wage 
differential between male and female stems from the concentration of female in lower 
paying jobs. At the same time, Fuchs (1971) attributes this wage differential to the 
discrimination and social bias against females. Later, Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) 
claim that the discrimination against females exists in the labor market if the wage of 
males exceeds the wage of females whenever both parties have the same personal 
characteristics. They assert that if there is no discrimination, the wage structure that is 
faced by females would also apply to males. Or, the wage structure that is faced by 
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males would also apply to females if there is no discrimination. On the basis of either of 
these two assumptions, Blinder and Oaxaca are the pioneers to decompose the wage 
differential between men and women who are not connected by marital relationship into 
the effects of discrimination and the effects of differential in individual characteristics. 
Their decomposition provides estimation to the discrimination against female workers 
in a quantitative sense. 
The ordinary least squares estimation on the semi-log wage ftinctions of males and 
females are 
l n ( W J = Z ; p \ (2.17) 
and 
ln(W,) = z/p\ (2.18) 
respectively, where 
and Wf = the mean values of the hourly wage rate of males and females 
respectively, 
f 一 t 
Z^ and Zf = a vectors of mean values of the individual characteristics of males and 
females respectively, 
(3 m and (3 ^ = vectors of estimated coefficients. 
On the basis of the assumption that current female wage structure would also apply to 
males in a non-discriminating labor market, with reference to Blinder (1973) and 
Oaxaca (1973)，the male-female wage differential can be written as 
ln(Wm) - ln(Wf) = ( Z . ； ( 2 . 1 9 ) 
— ' — ' 〜 
(Zm - Z f ) P f represents the amount of male-female wage differential that can be 
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explained by the male-female differential in personal characteristics. Moreover, 
Z^ (Pm - p f ) represents the amount of male-female wage differential that are 
unexplainable. Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) contend the unexplainable wage 
differential to the effects of discrimination against female workers in the labor market. 
In addition, the male-female wage differential can be written as 
) — ln(Wf ) = ( z J - z / ) | 3 \ + z / ( ( 3 \ - p % ) (2.20) 
on the basis of the assumption that the current male wage structure would apply to 
一 f _ ‘ ^ 
females in a non-discriminating labor market. (Z^ - Zj.) p ^  represents the amount of 
male-female wage differential that can be explained by the male-female differential in 
personal characteristics. Zf (P „ 一 P f ) represents the amount of male-female wage 
differential that is caused by discrimination against females. 
Oaxaca (1973) empirically finds by using the Survey of Economic Opportunity that 
discrimination against females in the labor market account for approximately 77.7 
percent of the wage differential for whites and 93.6 percent for blacks in USA in 1967. 
Blinder-Oaxaca's decomposition steps up the future analysis of male-female wage 
differential. However, some "researchers hesitate over the conclusion that the 
unexplainable part of male-female wage differential is solely caused by the 
discrimination against females in the labor market. 
2.6) Summary 
The theory of allocation of time that is developed by Becker implies that the economic 
contributions of husbands and wives to their families and the division of labor between 
them would be affected by age, education, number of children, number of co-residents, 
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family non-labor income, economic development and the stereotype on the role of 
spouses. In particular, we note that the effect of children, co-resident, family non-labor 
income and stereotype on the economic contribution of husbands is theoretically 
different from those of their wives. Therefore, the changes in their relative economic 
importance may stem from these four aspects. 
The exploration of the earnings of husbands and wives and the division of labor 
between them has long been the empirical issue. In the earlier days, researchers explore 
this topic by analyzing the hours of market work and household work. Some of them 
also use income levels as well as output levels as the focus for analyzing the relative 
economic contribution of husbands and wives to their families. Much of the empirical 
research finds that wives of many western countries such as Britain, Germany, 
Netherlands, Sweden, United States of America and Italy are earning more and more for 
their families. These show that the relative importance of western wives as the financial 
supporters of their families is increasing over times. 
This thesis is going to examine the case in urban China. In addition, the share of 
husbands and wives labor earnings to total family income would be used as proxy for 
their economic contributions to their families. Details of the methodology would be 




In this chapter, methodology would be introduced to give all-round analysis on the 
changes in relative importance of husbands and wives as the financial supporters of 
their families in urban China over the urban reform period. In addition, the reasons for 
the changes would also be examined. Before introducing the methodology, it is notable 
that the empirical analyses in this thesis would be done on those families in which there 
are both husband and wife no matter whether they work or not, except specified. In this 
sense, single parent families and widows are excluded from the analyses. In addition, 
those households in which any one spouse is self-employed are also excluded since the 
earning structures of the self-employers are different from that of those wage earners ^  
The methodology of finding out whether urban Chinese husbands or wives earned more 
for their families over the years and the changes in their relative financial importance 
would be introduced first. Thereafter, methodology of examining the reasons for the 
changes would be presented, 
3.1) Changes in the Relative Economic Contribution of Husbands and Wives to 
Their Families 
To trace the pattern of the relative economic contribution of urban Chinese husbands 
and wives to their families in urban China during the urban reform period, simple data 
analyses and regression analyses will be carried out. 
1 Detailed descriptions on the data set and the selected sample would be given in the next chapter, 
Chapter 4. 
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3.1.1) Simple data analysis 
Machin and Waldfogel (1994) suggest that the share of the labor income of an 
individual in total family income is a simple index that can help figure out the economic 
contributions of individuals to their families relative to other family members. This 
thesis would use this index for the simple data analysis and it is calculated as follows: 
Share of individual's labor income in total family income 
=Annual labor earnings of an individual/ Total annual family income (3.1) 
If this index is zero, this implies that the individual does not contribute to the family 
economically. The higher is the value of this index, the higher is the economic 
contribution of the individual to his/her family. Besides, individual is expected to 
contribute increasingly more to his/her family if the value of this index for this 
individual is increasing over time. Moreover, this index is a starting point to explore the 
relative economic contribution of husbands and wives to their families. To deepen our 
understanding on the income structure of Chinese families, there are several different 
ways of exploring this index. 
As in Harkness, Machin, and Waldfoget (1997), the distributions of the shares of labor 
earnings of husbands and wives total family income over the years would be analyze in 
this thesis. More details on the changes in family income structure would be obtained by 
exploring the evolution of the fractions on the shares of labor earnings. 
Harkness, Machin, and Waldfoget (1997) analyze the shares of labor earnings of 
husbands and wives by male earning deciles groups. Similarly, this thesis would analyze 
the shares of labor earning of husbands and wives by family income deciles groups. All 
families in the sample would be divided into ten deciles groups according to the total 
family income level. Decile group 1 is constituted by lowest 10 percent family income 
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group and decile group 10 is constituted by the highest 10 percent family income group. 
In this way, the changes in relative economic contribution of husbands and wives in 
high and low family income groups can be revealed. 
Besides, this thesis would also analyze the average share of labor earnings of husbands 
and wives by life cycle stages. Following Lehrer and Nerlove (1984), life cycle of 
individuals are divided into three stages in this thesis. The first life cycle stage is 
defined as the time when the individual is in the interval between marriage and first 
birth of child. The second life cycle stage is defined as the time when the individual is in 
a period of parenting. That is, there is (are) preschool-aged child (children) in his/her 
family. The third life cycle stage is the time when the individual is in a situation when 
all his/her children have reached school age. 
f. 
The simple data analyses would take a first look at how the roles of husbands and wives 
as breadwinners to their families change over time in urban Chinese society and the 
results are presented in Chapter 5.1. Nevertheless, regression models would be 
suggested in the next section to ensure the creditability and accuracy of the results. 
3.1.2) Pooled regressions of the family economic contribution over husbands and 
wives with husband dummy 
In this section, the proxy for the economic contribution of individuals to their families is 
modified as the percentage share of labor earnings of the individual in total family 
income ( C ) and it is calculated as 
_ Individual ’ s labor earnings 
^ 一 ‘ “ ~ X 1UU • (^ ) 
Total family income 
The only different between the above index and the index that is used by Machin and 
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Waldfogel (1994) is that we multiplies the index of Machin and Waldfogel (1994) by 
100 times and turns it into a percentage. The reason is that percentage is more 
convenient for interpretation. If the percentage share is higher, the importance of the 
individual as a financial supporter would be greater. In order to find out how the 
economic contribution differential between husbands and wives changes over time in 
urban China, this thesis suggests to perform a empirical research on pooled OLS model 
of the percentage share of labor earnings in total family income over husbands and 
wives with "Husband Dummy". The econometric model is constructed as follows: 
Ct = P ot + P It Husband Dummy + [ p 丨�Control Variablej, +s ^ (3.3) 
This is the basic model of this thesis. Symbol Q represents the dependent variable 
which is the percentage shares of the labor earnings of individuals in total family 
income, "t" is a time indicator. The symbol P � t represents the intercept term, "e" is an 
i.i.d. disturbance term. The variable "Husband Dummy" is the main variable in this 
model. This is a dummy variable in which value equal to one for those individuals who 
are husbands. Moreover, the value of the dummy variable equals to zero for those 
individuals who are wives. The coefficient "pi" that is associated with the variable 
"husband dummy" shows us how much more or less are contributed by husbands to the 
families economically relatively to those of their wives on average. In that sense, 
“Pit，，can tell the relative economic importance of husbands and wives in the urban 
Chinese families. Besides, all the control variables that will be used in the above 
econometric models will be constructed with reference to those that were used by other 
researchers. The definitions of the control variables will be explained in the later section 
of this chapter, section 3.5. 
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In addition, the importance of husbands and wives as financial -supporters of the 
families may be different in different regions of China. In order to allow the economic 
contribution differential between husbands and wives to vary in different regions， 
"Regional Dummies" and interaction terms in which "Regional Dummies" interact with 
the "Husband Dummy" would be added to the model. The "Regional Dummies" would 
be created for 5 different regions in urban China. They are Beijing, Liaoningj Zhejiang, 
Sichuan and Shaanxi . 
The empirical results of the pooled regressions that are suggested in this section would 
be presented in Chapter 5.2. 
3.2) Stable and Unstable Mating 
After suggesting the methodology of finding out the changes in the relative economic 
importance of husbands and wives as financial supporters to their families in urban 
China, this thesis would like to trace the reasons for the changes. With reference to the 
discussion in Chapter 2, this thesis suspects that the changes in the relative economic 
importance of husbands and wives to their families and the division of labor between 
them are affected by children, co-residents, family non-labor income and stereotype on 
the role of spouses. On top of it, we note that the reason of the changes would have a 
little bit difference under stable mating and unstable mating. 
Marriages that were arranged by parents and match-makers, or even ratified and 
assigned by organizations were prominent in China in the old days. As a result, the 
mating function between men and women in Chinese marriage market is more or less 
2 Guangdong is omitted as reference group. 
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stable. However, freedom of love and marriage is popular in modem Chinese society. 
Then, the mating function may not be stable in China nowadays. The changes in the 
mating function of men and women would lead to changes in their comparative 
advantage with respect to market work and housework. As a result, the division of labor 
of husbands and wives between market work and housework and the relative economic 
role of husbands and wives would be affected. Therefore, the fluctuation in mating 
function is another possible factor for the changes in the responsibility of husbands and 
wives as breadwinners to their families. 
Because of the effect of the changes in mating function on the comparative advantage of 
husbands and wives, the story for the reasons of the changes in relative economic 
importance of husbands and wives would be more complicated under unstable mating. 
Under unstable mating, both fluctuations in mating function and the changes in aspects 
such as children, co-resident, family non-labor income and stereotype on the role of 
Spouses would be the possible causes for the changes in relative financial importance of 
husbands and wives. However, only the latter one would be in effect under stable 
mating. 
In this sense, it is necessary to find out whether the mating function of men and women 
is stable or not in Chinese marriage market during the urban reform period. After 
finding out the stability of mating criteria in Chinese marriage market, the analyses on 
the reasons for the changes in relative economic roles of husbands and wives would be 
facilitated. 
In this thesis, the stability of mating in China would be explored by using the canonical 
correlation analysis with reference to Hotelling (1935). Hotelling (1935) develops the 
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logic for conventional canoni-cal correlation analysis. Canonical correlation analysis is 
employed to study relationships between two variable sets when each variable set 
consists of at least two variables. The canonical model selects linear functions that 
maximize the correlations between these two sets of variables. Meanwhile, canonical 
variates are calculated as the linear combinations that represent the weighted sum of the 
sets of variables. In addition，there are weights, so-called coefficients, which are 
generated so that the correlations between the two variable sets are maximized. In 
addition, it is notable that the further one deviates from the optimal weights, the lower 
the correlation between the two sets of variables become. 
For example, given the following two sets of variables: 
A=(ai，a2, a3，...,aK) (3.4) 
B = (bi，b2,b3，".,bL) (3.5) 
The objective of canonical correlation analysis is to find out linear combinations of A 
and B so that the correlation between the linear combinations is as high as possible. 
That is, letting the linear combinations of the set of variables A and B be as follows: 
K = P i i a , + P i 2 a 2 + • … … ( 3 . 6 ) 
Bi =厂+^12^2+…•…+ (3.7) 
The first canonical correlation is the maximum correlation between the above two linear 
combinations. The second canonical correlation coefficient is then derived so that it 
exhibits the maximum relationship between the two sets of variables that is not 
accounted for by the first pair of linear combinations. Therefore, the second canonical 
correlation coefficient is defined as the correlation between 





The correlation is maximized subject to the constraints that A, and A2 along with 
A A A A A A 
Bi and Bj are orthogonal. Moreover, A! and B: along with A2 and B, are 
also orthogonal. The third canonical correlation, and so on, is defined similarly. So, 
successive pairs of canonical variates are based on residual variance. Each of the pairs 
of variates is orthogonal and independent of all other variates that are derived from the 
same set of data. The number of canonical correlations that can be derived equals to the 
minimum of K and L. 
Following Hotelling (1935), this thesis decides to use the canonical correlation analysis 
to find out the evolution of the mating function of men and women in urban China over 
the urban reform period. Age, education and the real labor income^ are used as proxies 
for the mating criteria. In addition, both 2x2 and 3x3 canonical correlation analysis will 
be done for comparison and the two sets of variables defined as 
Husband = (Husband's age, Husband's education) (3.10) 
Wife = (Wife's age, Wife's education) (3.11) 
and 
Husband = (Husband's age, Husband's education, Husband's real labor income)(3.12) 
Wife = (Wife's age, Wife's educational, Wife's real labor income). (3.13) 
respectively. -
In short, we concern the canonical correlations of the mating function of husbands and 
wives. If the canonical correlations are similar over time, this implies that there are no 
3 Detailed definitions of variables will be clarified in later sections of this chapter and summarized in 
Table 3.1. 
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big changes in the matching and mating criteria in Chinese marriage market. Otherwise, 
the marriage market in urban China is expected to experience changes. The empirical 
results of the canonical correlation analyses will be presented in Chapter 6. 
3.3) Reasons for the Changes in Economic Contribution of Husbands and Wives 
After suggesting the methodology of finding out the changes in the relative.economic 
contribution of husbands and wives to their families and nature of mating in the last two 
sections, the objective of this section is to suggest a model to look at the reasons for the 
changes in relative economic contributions of husbands and wives to their families in 
urban China. 
I 
According to the application of Becker's theoretical models to different variables in 
Chapter 2.3, we think that the effect of variables like children, co-residents, family 
non-labor income and the stereotype on the role of spouses on the economic 
contributions would, to a large extent, be different for husbands and wives. With 
reference to the previous discussions, children as well as the stereotype on the role of 
spouses are expected to have opposite impact on the economic contributions of 
husbands and wives to their, families. Besides, the magnitude of the effect of 
co-residents on the economic contributions of husbands and wives are expected to be 
different. In addition, family non-labor income would also have different degree of 
impact on the economic contribution of husbands and wives. Therefore, we expect that 
reasons for the changes in the relative economic role of husbands and wives to their 
families would greatly relate to these four aspects. Although some may argue that other 
variables may also have different impact on the economic contribution of husbands and 
wives and affect their relative economic importance, for simplicity, this thesis is going 
to consider children, co-resident, family non-labor income and stereotype only. 
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In order to trace the reasons for the changes in relative economic importance of 
husbands and wives, the pooled regression is modified as follows: 
Ct = 0 ot +0 1,Husband Dummy +10 Control VariablCj 
+10 j, Control Variable�* Husband Dummy (3.14) 
Symbol Ct represents the percentage share of labor earnings in total family income 
which is used as proxy for the economic contribution of husband and wives to their 
families, “t，，is a time indicator. The symbol 0 ot and 8t represents the intercept term 
and the i.i.d. disturbance term respectively, "i" is the number of control variables that 
are added to the model. The details of the definitions of the control variables will be 
discussed in section 3.5. 
Furthermore, interaction terms are the focus of this model, "j" is the number of control 
variables that will be interacted with husband dummy. It is a part of the full set of 
control variables. Control variables such as children, co-residents and family non-labor 
income would multiply husband dummy so as to form interaction terms where the 
husband dummy equals one for those individuals who are husbands and equals zero for 
those individuals who are wives*. The coefficients on interaction terms would tell the 
differential in the effect of variables on the percentage shares of husbands and wives. 
With reference to the discussion in Chapter 2.3，the economic contribution of wives to 
their families would fall and the economic contribution of husbands to their families 
would increase as a result of the increase in the number of young children. Therefore, 
4 Since "stereotype on the role of spouses" is unexplainable factor which cannot be measured directly, the 
effect of stereotype on the economic contribution of husbands and wives to the families will be examined 
by Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. Detailed discussions will be given in the next section. 
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we expect that the coefficient on the number of young children is negative. On the other 
hand, the coefficient on the interaction term of young children is expected to be positive. 
We should note that the coefficients on the interaction terms of young children would 
tell the differential in the effect of young children on the percentage shares of labor 
earning of husbands and wives to total family income. In short, the effect of children on 
the economic contribution of husbands would be opposite to the effect of children on 
the economic contribution of wives. Any variations in these relationships would 
constitute a differential effect on husbands and wives. 
Besides, we expect that the reduction in the economic contributions of husbands to their 
families is greater than those of their wives for additional co-resident. So, the coefficient 
on co-resident and the coefficient on the interaction term of co-resident are both 
expected to be negative. 
Also, assuming that leisure is a normal good to both males and females in China, the 
rise of non-labor income would cause both husbands and wives to spend less time on 
market work theoretically. Therefore, we expect that the coefficient on non-labor 
income is negative. Since the sizes of the wealth effect are different for husbands and 
wives, the coefficients on the interaction terms of non-labor income are expected to 
show the differential in the effect of non-labor income on the percentage shares of labor 
earning of husbands and wives. Any change in their wealth effect would constitute a 
differential effect on the economic importance of husbands and wives to their families. 
By comparing and contrasting the coefficients on interaction terms over the years, we 
expect that the reasons for changes in the relative economic importance of husbands and 
wives as the financial supporters to their families in urban China can be traced. The 
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empirical results are presented in Chapter 7.1. 
3.4) Decomposition of the Economic Contribution Differential 
A strong social norm in old Chinese society is that husbands should be the breadwinners 
and wives should be the homemakers. This culture tends to cause wives to contribute 
‘ less to their families economically and contribute more to the domestic force. On the 
other hand, husbands would contribute more to their families economically and less to 
the domestic force. As a result, stereotype on the role of spouses within a family is 
gradually constituted. This culture largely affects the division of labor of husbands and 
wives and the economic contribution differential between them. Moreover, any change 
in stereotype would change the economic contribution differential between husband and 
wives and their relative importance as financial supporters to the families. 
This thesis is going to trace the effect of stereotype on the economic contribution 
differential between husbands and wives by using Blinder-Oaxaca's decomposition. 
Although those males and females who are concerned by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca 
(1973) are not connected by marital relationship, this thesis would decompose 
husband-wife economic contribution differential by taking Blinder-Oaxaca's (1973) 
decomposition as reference. Similar to the decomposition of male-female wage 
differential, the husband-wife economic contribution differential in China can be 
decomposed into explainable and unexplainable differential. The explainable 
differential is the effects of differences in individual characteristics between husbands 
and wives. And the unexplainable differential can be traced to the effect of social culture, 
norms and stereotype on the role of spouses within families in China. 
By replacing the natural log of the mean values of hourly wage rate ( InW)as the 
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proxy of economic contribution (C) in all of the equations that are derived by Blinder 
(1973) and Oaxaca (1973), the decomposition of husband-wife economic contribution 
differential can be done. On the basis of the assumption that the current economic 
contribution structure of wives would also apply to husbands in a society where 
stereotype does not exist, the husband-wife economic contribution differential can be 
written as 
C „ - C ^ = (Zh' 一之 W' ) + 之 H' ( P ^ - P w ) . (3.15) 
where 
Ch and C^ = the mean values of the economic contribution of husbands and wives 
respectively, 
. — r — f 
Zh and Z^ = a vectors of the mean values of control variables for an individual 
P H and p ^ = vectors of estimated coefficients. 
__ t — f ^ 
(Zh - Zw ) P w represents the amount of differential that can be explained by the 
— ' A 
husband-wife differential in personal characteristics. Moreover, Zh (P h 一 P w) 
represents the amount of differential that are unexplainable. To a certain extent, the 
differential of this part is caused by the stereotype on the role of spouses within families. 
In addition, the husband-wife economic contribution differential can also be written as 
C H - C ^ = ( Z h ' 之 W' ( K - K ) - (3.16) 
on the basis of the assumption that the current economic contribution structure of 
husband would apply to wives in a society where stereotype does not exist. 
— ' _ ‘ « 
(Zh - Zw ) P h represents the amount of differential that can be explained by the 
differential in personal characteristics. Z^ (P h ~P w) represents the amount of 
economic contribution differential that is caused by the stereotype on the role of spouses 
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within families. 
Following the decomposition that is suggested above, we can find out the unexplainable 
part of husband-wife economic contribution differential and the evolution of the effect 
of stereotype on the husband-wife economic contribution differential. Empirical results 
will be reported in Chapter 7.2. . 
3.5) Definitions of Control Variables 
Lastly, this section would introduce all the variables that are used as control variables in 
this thesis. All the control variables are set up with reference to the literature. In addition, 
detailed summaries of the definitions of variables are given in Table 3.1. 
The age of individual and the age of his/her spouse are both included as the control 
variables of this thesis. Following Stein and Hedges (1971), we divide all the husbands 
and wives into six age groups. These are age above 10 and below 20 (11-20 years old), 
age above 20 and below 30 (21-30 years old), age above 30 and below 41 (31-40 years 
old), age above 40 and below 51(41-50 years old), age above 50 and below 61(51-60 
years old), and age above 60. In this thesis, the groups of age below 31 for both husband 
and wife would be omitted from the regressions as reference group. Moreover, age 
groups would be used as control variables for all the analyses in this thesis except the 
canonical correlation analyses. In canonical correlation analyses, actual age is used as 
one of the variables to find out the canonical correlation as well as the mating. Since an 
inverted-U shaped age profile for the earning power of an individual is confirmed by the 
literature, we also expect that the inverted-U shaped age profile for the economic 
contribution of individuals to their families also exists in urban China. 
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According to the discussion in Chapter 2，it is expected that the economic contribution 
of husbands and wives to the families are, to a certain extent, related to the number of 
children that they have. So, further analysis would be done on the relationship between 
the amount of children and the economic contributions of husbands and wives in urban 
China. Following Cain (1966), Waite (1980), Presser and Baldsin (1980), Waite (1980)， 
Sorensen (1983) and Moen and Moorehouse (1983), we classify the number of children 
into the number of preschools children, school-age children, adolescent children and 
adult children. All of them are included as control variables in this thesis. With reference 
to the contemporary educational system in urban China, we define preschools children 
as those children with age 5 or below since children normally start to go to school at the 
age of 6. School-age children are children with age above 5 and below 13 (6-12). 
Children with age between 13 and 17 are classified as adolescent children. Lastly, 
children with age 18 and above are defined as adult children. 
f 
In old China, families were usually composed of three or more generations. So, 
co-residents were very popular in China at that time. Like Rosenbaum and Gilbertson 
(1995), we include the number of co-resident adults as control variable so as to find out 
how other adults who live together with the couples affect the relative economic roles of 
husbands and wives to their families. Following Rosenbaum and Gilbertson (1995), we 
define co-residents as those people who are living together with the couples including, 
parents, grandchildren, relatives and friends. It is notable that children are excluded 
from the definition of co-residents in this thesis so as to avoid overlapping. In addition, 
adult is defined as those people with age 18 or above. Besides, we would deepen the 
analysis by looking into the effect of co-resident male adults and co-resident female 
adults on the economic contributions of husbands and wives. 
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Since skill level and human capital can generate earning power for the families and 
affect the economic contributions of individuals to the families, the education of 
individuals and spouse are among of the set of control variables in the analysis of this 
thesis. Moreover, there are different ways in defining education. 
One of the ways is to define the education by discrete educational level. In this thesis, 
discrete educational levels are classified by the kinds of education in China including 
primary school level, junior high school level, senior high school level, technical school 
level and level of college and above. These are dummy variable that equal one if an 
individual studied the respective kinds of education as the highest education, zero 
otherwise. Moreover, below primary school level is omitted as reference group in the 
regression analysis. 
Another way to define the education is by the years of schooling and the square of the 
years of schooling. The length of schooling is to be inferred from the kinds of education. 
However, there were changes in the educational system of China in the past^. Therefore, 
with reference to the changes, this thesis suggests two different measurements in 
estimating the years of schooling of an individual. 
The first measurement method for the years of schooling are 6 years for person who 
studied primary school level and below, 9 years for persons who studied junior high 
school, 12 years for persons who studied technical school or senior high school, 14 
years for persons who studied college and 16 years for persons who studied university 
or above. This thesis assumes that the years of schooling of those people with 
5 The development of educational system in China in the past few decades is discussed in Appendix 3.1. 
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educational levels that are below primary school are 6. 
The second measurement method for years of schooling are 5 years for persons who 
studied primary school and below, 8 years for persons who studied junior high school, 
10 years for persons who studied technical school or senior high school, 12 years for 
persons who studied college and 14 years for persons who studied university or above. 
The years of schooling of those people with educational levels that are below primary 
school are assumed to be 5 in this thesis. 
In order to compare and contrast the empirical results, most of the data analysis in this 
thesis would be performed by using different ways in measuring education including the 
discrete educational levels and the years of schooling. Moreover, only years of 
schooling would be used as one of the variables to find out the canonical correlation. 
Following Benjamin and Brandt (1995)，this thesis is going to assume that family 
non-labor income is exogenous and the real family non-labor income which is adjusted 
by the regional general consumer price index is used as a proxy to find out the income 
effect of individuals. More details about the regional general consumer price index are 
in Chapter 4. With reference to the discussion in Chapter 2, we expect that the 
relationship between real family non-labor income and the work force of individuals is 
negative for both urban Chinese husbands and wives. As the real family non-labor 
income as well as household income increases, husbands or wives are expected to be 
less likely to work in the market and contribute less to the household economically. 
Furthermore, the changes in significance and magnitude of real income effect for 
husbands and wives over time is expected, to a certain extent, contributing to the 
changes in economic importance of husbands and wives to their families. 
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Besides, the relationship between the economic importance of individuals to their 
families and the economic development in the urban reform period of China over the 
years is one of the concerns of this thesis. This thesis is going to use real regional GDP 
per capita and the square of it as proxy for the regional economic developments in 
urban China. And these two variables are to be included as control variables in the 
empirical analyses. 
3.6) Summary 
As a whole, the flow of empirical analyses in this thesis is summarized in Flow Chart 
3.1. From Flow Chart 3.1，the changes in the relative economic importance of urban 
Chinese husbands and wives to their families over the urban reform period are going to 
be discussed first by studying the shares of the labor earnings of husbands and wives in 
total family income through simple data analyses and regression analyses with husband 
dummy. Results would be reported and discussed in Chapter 5. Thereafter，this thesis 
would identify whether the mating function in urban Chinese marriage market is stable 
or not over the years in Chapter 6 by performing canonical correlation analyses on 
selected characteristics of men and women. This is a prerequisite for finding out the 
reasons for the changes in relative economic importance of urban Chinese husbands and 
wives. After understanding the stability of the mating function, this thesis will examine 
the reasons for the changes in relative economic importance of husbands and wives to 
their families in Chapter 7. Meanwhile, we will study the regression analysis in which 
control variables such as children, co-resident and family non-labor income will interact 
with husband dummy. Thereafter, the decomposition of husband-wife economic 
contribution differential will be conducted with reference to Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca 
(1973). Next chapter, Chapter 4，will briefly introduce the dataset that are going to be 
used for empirical analysis in this thesis. 
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Chapter 4 
Data and Sample Description 
4.1) Data and Sample Extraction 
The data that will be used in the forthcoming research is the data from the Urban 
Household Survey of China from 1988 to 1999. This household survey is conducted by 
the Urban Socio-Economic Survey Organization of the State Statistical Bureau of China 
through collecting data from non-agricultural households in different provinces of China. 
Besides, this data set is a repeated cross-sectional data set. There are around 
thirteen-thousand households taking part in the survey in each year and the set of 
households that take part in the survey is possible to be different for different years. 
It is notable that not all of the families that are contained in the data set would be 
analyzed. This thesis is going to figure out and analyze the economic roles as well as the 
pattern of the relative economic contribution of husbands and wives within those 
families that are of interest. 
Firstly, the data analysis in this thesis would be focused on six regions only although the 
Urban Household Survey collected data from different provinces of China. These six 
regions are Beijing, Liaoning, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Sichuan and Shaanxi. With 
reference to Map 6.1，Beijing situates at the northern part of North China. There is 
Yongding River in the southeast of Beijing. And she is also surrounded by the Yanshan 
Mountains on the west, north and east. Liaoning situates in the southern part of China's 
Northeast. The Yellow Sea and the Bohai Sea is in the south of Liaoning. Zhejiang 
locates at the southeast of China. Guangdong situates in the southern part of China with 
Guangzhou as her provincial capital. Sichuan locates at the southwest part of China 
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with Chengdu as her provincial capital. Shaanxi situates on the northwest China with 
Xi'an as her provincial capital. Shaanxi covers a part of the middle reaches of the 
Yellow River. From the above descriptions, the six regions that will be concerned in this 
paper are, to a certain extent, good proxy for the whole urban China since these six 
regions cover considerable part of urban China from each direction. 
Besides, this thesis would extract those families in which there are both husband and 
wife no matter whether they work or not for empirical analysis. So, families such as 
single-parent families and widow families are excluded. On top of this, those families in 
which any one spouse is self-employed are excluded in the analysis. The main reason is 
that the earning pattern of those self-employed is different from those of wage earners. 
Klinjn 乙, 
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Source: Wcb-sitc of China PeopleDaily 
Map 4.1: Map of China 
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4.2) Variable Characteristics 
Detail summaries of the definitions of variables are given in Table 3.1. In addition, the 
means and standard deviations of variables from 1988 to 1999 are summarized in Table 
4.1. With reference to Table 4.1, it is notable that husbands are generally older than their 
spouses on average over the period concerned. In other words, wives are generally 
younger that their spouses on average over time. Besides, the educational level of 
husbands are generally higher that that of their wives from 1988 to 1999. Also, it is 
notable that the household characteristics of individuals and their spouse should be the 
same since they are bound by marital relationship and are living together. Furthermore, 
the specialties of some of the variables are highlighted below. 
Firstly, all kinds of income in the data set are expressed in annual term. The income of 
individuals can be divided into two kinds. They are labor income and non-labor income. 
According to the Urban Household Survey of China, labor earnings are divided into 
‘several types in the data set. They are wages in state-owned or collectively-owned units, 
salary of private-owned employees, income of retirees re-employed, income from 
employment in other business and income from other work. All of them are included as 
components of labor earnings for the empirical analysis in this thesis. Non-labor 
income is classified into two types in the Urban Household Survey of China. They are 
property income and income from transfers. Property income includes interest income, 
dividend income and other property income. Income from transfers consists of 
retirement income, price subsidies, subsidies to surveyed households and income from 
supporters, gifts, boarders, selling property and other transfers. The empirical analysis 
in this thesis will consider all of the above mentioned property income and income from 
transfers as non-labor income. 
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The real labor earnings and real non-labor income will also be considered for some 
cases. They are found by deflating the labor earnings and non-labor income by regional 
general consumer price index respectively. The regional general consumer price indices 
from 1988 to 1999 are summarized in Table 4.2. All the regional general consumer price 
indices would be adjusted before deflating earnings and non-labor income so that the 
indices are measured with base year 1988. Then, 1988 would be the base year of real 
labor earnings and non-labor income in the empirical analysis. 
Secondly, the regional real GDP per capita that is used for data analysis in this thesis is 
obtained by deflating the regional nominal GDP per capita with the regional general 
consumer price index. And the year 1988 would be the base year of the regional real 
GDP per capita in the empirical analysis of this thesis which is the same as the base year 
of the regional general consumer price index. The regional nominal GDP per capita 
from 1988 to 1999 is summarized in Table 4.3. With reference to Table 4.3, it is notable 
that the nominal GDP per capita is increasing over time from 1988 to 1999 in every 
regional concerned. Particularly, Beijing had the greatest nominal GDP per capita over 
the period concerned among the six regions. 
Besides, according to questionnaire of Urban Household Survey of China, there is no 
clear indication on whether individuals who have no job are finding job or not. However, 
those individuals who are finding job should also be included as a part of labor force 
participation by definition. Due to this limitation of the data set, this paper assumes that 
only those with positive annual labor earning are in labor force, otherwise do not. 
Although this assumption may cause discrepancy, there is little effect to the analysis in 
this thesis. 
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According to the Urban Household Survey of China, education is divided into 6 major 
levels which are below primary school level, primary school level, junior high school 
level, senior high school level, technical school level and level of college and above. 
However, there is no indication in the dataset that whether individuals completed the 
stated educational level or not. So, if the dataset shows that an individual has primary 
school level, there is a possibility that the individual only studied primary school instead 
of completed primary school education. This is another limitation of the dataset. Due to 
the lack of clear indication in the data set, this thesis assumes that individuals have 
completed the level of education when their lengths of schooling are inferring from the 
kinds of education. However, this may cause certain degree of discrepancy. 
As a whole, the suitability of the Urban Household Survey of China for analyzing the 
economic importance of husbands and wives to their families cannot be denied since it 
provides detailed information on income, demographic characteristics, accommodation 
and other family related matters, despite the fact that there are some limitations and 
defects in the dataset. 
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Chapter 5 
A First Look at the Changes in Relative Economic Contribution of 
Husbands and Wives 
This chapter is going to take a first look at the share of labor income of husbands and 
wives in total family income with the help of the simple data analyses and regression 
analyses. In this chapter，we aim at identifying the changes in the relative economic 
contribution of husbands and wives to their families in urban Chinese society during the 
urban reform period from 1988 to 1999. Some insights are expected to be gained on the 
evolution of the relative economic importance of husbands and wives. 
5.1) Simple Data Analyses 
Table 5.1 reports the average share of labor income of husbands and wives to total 
family income over time and across regions in urban China. In six regions as a whole, 
the shares of husbands' labor income are greater than those of their wives' on average 
over the 12-year horizon. We note that the average share of husbands' labor income in 
total family income is largely stable over the period form 1988 to 1999 and it remains 
around 0.4. On the other hand, the average share of wives' labor income in total family 
income falls slightly from 0.306 in 1988 to 0.272 in 1999. In addition, the average share 
of husbands' labor income is greater than those of their wives' by 0.093 on averages in 
1988 and this differential increases by around 4 percentage point to 0.129 in 1999. The 
above descriptions show that the economic importance of urban Chinese wives as 
financial supporters of the families tends to decline slightly over the urban reform 
period. This implies that urban Chinese husbands are becoming relatively more 
important to their families financially. On top of the finding that husbands are becoming 
relatively more important to their families financially over the urban reform period in 
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urban Chinese society, the magnitude of changes is slightly different in different regions 
of China. 
In Beijing, the differential between the average share of labor earnings of husbands and 
wives in total family income fluctuates around 0.09 over the period from 1988 to 1999. 
Therefore, the relative importance of husbands as the financial supporters and wives as 
the homemakers are more or less stable over time during the urban reform period. 
In Guangdong, the gap between the economic contribution of husbands and wives to 
their families widen by only a little bit over the 12-year horizon. With reference to Table 
5.1, the differential between the average share of labor earnings of husbands and wives 
to total family increase by a little bit from 0.091 in 1988 to 0.096 in 1999. 
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In Liaoning, there is a sharp declining of wives' share of labor income. From Table 5.1, 
we note that the average share of labor income of wives in Liaoning decreases from 
0.32 in 1988 to 0.24 in 1999. Moreover, the average share of husbands' labor income in 
total family income is greater than those of their wives' by 0.088 on average in 1988 in 
Liaoning and this differential, increases to 0.144 in 1999. This implies that the 
differential of the economic importance between husbands and wives within families is 
enlarging sharply over time from 1988 to 1999 and husbands in Liaoning are becoming 
more and more important as the financial supporters of their families over the urban 
reform period. 
The average share of husbands' labor income in total family income follows a sharp 
increasing trend in Zhejiang from 1988 to 1999. On the other hand, the trend of the 
average shares of wives' labor income in total family income falls a little over the 
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period concerned. With reference to Table 5.1，the share of husbands' labor income in 
total family income is greater than that of wives' by 0.083 on average in 1988 in 
Zhejiang and the differential increases by about 50 percent to 0.141 in 1999. So, similar 
to the case of Liaoning, the economic importance of husbands to their families is 
increasing tremendously over time in Zhejiang. 
As shown in Table 5.1，we note that the average shares of husbands' labor income in 
total family income is greater than those of their wives' by 0.097 in 1988 in Sichuan. 
And the differential increases by nearly 40 percent to 0.133 in 1999. So, to a large 
extent, the economic roles of husbands as the main breadwinners of the families are 
strengthening gradually over time in Sichuan from 1988 to 1999. 
Furthermore, the gap between the economic contribution of husbands and wives to their 
families in Shaanxi is widening over the period concerned. Numerically, the shares of 
husbands' labor income in total family income are greater than that of their wives' by 
0.103 on average in 1988 in Shaanxi and this differential increases by nearly 50 percent 
to 0.156 in 1999. 
As a whole, the economic role of husbands as financial supporters in the families are 
becoming more important relative to those of their wives over the urban reform period 
in most of the six regions concerned, except Beijing, with reference to the empirical 
results of the simple data analyses on the average share of husbands' and wives' annual 
labor income in annual family income in this thesis. 
Next, Graph 5.1 shows that the distribution of the shares of husbands' and wives' labor 
income to total family income in selected years. Following Harkness, Machin, and 
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Waldfoget (1997)，more about the family income structure of urban China during the 
urban reform period can be found by exploring into the distribution. With reference to 
Graph 5.1, the fraction of wives who do not contribute to the families economically (0 
shares) is remarkably greater than the fraction of husbands who do not contribute to the 
families economically over the years. Besides, the fraction of husbands and the fraction 
of wives who do not contribute to their families economically (0 shares) are increasing 
together over time. The fraction of wives who do not contribute to their families 
economically increases by 0.097 from 0.138 in 1988 to 0.235 in 1999 whereas the 
fraction of husbands who do not contribute to their families economically increases by 
0.076 from 0.08 in 1988 to 0.156 in 1999�We note that the increase in fraction of wives 
who do not contribute to their families economically is slightly greater than that of the 
husbands'. Despite the possibility that there exist missing values during data collection, 
this finding provides one of the clues to the shrinkage of the relative economic 
importance of wives to their families. 
Besides, the fraction of husbands who contribute to less than half of total family income 
excluded those who contribute 0 shares falls by 0.419 from 0.68 in 1988 to 0.261 in 
1999. The fraction of wives who contribute less than half of the share of total family 
income excluded those who contribute 0 shares falls by 0.375 from 0.815 in 1988 to 
0.44 in 1999. From the above description, the reduction in the fraction of husbands who 
contribute less than half of the total family income is greater than that of the wives'. 
This is another clue to the possibility that husbands tend to earn more for their families 
1 For additional information, there are 5.64 percent couples in which both husbands and wives do not 
‘ contribute economically to their families in 1988. The percentage increases to 8.52 percent in 1994 and 
11.04 percent in 1999. 
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over time and the shrinkage of the relative economic importance of wives to their 
families. 
Furthermore, the fraction of wives who contribute more than 70 percent of total family 
income increases slightly by 0.04 from 0.0034 in 1988 to 0.044 in 1999. At the same 
time, the fraction of husbands who contribute to more than 70 percent of total family 
income increases greatly by 0.128 from 0.065 in 1988 to 0.193 in 1999. The increase in 
the fraction of husbands who contribute to more than 70 percent of total family income 
is remarkably greater than those of their wives. This is also another clue to the 
strengthening of the relative economic role of husbands to their families over the urban 
reform period. 
To further consider the extent of the changes in relative economic contribution of 
husbands and wives to their families, we divide all the families in the sample into ten 
‘deciles groups according to the total income level of the families for further analyses. 
Deciles group 1 is constituted by lowest 10 percent family income group and deciles 
group 10 is constituted by the highest 10 percent family income group. The results of 
the average shares of husbands' and wives' labor income by family income deciles 
groups are summarized in Table 5.2. 
With reference to Table 5.2，the labor income share differential between husband and 
wife in total family income fluctuates a lot in those lower family income deciles groups 
including deciles group 1 to 5. There is no clear pattern for the changes. Moreover, the 
labor income share differential between husband and wife in total family income 
increases a lot in those higher family income deciles groups from 1988 to 1999. The 
differential increases from 0.083 in 1988 to 0.305 in 1999 in family income deciles 
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group 6. In family income deciles group 7，the differential increases from 0.048 in 1988 
to 0.415 in 1999. Also, the differential increases from 0.027 in 1988 to 0.382 in 1999 in 
family income deciles group 8. In family income deciles group 9，the differential 
increases from 0.041 in 1988 to 0.541 in 1999. The differential increases from 0.008 in 
1988 to 0.464 in 1999. The above finding implies that husbands' economic importance 
increases a lot over the 12-year horizon, especially in those higher family income 
deciles groups. 
Furthermore, the average shares of husbands' and wives' labor income to total family 
income in different life cycle stages across different years are shown in Table 5.3 and 
Graphs 5.2. As mentioned in Chapter 3.1.1, life cycle stages are classified following 
Lehrer and Nerlove (1984). The life cycle of individuals are divided into three stages. 
The first life cycle stage is defined as the time when the individual is in the interval 
between marriage and first birth of child. The second life cycle stage is defined as the 
time when the individual is in a period of parenting. The third life cycle stage is the time 
when the individual is in a situation when all his/her children have reached school age. 
The empirical results in Table 5.3 show that both husbands and wives contribute most to 
their families economically in life cycle stage 2 on average. And they contribute least to 
their families economically in life cycle stage 1 on average. It is also notable that the 
economic contributions of husbands are consistently greater than that of wives' in all of 
- the life cycle stages across different years. 
The economic contributions of husbands to their families are increasing gradually over 
the period concerned in both life cycle stage 2 and 3 while the economic contributions 
of wives to their families are slightly decreasing in both life cycle stage 2 and 3 in 
recent years with reference to Graph 5.2b and 5.2c. Also, with reference to Table 5.3, we 
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note the average share of husbands' labor income in total family income is greater than 
that of wives' by 0.073 and 0.095 in 1988 in life cycle stage 2 and 3 respectively. And 
the differentials increase remarkably to 0.145 and 0.137 in 1999 in life cycle stage 2 and 
3 respectively. These show that the economic role of husbands as the main breadwinners 
of their families become more important than those of their wives in life cycle stage 2 
and 3 over the urban reform in urban China. . 
From the above discussion, the widening of the gap between the average share of labor 
income of husbands and wives in annual family income reveals that, to a large extent, 
the relative economic importance of urban Chinese husbands as financial supporters of 
their families tends to increase slightly during the urban reform period from 1988 to 
1999. In other words, the analyses imply that wives contribute relatively less and less to 
the families economically over time in urban China. 
To confirm the accuracy and creditability of the implications that are found in the 
simple data analyses, regressions analyses would be performed in the next section. 
5.2) Pooled Regressions with Husband Dummy 
In the last section, the simple data analyses reveal that the relative economic importance 
of husbands as the main financial supporters of their families tends to become slightly 
more important in urban China during the urban reform period. To ensure this finding, 
this section would further develop the analyses by exploring the pooled regressions that 
are suggested in the methodology, Chapter 3. On the top of all, those families in which 
there is any one spouse who is self-employed would be excluded from our analysis 
since their family income structures are different from the others. In addition, all the 
results that are reported and discussed in the main text are the regression results in 
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which education is measured by discrete educational levels. Besides, regressions in 
which education is measured by the years of schooling with measurement 1 and 2 are 
also done and empirical results are reported in Appendix. In fact, the empirical results 
are similar no matter how education is measured. 
Firstly, the empirical results of Equation 3.3 are reported in Table 5.4^. Besides, the 
coefficients that are associated with the husband dummy over time are plotted in Graph 
5.3. The coefficients of the "Husband Dummy" can trace the differential in the 
economic contributions of husbands and wives to the families. With reference to the 
regression results that are summarized in Table 5.4, the coefficients of the variable 
"husband dummy" are positive and extremely significant at over 99 percent confidence 
interval from the years 1988 to 1999. This shows that husbands in urban China 
contribute statistical significantly more than those of their wives to their families 
economically. 
In addition, the coefficients that are associated with the husband dummy are obviously 
following a raising trend over the period concerned. Table 5.4 shows that the 
coefficients of the husband dummy raised slightly from 8.504 percentage points in 1988 
to 11.833 percentage points in 1999. This implies that the percentage shares of labor 
earnings of husbands to total family income are higher than those of their wives by 
8.504 percentage point in 1988 on average. And this differential in percentage share 
increases by about 3 percentage points to 11.833 percentage points in 1999. The raising 
trend of the coefficient on "Husband Dummy" reveals that the gap between the 
economic contribution of husbands and wives to their families tends to enlarge. Also, 
2 Empirical results in which education is measured by years of schooling are reported in Appendix 5.1. 
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the economic roles of husbands as the main breadwinners of their families tend to 
become slightly more important over time during the urban reform period in urban 
China. 
In order to broaden the findings, the changes in the economic contribution differential of 
husbands and wives to their families at the predicted sample average are considered. 
The predicted economic contributions of husbands to their families at sample mean are 
calculated as the predicted percentage share of husband's labor earnings to total family 
income at the sample mean with value one for husband intercept dummy. Moreover, the 
predicted economic contributions of wives to their families at sample mean are 
calculated as the predicted percentage share of wife's labor earnings to total family 
income at the sample mean with value zero for husband intercept dummy. The results 
are summarized in Table 5.5 and Graph 5.4. 
With reference to Table 5.5 and Graph 5.4, the predicted differential between the 
percentage share of husband's and wife's labor earnings is increasing slightly over the 
period concerned. On average, husbands' percentage share of labor earning to total 
family income are higher than that of their wives by 9.27 percentage points in 1988. The 
differential in percentage shares increase slightly to 12.87 percentage points in 1999. 
Similar to the previous findings, the economic importance of husbands tends to 
increase. 
Table 5.6 describes the distribution of the differential in predicted percentage share of 
husband's and wife's labor earnings in total family income in 1988 and 1999. Although 
the portions of husbands who earn more than those of their wives' are around 96 percent 
in both 1988 and 1999, the components change over the years. We note that that 
6 6 
majority of husbands earn more for their families than those of their wives by not more 
than 15 percentage points in 1988. However, the percentage of husbands who earn more 
for their families than those of their wives by more than 15 percentage points increases 
from 8.569 percent in 1988 to 27.64 percent in 1999. This implies that there are 
increasing amount of husbands who earn more and more for their families relatively to 
those of their wives over the urban reform period of urban China. So, the economic 
roles of husbands to their families tend to become more important over the urban reform 
period. 
Besides, Table 5.6 also shows that the portion of wives who earn more for their families 
than those of their husbands is also similar in 1988 and 1999 which is only around 3.6 
percent. In fact, we note that majority of these wives earn more than those of their 
husbands to their families by not more than 5 percentage points. Therefore, high 
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economic contributions of this small group of wives to their families do not hinder the 
tendency of strengthening of the relative economic importance of husbands. 
We also try the pooled regressions on the same equation, Equation 3.3, by restricting the 
sample observations to double wage-earners families where those families in which any 
one spouse is not employed or self-employed are excluded. The empirical results are 
reported in Table 5.7^ and the coefficients that are associated with the husband dummy 
‘ over time are plotted in Graph 5.5. With reference to Table 5.7，the coefficients of the 
variable "husband dummy" are significantly positive over the period from 1988 to 1999. 
This implies that husbands contribute significantly more than those of their wives to 
their families economically in those double wage-earners urban Chinese families over 
3 Regressions in which education is measured by years of schooling are reported in Appendix 5.2. 
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the urban reform period. Also, Graph 5.5 shows that the coefficients associated with 
husband dummy are obviously following a raising trend over the period concerned. The 
coefficients of the husband dummy rose slightly from 7.016 percentage points in 1988 
to 9.73 percentage points in 1999. This shows that the percentage shares of labor 
income in total family income for husbands who are in double wage-earners families are 
higher than those of their wives by 7.016 percentage points on average in 1988. The 
differential has been increasing slightly by about 3 percentage points to 9.73 percentage 
points in 1999. The raising trend of the coefficients on husband dummy implies that the 
economic contributions of husbands in those double wage-earners families also tends to 
increase gradually over the urban reform period in urban China. 
In order to examine the regional difference of the husband-wife family economic 
contribution differential in urban China during the urban reform period, both "Regional 
Dummies" and interaction terms in which "Regional Dummies" interact with the 
"Husband Dummy" are added into the model. The "Regional Dummies" are created for 
Beijing, Liaoning，Zhejiang, Sichuan and Shaanxi. Moreover, Guangdong is omitted as 
reference group. The empirical results are reported in Table 5.8. 
From the empirical results, we find that the percentage share of labor earning to total 
family income of husbands in Guangdong would be greater than those of their wives by 
6.998 ( percentage points on average in 1988. And the economic contribution 
differential of husbands and wives in Guangdong increases to 10.858 percentage points 
in 1995 and falls back to 7.57 percentage points gradually in 1999. This shows that the 
role of husbands in Guangdong as financial supporters to their families strengthened by 
only a little bit over the period concerned. This finding is very similar to the finding in 
4 It is the coefficient of "Husband Dummy" in Table 5.8. 
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the simple data analyses that are presented in Section 5.1. 
In addition, the coefficients on the "Interaction term of Beijing" are statistically not 
significant at 5 percent level for most of the time with reference to Table 5.8. This 
implies that the pattern of the changes in the economic contribution differential between 
husbands and wives in Beijing is very similar to that of Guangdong. So, the economic 
importance of husbands as breadwinners in Beijing does not change much over time. 
Besides, Table 5.8 shows that the coefficient on the "Interaction term of Liaoning" tends 
to become more significant in the late of 1990s. The percentage share of labor earning 
to total family income of husbands in Liaoning would be greater than those of their 
wives by 6.998^ percentage points on average in 1988. Thereafter, the economic 
contribution differential between husbands and wives in Liaoning increases sorely over 
the years. After 1995, husbands in Liaoning would contribute around 14^ percentage 
points more to their families economically than those of their wives. This indicates that 
the economic importance of husbands in Liaoning is strengthening tremendously over 
time. 
Besides, the coefficients on the "Interaction term of Zhejiang" are not significant over 
time at 5 percent level except 1999. This implies that the pattern of husband-wife 
economic contribution differential in Zhejiang is similar to that of Guangdong before 
5 It is the coefficient of "Husband Dummy" in Table 5.8. The coefficient on interaction term of Liaoning 
in 1988 is not considered as it is not significant at 5 percent level in 1988. It is notable that the 
coefficients on interaction terms of all other regions will not be considered if they are not significant at 5 
percent level. 
6 14 percent is obtained by adding up the coefficient on the husband dummy and the coefficient on 
interaction term of Liaoning. The calculation method is the same for the case in other region such as 
Zhejiang, Shaanxi and Sichuan. 
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1999. On average, husbands in Zhejiang would contribute 6.998 percentage points more 
to their families economically than those of their wives in 1988 and the economic 
contribution differential of husbands and wives in Zhejiang increases gradually to 
12.268 in 1999. Furthermore, the coefficients on the "Interaction term of Sichuan" are 
not significant in majority of the time at 5 percent level except 1993 and 1999. Although 
the economic contribution of husbands in Sichuan would be higher than that of their 
wives by only 6.998 percentage points in 1988，the differential increases gradually to 
11.561 in 1999. In addition，the percentage share of labor earnings to total family 
income of husbands in Shaanxi would be greater than that of their wives by only 6.998 
percentage points in 1988. However, the differential increases sharply to 12.444 
percentage points in 1989 and gradually to 14.765 percentage points in 1999. 
In short, the relative importance of urban Chinese husbands as financial supporters to 
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their families is strengthening relative to those of their wives over the urban reform 
period especially in Liaoning，Zhejiang, Shaanxi and Sichuan. 
Tables 5.9，5.10 and 5.11 report the results of employing the White robust standard error 
procedure to re-estimate the. equations of Tables 5.4, 5.7 and 5.8 respectively. 
Comparing and contrasting the empirical results, the coefficients on the husband 
dummy and interaction terms in which regional dummies interact with husband dummy 
and their statistical significance under two different estimation methods are similar. 
5.3) Summary 
The empirical research that aims at identifying the changes in relative economic roles of 
husbands and wives to their families over time in urban China is presented here in this 
chapter. From the above simple data analyses and regression analyses, it is found that 
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husbands tends to contribute slightly more to their families economically relatively to 
those of their wives, especially in Liaoning, Zhejiang, Sichuan and Shaanxi. Although it 
is the fact that more wives work in the market recently, housework is still their major 
concern. Therefore, this thesis concludes that the traditional roles of males as 
breadwinners and wives as the homemakers continue to hold in urban China from 1988 
to 1999. And the economic roles of husbands as the main financial supporters of the 
families are becoming slightly more important during the urban reform period. 
The forthcoming Chapter will discuss the nature of mating in Chinese marriage market. 
Besides, the reasons for the slightly strengthening of the economic importance of 
husbands will be studied in Chapter 9. 
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Chapter 6 
An Analysis of Selected Characteristics between Husbands and Wives 
After confirming the strengthening of the economic importance of husbands as 
breadwinners relative to those of their wives over the urban reform period in urban 
China in last chapter, the forthcoming chapters would explore into the reasons for this 
phenomenon. With reference to the discussion in Chapter 3 and Flow Chart 3.1，there 
are differences between the reasons for the changes in relative economic contributions 
of husbands and wives to their families under stable and unstable mating. Therefore, as 
suggested in the Methodology, the empirical priority of this chapter would be to apply 
the 2x2 and 3x3 canonical correlation analysis to find out whether the mating function 
of individuals change in urban China over the 12-year horizon from 1988 to 1999. If the 
canonical correlations are similar over time, we expect that there are no big changes in 
the matching and mating criteria in China's marriage market. Otherwise, the marriage 
market in urban China is expected to experience changes in the past. 
The 2x2 and 3x3 canonical correlation analyses are presented in Section 6.1 and 6.2 
respectively. ‘ 
6.1) 2x2 Canonical Correlation Analyses 
Firstly, this thesis would examine the 2x2 canonical correlation analyses. In these 
analyses, age and education of individuals are decided to be used as proxies for the 
mating criteria of these individuals. The two sets of variables of interest are stated in 
equations 3.10 and 3.11. The empirical results of 2x2 canonical correlation analyses are 
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summarized in Table 6.1�Referring to Table 6.1, the coefficients of the first canonical 
functions are reported. Also, the first canonical correlations along with their F-statistics 
in each year are reported. Besides, the canonical loadings, cross-loadings and 
redundancy indices of the first canonical correlation function are shown for reference. 
With reference to the F-statistics of the first canonical correlations that are shown in 
Table 6.1, the first canonical correlations of the 2x2 canonical functions are statistically 
significant over the 12-year horizon from 1988 to 1999 at 1 percent level. To a large 
extent, the remarkable high explanatory power of the 2x2 canonical functions over the 
years is confirmed by the statistical significance of the first canonical correlations. 
In addition to the statistical significance, all of the first canonical correlations for the 
2x2 canonical correlation analyses are higher than 0.95 during 12-year horizon. This 
implies that the optimal linear combination of the mating characteristics of Chinese 
husbands correlates more than 0.95 with the linear combination of the mating 
characteristics of their wives over the period from 1988 to 1999. And the mating 
characteristics of husbands and wives are highly closely related to each other during the 
urban reform period in urban China. 
Besides, Graph 6.1 plots out the first canonical correlations for the 2x2 canonical 
correlation analyses. It is remarkable that the two lines in Graph 6.1 are overlapping 
each other. This implies that no matter how the education of individuals is controlled the 
results for canonical correlations are most likely the same. 
1 Table 6.1 reports the 2x2 canonical correlation analyses in which education is measured by years of 
schooling with measurement 1. 2x2 Canonical correlation analyses in which education is measured by 
years of schooling with measurement 2 are also done and results are reported in Appendix 6.1. Two 
methods give similar results. 
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Furthermore, Graph 6.1 also reveals that the optimal linear combination of the mating 
characteristics of husbands and wives in urban China does not experience much change 
over the period concerned from 1988 to 1999. There are more or less no sharp 
fluctuations in the first canonical correlations. The similarity of canonical correlations 
over time shows that the possibility of no big changes in the matching and mating 
criteria of men and women in the urban Chinese marriage market during the urban 
reform period from 1988 to 1999 is remarkable. 
The magnitude of the canonical weight or so called coefficient of a variable represents 
the relative contribution of this variable to the canonical variate. With reference to the 
empirical results of Table 6.1，age contributes greater to their mating characteristics over 
the years. 
‘Besides, canonical loading measures the simple linear correlation between variable and 
its respective canonical variate. This loading reflects the variance that the observed 
variable shares with the canonical variate. It is also known as canonical structure 
correlation. With reference to- Table 6.1，the canonical loadings of individuals' age 
exceed 0.99 for both husbands and wives over the years from 1988 to 1999. This 
implies that great variance of the ages of urban Chinese positively shares with their 
mating criteria over time. To a large extent, this is caused by the great contribution of 
age to the mating characteristics of urban Chinese. On the other hand, the relatively 
small canonical loadings of the years of schooling show that the variances of the 
education of urban Chinese share little with their mating criteria over the 12-year 
horizon. 
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Furthermore, the canonical cross-loadings are the linear correlation between the 
variables and the opposite canonical variates. With reference to the empirical result of 
Table 6.1，the ages of urban Chinese are positively correlated to a great extent with the 
mating criteria of their spouses over time since the cross-loadings of individuals' age 
exceed 0.95 for both husbands and wives over the years from 1988 to 1999. On the 
other hand, the cross-loading of education as well as the variances of educations of 
urban Chinese that share with their spouses' mating criteria remain to be low. 
The redundancy index measures the ability of the variation of a set of variables to 
explain the variation of another set of variables and it is calculated as the average 
loading squared times the square of the canonical correlation. With reference to Table 
6.1，the variation of urban Chinese mating characteristics can explain around half of the 
variation of their spouses' mating characteristics over the period concerned. And it is 
notable that the low redundancy indices over the years are the result of the relatively 
low averages loading squared which in turn are caused by the relatively low 
contribution of individuals' education to their mating characteristics over time. 
6.2) 3x3 Canonical Correlation Analyses 
Next, 3x3 canonical correlation analyses are discussed. In addition to individual's age 
and education, the individual's real labor income is added to become one of the mating 
criteria in this section. The two sets of variables of interest are stated in Equations 3.1-2 
and 3.13. The results of 3x3 canonical correlation analyses are summarized in Table 
6.22. 
2 Table 6.2 reports the 3x3 canonical correlation analyses in which education is measured by years of 
‘ schooling with measurement 1. 3x3 Canonical correlation analyses in which education is measured by 
years of schooling with measurement 2 are also done and results are reported in Appendix 6.2. Two 
methods give similar results. 
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The first canonical correlations of the 3x3 canonical functions are statistically 
significant during the urban reform period in urban China from 1988 to 1999 at 1 
percent level with reference to the F-statistics of the first canonical correlations that are 
shown in Table 6.2. This shows that the explanatory power of the 3x3 canonical 
functions is assured over the period concerned. 
With reference to the empirical results in Table 6.2, all of the first canonical 
correlations in 3x3 canonical correlation analyses are higher than 0.95 during the 
studying period. This shows that the mating criteria of husbands and wives in urban 
China are also closely related to each other over time when the individual's real labor 
income is added as one of the mating characteristics. 
In addition, no matter how the years of schooling of individuals are calculated, the 
canonical correlations in 3x3 canonical correlation analyses are most likely the same. 
‘Graph 6.2 plots out the two sets of the first canonical correlations that are generated by 
the two different methods in controlling the years of schooling. It seems that two lines 
are overlapping each other. 
Besides, with reference to Graph 6.2, the optimal linear combination of the mating 
criteria of husbands and wives changes little over time. The similarity of canonical 
correlations over time shows the high possibility of no big changes in the matching and 
mating criteria in Chinese marriage market during the urban reform period. 
Furthermore, it is notable that there is no big difference between the first canonical 
correlations that are calculated in 2x2 and 3x3 canonical correlations analysis. Graph 
6.3 plots out all the first canonical correlations that are found in these two analyses. It 
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seems that four lines are almost overlapping each other. This implies that the values of 
first canonical correlations that are calculated under different constraints are almost the 
same. 
Comparing the empirical results of Table 6.2 with that of Table 6.1, the signs and 
magnitude of the canonical coefficients of individuars age and years of schooling in 
3x3 canonical functions are approximately the same as those in 2x2 canonical functions. 
In addition, individuals' real labor incomes contribute only a little bit to their mating 
criteria negatively over time with reference to Table 6.2. As a whole, age contributes the 
most to urban Chinese mating characteristics and real labor income contributes the least 
to their mating characteristics in 3x3 canonical correlation analyses. 
Besides, the loadings of individual's age and education for the first canonical functions 
in 3x3 canonical functions are approximately the same as those in 2x2 canonical 
‘functions. Also, the low canonical loadings of individuals' real labor income show that 
the variances of the real labor income of urban Chinese share with the variance of their 
mating criteria by small portion over the 12-year horizon. 
The cross-loadings of age and education for the first canonical functions in 3x3 
canonical functions are approximately the same as those in 2x2 canonical functions. 
With reference to Table 6.2，only a small portion of the variance in individuals' real 
labor income correlates to the variation in their spouse's mating criteria over the urban 
reform period. 
Last but not least, the redundancy indices of 3x3 canonical functions that are reported 
in Table 6.2 are slightly smaller than that of those redundancy indices of 2x2 canonical 
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functions that are reported in Tables 8.1 over time. This shows that the explanatory 
powers of a 3x3 canonical functions are lower than that of 2x2 canonical functions over 
time. 
6.3) Summary 
Although the above two sections analyze the matching and mating criteria of husbands 
and wives in urban China with two different sets of variables, the values of first 
canonical correlations that are calculated under these two different sets of variables are 
almost the same. In addition, these canonical correlations change little over the period 
from 1988 to 1999. This implies that, to a large extent, the mating function of the 
marriage market in urban China does not fluctuate much from 1988 to 1999. As a whole, 
this thesis concludes that mating is largely stable in Chinese marriage market during the 
urban reform period. 
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‘After confirming the high degree of stability in the mating function of Chinese marriage 
market, the rest of the thesis will assume a stable mating. Furthermore, the reasons for 
the slight increase in the relative economic importance of husbands to their families 
under stable mating would be explored in next chapter, Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 7 
Reasons for the Changes in Relative Economic Contribution of 
Husbands and Wives to Their Families 
This chapter would explore the reasons for the slight increase in the economic 
importance of husbands to the families relative to those of their wives under stable 
mating. There are two sections in this chapter. Section 7.1 looks into some explainable 
factors like children, co-residents and family non-labor income as the possible reasons 
for the raise in relative economic contribution of husbands in urban Chinese families. 
Section 7.2 looks into the unexplainable husband-wife economic contribution 
differential. The effect of stereotype in China on the economic importance of husbands 
to their families is studies. We hope that the analyses in these two sections can help us 
to understand more about the reasons for the slight increase in the economic importance 
of husbands in urban China during the urban reform period. 
7.1) Determinants of the Changes in Economic Contribution of Husbands and 
Wives to their families 
From the literature review and-the application of Becker's theoretical model to different 
variables in Chapter 2, we think that the effects of variables like children, co-residents, 
family non-labor income and stereotype on the role of spouses on the economic 
contributions of husbands and wives to the families are different. These aspects are, in 
turn, suspected to be the possible reasons for the changes in the relative economic role 
of husbands and wives to their families. In order to understand more about the causes 
for the changes, we modify our regression model according to the above suspected 
reasons and Equation 3.14 comes along. 
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Equation-3.14 is a pooled regression model, just like Equation 3.3, over husbands and 
wives. In addition, control variables that relate to children, co-resident and family 
non-labor income are interacted with husband dummy to form interaction terms and 
these interaction terms are added to the equation in this section'. We expects that the 
differentials of the effect of variables on the percentage shares of labor earnings of 
husbands and wives to total family income would reflect from the coefficients on the 
interaction terms. Then, the reasons for the strengthening of the economic roles of 
Chinese husbands in their families under stable mating can be traced from the 
evolutions of the value of coefficients on these interaction terms. The regression results 
are summarized in Table 7.1 . 
Before discussing the regression results in Table 7.1，joint tests on the significance of 
the coefficients on interaction terms are done for each year. The null hypothesis is to 
assume that all of the coefficients on the interaction terms are zero. And the alternative 
‘hypothesis is stated to be at least one of the coefficients on the interaction terms is 
nonzero. The results of the joint tests are also shown in Table 7.1. We find that the 
p-values are zero for every year. This implies that there is zero chance of not rejecting 
the null hypothesis. Therefore, the interaction terms are statistically valuable to be 
included in the analyses. 
‘Discuss ions on stereotype are to be done in Section 7.2. 
Table 7.1 reports the regression results in which education is measured by discrete educational levels. 
Regressions in which education is measured by the years of schooling are also done and they give similar 
results. Since the regression results are more or less similar no matter how education is measured, the 
discussions and explanations would only focus on the regression results in which education is measured 
by discrete educational levels. 
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7.1.1) Number of Children 
From Table 7.1, the coefficient on the interaction term of the number of preschool 
children is significant at 5 percent level for all of the time from 1988 to 1999. This 
implies that the effect of preschool children on the economic contribution of husbands 
and wives to their families are significantly different on average. This finding matches 
the discussion in Chapter 2. In addition, the coefficient on the interaction term of the 
number of preschool children increases tremendously from 5.89 percent in 1988 to 
11.47 percent in 1999. This shows that the positive differences between the effect of 
additional preschool child on the percentage shares of labor earnings of husbands and 
wives to total family income are enlarging significantly over time in urban China from 
1988 to 1999. 
Furthermore, the percentage shares of labor earning of wives to total family income 
would reduce by 2,38 percentage points on average if they have additional preschool 
-child in 1988. This empirical result matches the finding of Cain (1966), Waite (1980) 
and Sorensen (1983) who predict that women's labor force participation is negatively 
related to the presence of preschool children. Thereafter, the reduction in the percentage 
shares of labor earnings of wives to total family income for additional preschool child is 
increasing gradually over time from 2.38 percentage points in 1988 to 6.29 percentage 
points in 1999. On the contrary, the percentage shares of husbands' labor earning to total 
family income would increase by 3.52^ percentage point if they have one more 
preschool child in 1988. And the increase in husbands' percentage shares of labor 
earning to total family income for additional preschool-aged child rises to 5.19 
‘ 3 This is obtained by adding up the coefficient of the number of preschool children and coefficient of the 
interaction term of that variable in Table 7.1. For example, in this case -2.375 plus 5.894 and 3.52 comes 
(round up to 2 decimal places). Similar calculation method applies to the other variables with husband 
interaction terms. 
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percentage points in' 1999. It is notable that while the negative effect of preschool 
children on the percentage shares of Chinese wives，labor earning to total family income 
is increasing, the positive effect of preschool children on the percentage shares of 
Chinese husbands' labor earning to total family income is raising. This enlargement of 
the differential contributes greatly to the increase in the economic importance of 
husbands to the family relative to those of their wives in urban Chinese families over 
the years from 1988 to 1999. 
Considering school-age children, the reduction in wives' percentage shares of labor 
earning to total family income that is caused by additional school-age child is generally 
smaller than the reduction that is caused by additional pre-school child over time. This 
shows that the economic contribution of urban Chinese wives to their families would be 
greater after their children reach school-age. This empirical result matches the finding 
t* 
of Cabin (1966), Waite (1980) and Sorensen (1983) who state that wives would have 
‘more time to participate in the labor force after children reach school-age. 
Besides, the coefficient on the interaction term of the number of school-age children is 
significant at 5 percent level over the period concerned. This implies that the effect of 
additional school-age child on the economic contribution of husbands and wives to their 
families are statistical significantly different. In addition, the coefficient on this 
interaction term increases tremendously from 5.41 percentage points in 1988 to 12.37 
percentage points in 1999 which implies that the positive differences between the effect 
of additional school-age child on the percentage shares of labor earnings of husbands 
and wives to total family income are enlarging significantly on average over time in 
urban China. 
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The empirical results of the pooled'regressions also show that the percentage shares of 
labor earning of wives to total family income would reduce by 1.7 percentage points on 
average for additional school-age child in 1988 and the reduction increase to 6.03 
percent in 1999. On the other hand, the percentage shares of husbands' labor earning to 
total family income would increase by 3.7 percentage points for additional school-age 
child in 1988 and the increase rises to 6.34 percentage points in 1999. In short, while the 
negative effect of school-age children on the percentage shares of Chinese wives，labor 
earning to total family income is increasing over time, the positive effect of school-age 
children on the percentage shares of Chinese husbands’ labor earning to total family 
income is also increasing. And this would contribute the increase in the economic 
importance of urban Chinese husbands. 
Also, we note that the coefficient on the interaction term of the number of adolescent 
children is statistical significantly at 5 percent level over the period concerned and the 
‘value of the coefficient increases from 4 percentage points in 1988 to 11.55 percentage 
points in 1999. This shows that the effect of additional adolescent child on the 
percentage shares of labor earnings of husbands to total family income is increasingly 
greater than that of their wives over time. Table 7.1 shows that the percentage shares of 
labor earning of wives to total family income are negatively related to the number of 
adolescent children and the reduction in percentage shares of labor earning of wives for 
- additional adolescent child increases from 1.38 percentage points in 1988 to 5.73 
percentage point in 1999. However, the percentage shares of labor earnings of husbands 
are positively related to the number of adolescent children. On average, the economic 
contributions of husbands to their families would increase by 2.62 percentage points for 
additional adolescent child in 1988 and the increase rises to 5.83 percentage points in 
1999. It is notable that the enlargement of the differential in the effect of additional 
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adolescent child on the family economic contribution of husbands and on the family 
economic contribution of wives contributes greatly to the strengthening of the economic 
importance of husbands to the families in urban China. 
As a whole, the negative effect of young children�on the percentage shares of urban 
Chinese wives' labor earnings and the positive effect of young children on the 
percentage shares of urban Chinese husbands' labor earnings to total family income are 
both enlarging over time from 1989 to 1999. One-child policy in China is one of the 
possible explanations to account for these phenomena. One-child policy is a policy that 
was adopted by the Chinese government in 1979 so as to overcome the widespread 
poverty and improve the quality of life of people in China. This policy has been very 
successful in China. It changes the family structure of urban China a lot. In urban China, 
families are only allowed to have only one child from 1979 on. So, children are treated 
as treasure by their parents. Wives, as mothers, would spend as much time as possible at 
‘home to look after the only child. This induces husbands to earn as much as possible to 
compensate the family income loss. As a result, the negative effect of young child on 
the economic contribution of wives and the positive effect of young child on the 
economic contribution of husbands to their families are increasing over time. 
When all families are only allowed having one child from 1979，wives spend more and 
more time on housework to look after their young child and husbands spend more and 
more time on market work. Then, the economic contribution of urban Chinese husbands 
to their families would increase faster than those of their wives and the economic 
importance of husbands to their families would as a result be strengthened. 
4 Here, young children include preschool, school-age and adolescent children. 
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After all, the success of the one-child policy stimulates the strengthening of the relative 
economic role of urban Chinese husbands to their families from 1988 to 1999. However, 
one concern with the one-child argument is that the policy was enacted in 1979, and 
thus only younger couples were subject to the policy. Thus, if the argument is valid, 
the same results should hold for a younger cohort, but we should not observe the same 
(or similar) results on the interaction term for an older cohort. To test these hypotheses, 
we perform regressions by first restricting the sample to those husbands and wives who 
are both higher than 40. The empirical results show that the interaction terms on 
younger children are not significant over the years. We then conduct regressions for a 
sub-sample with both husbands and wives less than 40 years old. The coefficients on the 
interaction term are positive and significant. These results support the prior expectation 
that the one-child policy has not affected the older cohort in the same way as for the 
younger cohort (or whole sample). Indeed, the policy may have changed the importance 
of children in the household division of labor. In particular, the policy seems to have 
‘made children become a more important factor that has a differential effect on husbands 
and wives (positive on husbands' and negative on wives' earnings). 
Next, we consider adult children. In this thesis, children with age 18 and above are 
defined as adult children. To a certain extent, these adult children who are living 
together with the couples would have earnings power and would provide financial 
support to'their families. Moreover, adult children who are living together with the 
couples would at the same time enlarge the domestic burden of wives and it is possible 
that wives would have less time to participate in the market it they have more adult 
children present in their home. From Table 7.1, the coefficient on the interaction term of 
the number of adult children increases tremendously from 3.27 percentage points in 
1988 to 7.04 percentage point in 1999. This shows that the positive differences between 
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the effect of additional adult child on the percentage shares of labor earnings of 
husbands and wives to total family income are enlarging significantly over time in 
urban China from 1988 to 1999. Urban Chinese husbands would reduce their percentage 
share of labor earning to total family income by only around 1 to 2 percentage points on 
average for the presence of additional adult child in the families over the period 
concerned. On the contrary, the reduction of percentage share of labor earning of wives 
to total family income for the presence of additional adult child is increasing over time. 
Wives would reduce their percentage share of labor earning statistical significantly at 1 
percent level by 4.64 percentage points on average for additional adult child in 1988 and 
the reduction increases sharply to 8.42 percentage points in 1999. The enlargement of 
the negative effect of additional adult child on the family economic contributions of 
wives weakens the relative economic importance of urban Chinese wives to their 
families. On the other hand, the relative economic importance of urban Chinese 
t* 
husbands to their families then increases. 
7.1.2) Number of adult co-residents 
From Table 7.1，it is notable that majority of the coefficients on the interaction terms 
that relate to adult co-resident.are not significant at 5 percent level over the years from 
1988 to 1999. In other words, we cannot reject the hypothesis at the 95 percent 
confidence interval that the effects of female co-resident adults on the percentage shares 
of labor earning in total family income as well as the family economic contributions of 
both husbands and wives are equal over the period concerned. Also, the hypothesis that 
the effects of male co-resident adults on the family economic contributions of both 
husbands and wives are statistically equal cannot be rejected at 5 percent level. 
Therefore, this thesis concludes that the number of co-resident adults does not constitute 
a significant cause for the widening of the gap between the economic contribution of 
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husbands and wives to their families in urban China during the urban Teform period 
from 1988 to 1999. 
7.1.3) Real family non-labor income 
In this thesis, non-labor income includes those incomes such as interest income, 
dividend income and income from supporters, gifts, boarders and selling property. It is 
expected that the income effect of leisure on husbands and wives can be proxy from the 
coefficient on real family non-labor income and its interaction term. 
From Table 7.1, the coefficients on real family non-labor income are significantly 
negative at 1 percent level over the years. Also, the coefficients on the interaction terms 
of real family non-labor income are significantly positive at the 5 percent level for most 
of the time. This shows that leisure should be a normal good to both husbands and 
V 
wives. Also, the percentage shares of husbands' labor earnings to total family income 
‘would reduce by a lesser percentage than that of their wives when real family non-labor 
income increases. In other words, the positive income effect on leisure of husbands is 
smaller than those of their wives. 
Moreover, we note that the coefficient on the interaction term of real family non-labor 
income is increasing gradually over time. This implies that the reductions in the 
economic contributions of husbands that are caused by the rise in family non-labor 
income are increasingly smaller than that of their wives. Numerically, husbands would 
reduce their contribution by 0.6 percentage points on average in 1988 for the increase in 
100 Yuan real non-labor incomes and the reductions fall to 0.4 percentage points in 
1999. On the other hand, wives would reduce their economic contribution by 0.7 
percentage points in 1988 for the increase in 100 Yuan real non-labor incomes. Their 
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reduction tends to increase over time and reach the highest level to 1.6 percentage 
points. 
In addition, it is notable that the sample average of the family non-labor income is 
increasing gradually over time during the urban reform period. It rises from 202.89 
Yuan in 1988 to 528.94 Yuan in 1999. The raise in family non-labor income together 
with the increase in positive income effect of wives would cause wives to reduce their 
economic contribution to the families by an increasing amount over the period 
concerned. The reduction in economic contribution of wives would then be increasingly 
greater than those of their husbands over the years. As a result, the economic importance 
of husbands to their families is favored in urban China during the urban reform period 
from 1988 to 1999. 
7.1.4) Other variables 
‘ W e now turn to variables that do not have interaction terms. Individual age groups are 
included as control variables in the regression analysis so as to capture the possible 
effect of age on percentage share of labor earnings in total family income. Similar to the 
finding of literatures and the discussion in Chapter 2，the empirical results of this thesis 
shows that there is inverted-U shaped relationship between one's age profile and his/her 
earning power. The coefficients of Age group "31 -40" and “41-50” are positive. On the 
other hand, the coefficients of Age group "51-W and "61 or above’, are negative. This 
implies that urban Chinese husbands and wives would contribute more to their families 
financially as their age increase in the earlier stage of their lives. Thereafter, their 
economic contribution to the families would reduce. 
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From the empirical results of Table 7.1, the rise in the age of spouse would reduce the ‘ 
economic contribution of husbands and wives to their families, especially in the later 
stage of the life of spouse. This finding is reasonable according to the theory of 
assortative mating of Becker. Becker claims that if the characteristic traits are 
complements, such as age, matching of like are optimal. In this sense, husband and 
wives would have similar age and their earning power would go up and down together. 
For example, the raise in the age of wives would suppress the economic contribution of 
husbands since the age of husbands are similar to the age of wives. 
Education is an indicator of skill level and human capital. Human capital can generate 
earning power. With reference to the empirical results of Table 7.1, all of the 
coefficients that related to the education level of an individual are positive. In addition, 
the higher is the education level, the greater is the value of coefficient. These findings 
imply that the higher educational level that urban Chinese husbands and wives have, the 
‘greater would be their economic contribution to the families. The phenomena match 
with the findings of the literature. Numerically, husbands and wives who have senior 
high school level would contribute 12.56 percentage points more to the families than 
those who are not educated in 1986. However, the increase in percentage points fall 
gradually to 6.74 in 1999. Besides, husbands and wives who have technical school level 
would contribute more to the families than those who are not educated by 13.69 
percentage points in 1986 and the increment falls-to 6.74 percentage points in 1999. 
Furthermore, husbands and wives who have technical school level would contribute 
more to the families than those who are not educated by 14.43 percentage points. 
However, the increase in percentage points fall gradually to 11.14 percentage points. 
The above descriptions show that the magnitude of the effect of each education level to 
the economic contribution of urban Chinese husbands and wives to their families is 
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reducing over time. 
The variables that are related to economic development are significant at 5 percent level 
from 1990 to 1996. The coefficients on the real GDP per capita are positive. Moreover, 
the coefficients of the square of real GDP per capita are negative and the value of it is 
very small. As a result, the economic contribution of husbands and wives to their 
families in urban Chinese society would mostly likely increase when the GDP per capita 
increase. 
Table 7.2 reports the results of employing the White robust standard error procedure to 
re-estimate the Equation 3.14. Comparing and contrasting the empirical results in Table 
7.1 and Table 7.2, the coefficients of all of the variables and the statistical significance 
of these variables under two different estimation methods are similar. Therefore, the 
robustness of the empirical results is ensured. 
7.2) Decomposition of the Economic Contribution Differential of Husbands and 
Wives to their Families 
The empirical results of Chapter 5 show that the economic importance of husbands 
within families was strengthening slightly over the years. This section is going to find 
out how the strengthening of the economic importance of husbands in urban Chinese 
families relate to the stereotype on the role of spouse within families. Decompositions 
of husband-wife economic contribution differential into explainable and unexplainable 
differential are done with reference to Blinder and Oaxaca (1973). The decomposition 
results are summarized in Table 7.3^ 
5 Table 7.4 reports the decomposition in which education is measured by discrete educational levels. 
Decompositions in which education is measured by the years of schooling are reported in Appendix 7.1. 
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Husbands conventionally contribute more than their wives to the families. With 
reference to the empirical results shown in Table 7.3, the differential in individual's age 
of husband and wife would reduce the husband-wife economic contribution differential 
on average by 14 percent in 1988. In other words, the differential in individual's age of 
husband and wife would not favor husband economic importance as a financial 
supporter to the families. The reduction in husband-wife economic contribution 
differential falls to 10 percent in 1999. In short, the differential in the age of husbands 
and wives within families is favoring the economic contribution of wives over the urban 
reform period. 
Besides, the percentage of economic contribution differential of husbands and wives 
within their families that can be explained by the differential in spouse's age fluctuates 
* 
greatly over the years and it increases slightly from 1 in 1988 to 4 in 1999. In other 
‘words, the percentage increase in husband-wife economic contribution differential that 
is caused by the differential in the age of spouse is increasing over time form 1 percent 
in 1988 to 4 percent in 1999. 
Furthermore, the percentage of husband-wife economic contribution differential to the 
family that can be explained by the differential in individuals' educational level 
fluctuates over the 12-year horizon. With reference to Table 7.3, the differential in 
individual's educational level or years of schooling constitutes around 12.49 percent of 
husband-wife economic contribution differential in 1988 and fall to 9.79 percent in 
1999. On the other hand, the percentage of husband-wife economic contribution 
differential to the family that can be explained by the differential in spouse's educational 
level increases gradually from 3.06 percent in 1988 to around 5.51 percent in 1999. 
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The above contents discuss the explainable part of husband-wife family economic 
contribution differential. It is notable that there is husband-wife family economic 
contribution differential that cannot be explained. The percentage of unexplainable 
differential is approximated by the residual left after subtracting the effects of 
differences in individual characteristics from the overall contribution differential. The 
percentages of unexplainable differential over time are summarized in Table 7.3 and 
plotted on Graph 7.1. From Graph 7.1, we know that the unexplainable part constitutes 
approximately 97 percent difference between husband's and wife's family economic 
contribution in 1988. Although the percentage of husband-wife family economic 
contribution differential that is not explainable is decreasing slightly over time, it is still 
very high in recent years. In 1999, unexplainable part constitutes around 90.5 percent of 
the husband-wife economic contribution differential to the family on average. If the 
unexplainable differential is considered as the result of the stereotype on the role of 
‘spouses, the empirical results of this thesis show that the stereotype on the role of 
spouses within urban Chinese families is still very serious^. 
Moreover, the declining of the unexplainable differential as well as stereotype matches 
the fact that the sense of equality between husbands and wives is raising in 
contemporary Chinese society. Since the percentage of husband-wife economic 
contribution differential to their families that is stemmed from the stereotype on the role ‘ 
of spouses within urban Chinese family is declining over time, this chapter concludes 
that the effect of the stereotype within urban Chinese families on the relative economic 
6 Model limitation is another possible reason for the phenomenon that nearly 90% of the income 
differentials are not explained, since the percentage of unexplainable differential is approximated by the 
residual left after subtracting the effects of differences in individual characteristics from the overall 
contribution differential. 
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importance of husbands as the breadwinners is dampening slightly over time. 
7.3) Summary 
This chapter identifies that the slightly strengthening of the economic importance of 
husbands relative to that of their wives to their families in urban China from 1988 to 
1999 is caused by the following factors, assuming stable matching and mating in 
Chinese marriage market. 
One of the factors is the enlargement of the negative effect of additional children on the 
family economic contribution of urban Chinese wives and the enlargement of the 
positive effect of additional children on the family economic contribution of urban 
Chinese husbands. This thesis finds that the one-child policy in China encourages wives 
to spend more and more time at home to look after their only child and husband to 
spend more and more time on market work to earn for the families. As a result, the 
‘economic role of husbands as the breadwinners of the families is slightly strengthened. 
Beside, the reduction in the positive income effect on leisure of urban Chinese husbands 
and the raise in family non-labor income over time induce husbands to contribute nearly 
as much as before to the families economically even if they have more non-labor 
income. At the same time，the increase in non-labor income would cause wives to 
reduce their family economic contribution by an increasing amount over time. These 
favor husbands as the financial supporters of the families. 
With reference to the decomposition results, this thesis concludes that the stereotype 
within urban Chinese families on the role of spouses is dampening slightly over time 




There are two objectives in this thesis. The first objective of this thesis is to find out the 
changes in the relative economic importance of husbands and wives as financial 
supporters to their families in urban Chinese society during the urban reform period 
from 1988 to 1999. The second objective is to explore the reasons for the changes in 
relative economic importance of husbands and wives to their families. In the earlier 
days, scholars explored this topic by analyzing the hours of market work and household 
work that are provided by them. In addition, some of the economists also used income 
levels as well as output levels as the focus for analyzing this topic. This thesis tries to 
use the percentage shares of labor earnings of husbands and wives to total family 
income as proxy for their economic contributions to families. Besides, the changes in 
the percentage shares of labor earnings of husbands and wives are studied by using data 
‘ f rom the Urban Household Survey of China. 
The regression results show that urban Chinese husbands would contribute more to their 
families than those of their wives by 8.5 percentage points in 1988. The percentage 
points increase slightly during the urban reform period to 11.8 in 1999. It is notable that 
the differential in the percentage share of husbands and wives increases by about 3 
percentage points over the years. With reference to the experience of western countries, 
one might have expected that wives in China have been gradually taking up "the half of 
the sky" during the urban reform period. However, this thesis finds, contrary to this 
expectation, that the percentage share of wives' labor earning tends to decline slightly 
over time. Wives to a certain extent have not swum upward economically during the 
urban reform period. Nevertheless, the percentage share of husbands' labor earning is 
9 4 
largely stable over the urban reform period from 1988 to 1999. Therefore, this thesis 
concludes that the relative economic role of urban Chinese husbands as the main 
financial supporters of their families tends to become slightly more important during the 
urban reform period. 
Before exploring the reasons for the changes in the relative economic importance of 
husbands and wives in urban Chinese families, the canonical correlation analyses find 
that the mating in Chinese marriage market is largely stable over the period concerned. 
Thereafter, this thesis attempts to trace the reasons for the slightly strengthening of 
relative economic importance of husbands as the financial supporters of urban Chinese 
families assuming that mating criteria of men and women are stable in Chinese marriage 
market. This thesis identifies that there are several factors. 
This thesis finds that the relative economic importance of husbands to their families are 
‘favored by the enlargement of the negative effect of additional children on the family 
economic contribution of wives and the enlargement of the positive effect of additional 
children on the family economic contribution of husbands. This thesis suggests that the 
one-child policy that is imposed in 1979 in China may be one of the possible 
explanations to account for these phenomena. When all families are only allowed to 
have one child from 1979, children are treated as treasure by their parents. Then, wives 
spend less time on market and more time on housework to look after their only child. 
This would induce husbands to spend more and more time on market work to 
compensate for the family income loss. As a result, the relative economic importance of 
wives in the urban Chinese families tends to be weakened. On the other hand, the 
economic importance of husbands increases. 
95 
‘ In addition, the economic role of husbands to the families tends to be favored by the 
shrinkage of the positive income effect on leisure of urban Chinese husbands during the 
urban reform period. This thesis finds that the reductions in the economic contributions 
of husbands that are caused by the rise in family non-labor income are increasingly 
smaller than that of their wives. Together with the raise in family non-labor income in 
urban Chinese family over the urban reform period, husbands tend to spend relatively 
more time in the market than that of their wives if they have higher non-labor income. 
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition finds that the percentage of husband-wife economic 
contribution differential to their families that is caused by the stereotype on the role of 
spouses within urban Chinese family maintains over 90 percent during the urban reform 
period. However, the percentage is decreasing slightly over time. This thesis concludes 
that although the stereotype within urban Chinese families on the role of spouses 
remains to be serious, it is dampening slightly over the period concerned. 
Assuming stable mating function, children and family non-labor income are affecting 
the division of labor between husbands and wives in urban China over the urban reform 
period. As a result of the effect of these two aspects on the division of labor, husbands in 
urban China tend to focus more on market work over the urban reform period. On the 
other hand, wives focus more and more on housework and are the homemakers. This 
thesis shows that the traditional division of labor between husbands and wives tends to 
be strengthening slightly over time in urban China. 
Undoubtedly, some may argue that the mating function in the Chinese marriage market 
may not be stable over time. Therefore, further research of investigating the effect of the 
change in mating function on the relative economic role of husbands and wives should 
9 6 
be done so as to further develop the findings. In addition, more empirical research 
should also be done to identify more factors to support the increase in the importance of 
urban Chinese husbands as the financial supporters to their families. 
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Table 3.1 to be continued 
Definit ions of Variables 
Variables Definitions 
Percentage share of the individuars labor ual,s labor earnings / Total family income) X 100 
earnings in total family income ( C ) 
Real labor earnings: 
Husband's real labor earnings annual labor earnings of husband I Regional general consumer price index 
(base year 1988) 
Wife's real labor earnings annual labor earnings of wife I Regional general consumer price index 
(base year 1988) 
Husband Dummy 1 if the individual is husband： 0 if the individual is wife 
Age: 
Individual age The actual age of an individual . 
Individual age square Individual age x Individual age 
Spouse's age The actual age of one's spouse 
Spouse's age square Spouse's age x Spouse's age 
Age Groups: 
Individual's age groups: 
Age 20 and below 1 if the age of the individual is below 21; 0 otherwise 
Age 21-30 1 if the age of the individual is above 20 and below 31; 0 otherwise 
Age 31-40 1 if the age of the individual is above 30 and below 41 ； 0 otherwise 
Age 41-50 1 if the age of the individual is above 40 and below 51 ； 0 otherwise 
Age 51-60 1 if the age of the individual is above 50 and below 61 ； 0 otherwise 
Age 61 or above 1 if the age of the individual is 61 or above; 0 otherwise 
Spouse's age groups: 1 if the age of one's spouse is below 21; 0 otherwise 
Age 20 and below 1 if the age of one's spouse is above 20 and below 31 ； 0 otherwise 
Age 21-30 1 if the age of one's spouse is below 31 ； 0 otherwise 
Age 31-40 1 if the age of one's spouse is above 30 and below 41; 0 otherwise 
Age 41-50 1 if the age of one's spouse is above 40 and below 51 ； 0 otherwise 
Age 51-60 1 if the age of one's spouse is above 50 and below 61 ； 0 otherwise 
Age 61 or above 1 if the age of one's spouse is 61 or above; 0 otherwise 
Number of children: 
‘ No. of preschool children The number of children with age 5 or below 
No. of school-age children The number of children with age above 5 and below 13 
No. of adolescent children 丁he number of children with age between 13 and 17 
No. of adult children The number of children with age 18 and above 
Discrete educational level: 
Individual's discrete educational level: 
Below primary school 1 if an individual educated with level below primary school or has no education; 
0 otherwise 
Primary school 1 if an individual studied primary school level as the highest education; 0 otherwise 
Junior high school 1 if an individual studied junior high school as the highest education; 0 otherwise 
Senior high school 1 if an individual studied senior high school as the highest education; 0 otherwise 
Technical school 1 if an individual studied technical school level as the highest education; 0 otherwise 
College or above 1 if an individual studied college or any other higher education; 0 otherwise 
Spouse's discrete educational level: 
Below primary school 1 if one's spouse educated with level below primary school or has no education; 
0 otherwise 
Primary school 1 if one's spouse studied primary school level as the highest education; 0 otherwise 
Junior high school 1 if one's spouse studied junior high school as the highest education; 0 otherwise 
Senior high school 1 if one's spouse studied senior high school as the highest education; 0 otherwise 
Technical school 1 if one's spouse studied technical school level as the highest education; 0 otherwise 
College or above 1 if one's spouse studied college or any other higher education; 0 otherwise 
Tables 98 
continued 
Table 3.1 ‘ 
* Variables • Definitions 
Years of schooling: 
Individual's years of schooling: 
Measurement 1 primary school and below = 6, junior high school = 9, technical school or senior 
high school = 12, college = 14, university and above=16 
Measurement 2 primary school and below = 5, junior high school = 8, 
technical school or senior high school = 10, college = 12, university and above=14 
Individual's years of schooling square Individual's years of schooling x Individual's years of schooling 
Spouse's years of schooling: 
Measurement 1 Same as individual's -
Measurement 2 Same as individual's 
Spouse's years of schooling square Spouse's years of schooling x Spouse's years of schooling 
No. of coresident adults: 
No. of male coresident adults The number of males who have age 18 or above and are living together with 
the core couple of the family 
No. of female coresident adults The number of females who have age 18 or above and are living together with 
the core couple of the family 
Real family non-labor income Total family non-labor income / Regional general consumer price index 
(Base year is 1988) 
Real GDP per capita Regional nominal GDP per capita I Regional general consumer price index 
(Base year is 1988) 
Square of real GDP per capita Real GDP per capita x Real GDP per capita 
Regional Dummies: 
Beijing 1 if the individual lives in Beijing; 0 otherwise 
-Liaoning 1 if the individual lives in Liaoning; 0 otherwise 
Zhejiang 1 if the individual lives in Zhejiang; 0 otherwise 
Sichuan 1 if the individual lives in Sichuan; 0 otherwise 
Shaanxi 1 if the individual lives in Shaanxi; 0 otherwise 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































General Consumer Price Index of Selected Regions in Urban China, 1988-1999 
(Base year = previous year) 
Year Beijing | Liaoning|| Zhejiang || Guangdong || Sichuan || Shaanxi | 
1988 I 120.4 119.3 121.5 129.4 119.9 119.1 
.1989 - 117.2 118.2 1 1 8 厂 122.1 119.8— 118.3 
1990 105.4 103.3 102.1 97.5 103.8 — 101.3 
1 9 9 ” 111.9 105.6 103.5 101.2 一 103.0 106.0 
.1992. “ 109.9 106.7 1 0 7 P 1 0 7 . 3 “ 107.4 — 109.7 
1993 119.0 115.2 119.8 121.6 ~116.8 H I . 8 
1994 124.9 —124.6 ~~124.8 121.7 1 2 4 ^ 126.7 — 
1995 117.3 116.1 ~T |6 .6 114.0 118.5 119.0 — 
,1996 111.6 107.9 ~107.9 107.0 109.3 109.7 
,1997^ " 105.3 1 0 2 ^ ^ 1 0 1 . 9 1 0 5 . 1 104.8 
1998 萝 102.4 99.3 99.7 98.2 ~ ~ ^ ~ 98.4 
M 9 9 9 l | 100.6 98.7 99.5 98.4 98.1 97.2 ~ 
Source: Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China 
Table 4.3 
Regional Nominal GDP per capita，1988-1999 
Year | Beijing ' LiaoningI Zhejiang Guangdong || Sichuan Shaanxi ‘ 
書1988 飽 I 4124 2285 1842 1961 861 1004 
"^989 4509 —2574 ~~2009 2307 960 1124 — 
1990 " 4878 —2698 ~~2^22 2537 1134 1241 — 
5782 —3027 "~T540 元01 1283 1410 — 
_ 9 9 2 “― 6804 " ^ 6 9 3 3187— 3815 1477 1591 
-1993 > 8239 5015 ~~4431 5254 1854 1926 
望994甚—10261 "~6103 6149—— 6795 一 2481 2344 
彻 1 3 0 8 4 6880 • 8074 — 8495 3081 2843 
1996「15044 —7730 ~T455 9516 3646 3314— 
1997 16735 8725 —10515 10428 —4029 3634 
1998 18478 —9415 ~Tl247 11143 4319~~ 3834— 
M999 . I 19846 10086 12037 11728 4 4 5 ^ 1 4101 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.4 to be continued 
Pooled OLS Regressions of the Economic Contribution to Family over Husbands and Wives with Husband 
Dummy, 1988-1999 
Dependent variables: Percentage share of husband's or wife's labor earnings in total family income 
Year: ^ 1988 ' 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Explanatory variables 
Husband Dummy ‘：…二 " . . •； 8.504" 8.696" 8.505" 9.517" 9.512" 10.767" 
‘f: -"^ '-l：^ ,.-. A " ' ' - (23.67) (22.95) (24.12) (25.18) (28.49) (28.84) 
Demographic Variables 
Individual's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 : ( 〜 . . 0 . 5 3 6 -0.498 0.700 0.703 2.359" 0.167 
‘〈 (0.73) (0.62) (0.84) (0.88) (3.12) (0.19) 
Age 41-50 ？ 0.494 -1.301 0.489 -0.124 2.883" -0.231 
二 . 其 ‘ e : 矜 二 二 {0.54) (1.31) (0.49) (0.13) (3.09) (0.22) 
Age 51-60 ' < -3.529** -5.175" -1.338 -3.743" -2.000 -4.404" 
(3.21) (4.42) (1.15) (3.21) (1.82) (3.54) 
Age 61 or above -17.486" -17.832" -13.931" -17.137" -16.768" -18.595** 
(12.89) (12.57) (9.99) (12.1) (12.67) (12.54) 
Spouse's Age Groups 
Age 3 1 * 4 0 - : . 一 说 0 . 5 0 1 1.066 0.890 0.038 -1.594* -0.038 
: : : (0.68) (1.33) (1.06) (0.05) (2.11) (0.04) 
Age 41-50 • 0.085 0.932 0.798 0.471 -2.154* 0.478 丨r“:. - , ; . � � � .‘ .. M (0.09) (0.94) (0.8) (0.48) (2.31) (0.45) 
Age 51-60 , , ’ ， -2.277* -2.162 -3.808" -4.757" -6.743" -4.776" 
-‘ / 々 ’ 餅 工 ： 、 ‘ ( 2 . 0 7 ) (1.85) (3.27) (4.08) (6.14) (3.83) 
• Age 61： or -5.47" -6.576" -8.181" -7.747"* -8.872" -6.65** 
'X (4.03) (4.63) (5.87) (5.47) (6.71) (4.48) 
Number of Children :么；r'r ； 二 
No:, of |5resChtJor c h i l d r e n 0 . 5 7 2 -0.899 0.677 0.505 -1.276 -0.773 
推 m p l l i ^ 泛 丨 讚 ( 0 . 9 4 ) (1.35) (0.99) (0.74) (1.87) (0.93) 
" No； of schoor-age children “ 、 1 . 0 0 1 * 0.635 1.017* 1.340* -0.541 0 361 
' 〜 ‘ (2.44) (1.4) (2.17) (2.54) (1.07) (0.61) 
« No. of adolescent children fiis'j^^ ^ ：!' 0.615* 0.843* 1.073" 1.415" -0.342 0.303 
(2.01) (2.46) (3.15) (3.89) (0.91) (0.67) 
’ No. of adult children ‘ ^ ‘ <''；‘ -3.001** -2.961" -3.094" -2.860" -5.425** -5 313" 买 ® ( 1 1 . 9 4 ) (11.88) (13.4) (11.01) (21.96) (18.87) 
Adult coresident — a: 。^： _ 
of male coresident adult , -rj J ； ： -3.610** -3.026** -4.233" -4.399" -7.004** -6.208" 
於 办 （ 4 . 0 8 ) (2.99) (4.82) (5.08) (8.2) (6.4) 
\ No. of female cofesitfent adult -1.073 -0.705 -0.499 -0.851 -3 113** -2 269" 
(1.88) (1.24) (0.89) (1.42) (5.71) (3.43) 
Household endowments /:、:-% ” > j 
Individual's educational level 、二-、: ’‘:項 
--College Qr a b o v e 1 4 . 4 6 2 * * 12.82" 15.208" 13.189" 11.783" 10.761" 
‘ ! ？ ？ ' • ^ 长 ( 1 4 . 0 2 ) (11.48) (14.14) (10.38) (9.34) (7.41) 
-"Techniral school,： - - - J 13.698- 12.929** 15.248" 13.296" 10.940" 10.867" 
、 " 二 ^ 知 ^ ； 4 (13.57) (11.85) (14.46) (10.56) (8.7) (7.49) 
Senior high school " ‘ ‘ - . 'v ‘ 12.601** 10.847" 13.541" 10.588" 8.457** 8.452" 
兔 • ； 攀 IE；!: (12.88) (10.26) (13.19) (8.62) (6.84) (5.95) 
‘^；： Junior high school 10.778" 9.260" 11.631" 8.952** 7.574" 6.625" 
u^mmmmw^'^ ⑴卿 （9.21) (H-qd (7.51) (6.27) (4.75) 
“Pr imary school 6.818** 4.517** 7.137** 4.925** 2 757* 1 697 
" ‘ (7.47) (4.56) (7.4) (4.14) (2.28) (1.23) 
Spouse's educational level、:;>:.;记"〜丨询 
College or above'^  -3.262". -1.779 -2.401* -6.204" -3.305" -1.081 
‘ 5 〜 . ( 3 . 1 6 ) (1.59) (2.23) (4.88) (2.62) (0.74) 
Technical school ‘,•笠’；、,('々 •.>) -4.164" -2.727* -4.525" -7.011" -3.834" -2 160 
, ？ ‘ • -- (4.12) (2.5) (4.29) (5.57) (3.05) (1.49) 
Senior high school : 衫 K -4.408" -1.998 -3.328" -6.616" -3.103* -0.826 
, 、 . . • ‘ . (4.51) (1.89) (3.24) (5.38) (2.51) (0.58) 
Junior high school ： ^ -3.671" -1.776 -2.583" -6.249** -2.516* -0 509 
, ' " V ' ' s。/ ‘ (3.97) (1.77) (2.65) (5.24) (2.08) (0.36) 
PrimatV school ’‘ : - 2 . 5 1 " -0.561 -1.275 -4.369" -1.201 1102 
, . ；•.•：：：•；-：'：：：•.： (2.75) (0.57) (1.32) (3.67) (0.99) (0.8) 
/ngome effeqt :�.: 
Real family non-labor income - ；' I -0.007** -0.006" -0.006" -0 005** -o 014" -0 013" 
. : ’ i ; :S_ iS i i l t 難 (32.89) (28.67) (29.81) (27.51) (33.23) (29.19) 
Ecohomlc development。二乂：《雜 
Real GDP per capita ‘ -:、-'、、‘ 0.001 0.002 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002" 
“ ‘ (0.98) (1.93) (2.55) (2.34) (2.08) (2.58) 
". Square of real GDP per capita ^ -0.0000002 -0.0000006 -0.0000006* •0.0000005 -0 0000004* -0 0000005* 
i i ^ S i ^ i l 雜 i ( _ (1.65) (2.16) (1.59) (2.14) (2.24) 
Constant — ... : 乂 , ‘：； ‘‘ ‘ ； 31.322" 29.811" 26.749" 31.623" 36.129" 32.714" 
盜 : i i r f S i :•丨 ( 1 9 . 9 9 ) (17.27) (15.71) (15.79) (19.12) (14.67) 
No. of Observation ‘ - ^ 5884 5524 6096 6234 7846 7158 
R-square 麵彳谋就;V•.裤::�::>.:::/.武丨、0.5854 0.5778 0.5952 0.5506 0.6010 0.5976 
Note: Absolute value of t-ratios are in parentheses 
'significant at 5% level： ** significant at 1% level 
Sample observations exclude families in which any one spouse is self-employed 
Education is measured by discrete educational levels 
Tables 107 
continued Table 5.9 
Year: i S M ^ M 5 • ^ 翅 一 ― … 搬 1998 1999 
Explanatory variables 
Husband Dumm^ . . .. . 11.913" 11.11336" 11.499" 12.000** 11.78" 11.833" 
. 、 人 ： r , (30.27) (27.25) (28.2) (27.55) (25.84) (24.72) 
Demographic Variables " 
Individual's Age Groups ‘ j 
Age 31-40 ‘ ‘ ‘ 1.118 1.231 0.563 2.355* 2.736* 1.852 
’' ； 、 ‘ % (1.2) (1.27) (0.52) (2.05) (2.28) (1.41) 
Age 41-50 1.107 0.299 1.178 3.508* 3.960" 3 605* 
‘ r ‘ \ ： r (0.98) (0.25) (0.92) (2.56) (2.8) (2.32) 
. A g e 5"i-60 ； -2.527 -3.595" -3.898" -0.703 -0.424 3.55* 
^ (1.9) (2.57) (2.62) (0.44) (0.26) (1.98) 
Age 61 or above ‘ “ •‘ -16.590" -17.718" -17.422" -14.868" -14.760" -18.364" 
• (10.66) (10.76) (10.06) (7.96) (7.69) (8.79) 
Spouse's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 ^ -1.129 -1.116 -0.102 -1.784 -2.877* -1.810 
』- 〜、•，,y..„„ .’,、.，…！;' .. .；-| (1.21) (1.16) (0.09) (1.55) (2.4) (1.37) 
Age41«50 - 、 f ^ ， V : : . ' -0.860 0.025 -0.272 -2.513 -3.948" -3.728' 
‘ V (0.76) (0.21) (1.83) (2.79) (2.4) 
Age 51-60_ ：： ；；,-； ： '：：； -7.376" -6.322" -5.632" -9.130" -11.252" -10.069" 
(5.54) (4.51) (3.79) (5.77) (6.85) (5.62) 
Age 61 or above •； .'^5 -9.220** -10.571" -6.668" -11.840" -14.065** -9.883" 
；變麵 l E i S P p P l (5.93) (6.42) (3.85) (6.34) (7.33) (4.73) 
Number of Children 、 “ 、 
No. of preschool children ' " " -0.135 0.184 -0.081 -0.919 0.458 -0 551 
. . (0.16) (0.21) (0.09) (0.95) (0.47) (0.49) 
No. Of school-age Children 0.674 1.001 0.846 -0.058 0.677 0 154 
(1 07) (1.55) (1.22) (0.08) (0.89) (0.19) 
H No. of adolescent children -45 0.811 1.163* 0.839 -0.093 1.202 0.049 
’’ ^ (1.57) (2.12) (1.47) (0.15) (1.87) (0.07) 
节路 No. of adult Children -5.177** -5.356" -5.256" -5.376" -4.327" -4 904" 
,么念忍eS盘綠i、:絕拜二 - (17.29) (16.57) (15.85) (15.43) (11.25) (11.84) 
-6.693** -6.077** -6.304" -6.107** -7.739" -7.202" 
V . ‘ ’ ‘ ： 〜 ” . . . (6.25) (5.84) (5.5) (5.69) (7.41) (6.23) 
,No. of female coresident adult ： -2.016" -2.920" -2.199" -2.466" -3 718" -2 629" 
(2.95) (4.05) ⑶ （3.45) (4.89) (3.04) 
Household endowments ' . 禪 霧 • 
IndivWua丨's education，丨 Jeyel ’丨 
College or above^ 、‘ 11.019** 10.041" 10.273** 6.209" 7.695" 9.510" 
？ � ' / l : ; i 丨 、 役 (7.09) (5.93) (6.08) (2.95) (3.16) (3.89) 
•, ； • Technical school J g a i S ^ S ^ p ' 10.618** 8.736** 10.19" 7.588" 9.009" 9.431" 
B ^ ' r n r n m m ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ m & i (^ .sd (5.15) (6.02) (3.61) (3.7) (3.86) 
. Senior high school . d 7.602** 6.319" 6.596** 3.990 3.532 5.274* 
〜、、卜、!： '•"巧 3 (4.97) (3.78) (3.97) (1.92) (1.46) (2.18) 
Junior high school ：：了；；‘广 二 . 4.929** 3.376* 3.999* 1.182 0.931 1.134 
(3.29) (2.06) (2.45) (0.58) (0.39) (0.47) 
丨 a g l S f ^ l l 0.853 0.155 0.586 -1.349 -0.344 -1.368 
s ‘ ^ (0.57) (0.09) (0.35) (0.65) (0.14) (0.57) 
Spouse's educational level、-
College or^bove • ^ Z -1.129. -1.968 1.617 2.376 3.212 -3.681 
“ 松 ’ ： … ： ( 0 . 7 3 ) (1.16) (0.96) (1.13) (1.32) (1.51) 
‘ Technical iscHopI ？^；；:资》华衆喊：运p -2.69 -1.705 0.1026 0.416 1.669 -3.819 
： ’） 二广‘’‘（1.73) (1.01) (0.06) (0.2) (0.69) (1.56) 
^ Senior high school ！‘- ^ -0.875 -0.003 3.274* 3.729 5.529* -0.952 
'‘；:..’？:.;‘.:::,’. (0.57) (0) (1.97) (1.79) (2.29) (0.39) 
Junior high s c h o o l ‘ ：.. > 0.319 0.772 4.352" 5.803" 7.547" 2.071 
‘ ， ， p 、 、 < (0.21) (0.47) (2.67) (2.83) (3.16) (0.87) 
Primary school V ‘‘ ‘ 0.348 0.717 4.312" 4.589* 5.939" 1.278 
。 ： r ^ . ^ S ' ^ ^ r ^ ^ J - i m ^ i ^ l (0.23) (0.43) (2.6) (2.22) (2.46) (0.53) 
Income effect ：‘,、:..:.,'广二.—.,。:、. 
Real family non-labor income . . : :々-0.011" -0.009** -0.011" -0.008** -0.007 -0.007 
/、…、、、:•产•！气:i‘;�:C'-.; (27.8) (24.6) (26.03) (20.06) (18.29广 （19.48广 
Economic devetooment ‘.、 
i Real GDP per capita 0.003" 0.003** 0.003** -0.0002 -0.00004 -0.001 
… 、 ( 3 ) (3.81) (2.97) (0.22) (0.04) (0.78) 
.Square of real GDP per capita ； / ^ -0.0000005** -0.0000006** -0.0000005* -0.00000007 -0.00000008 0.00000008 
r 、： (2-31) (3.23) (2.3) (0.37) (0.45) (0.48) 
Constant 30.966** 31.564" 27.782** 33.338" 30.989" 37.159" 
� - - I k (13.06) (11.98) (10.35) (10.46) (8.46) (10.04) 
No： of Observation .‘，/,’'/•': 7180 7202 7214 7246 7138 6882 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































Distribution of Couples by the Differential in Predicted Percentage Shares of 
Husband's and Wife's Labor Earnings for the Pooled Regressions in Table 5.4 
Y，r 
Differential in % share ‘ (%) (%) 
above-25% to-20% — 0 = 0 
,above -20% to-15% — 0.034 0 . 
？ above -15% to -10% ~ 0.1 0.17 
above -10% to - 5 % 、 " “ 0.5 — 0.14 
above -5% to； 0% — 2.96 3.25 
0% -nd below . , � 3.6 3.56 
- 也 ^ above 0% 96.4 96.44 
: ; : f^,;above O^ta.5% 、— 5.13 6.69 
5% to 10% ^ ^ 12.66 
above 10% to-^5% : 22.74 49.45 
above 15% to 20% 二、 6.8 13.62 
20% to 25% 广 ' 吟 — 1 . 1 6 8.21 
above 25%ty30%:f：、’ 0.55 5.69 
、 ” 、 、 “ b 6 v g 30% 0.07 0.12 
Note a: Differential in % sham = (% share of husband's labor earnings - % share of wife's labor earnings) 
If Differential in % share is positive, husbands contribute more than that of their wives to their families 
economically. 
If Differential in % share is negaf/Ve, husbands contribute less than that of their wives to their families 
economically. 
Tables 110 
Table 5.7 to be continued 
Pooled OLS Regressions of the Economic Contribution to Family over Husbands and Wives with Husband Dummy 
and Sample Observations restricted to Double-wage Earners Families, 1988-1999 
Dependent variables: Percentage share of husband's and wife's labor earnings in total family income 
Year: 週 - 1989 1990 _ 1991 1992 1993 
Explanatory variables 
Husband Dummy ” 7.016" 6.949" 6.639" 7.365" 7.382" 9.022" 
, ^ r - “ 、 … (22.89) (21.98) (22.62) (23.41) (25.15) (26.41) 
Demographic Variables • ...：丨: 
Individual's Age Groups 
I"-; Age 31-40 “ 7 ’ ’ . ’ : , 0.961 0.238 0.735 2.068" 2.481" 0.993 
. . , . (1.62) (0.38) (1.13) (3.34) (3.95) (1.35) 
Age41-50 ‘ ‘ --r, .. 2.323" 0.625 1.693* 2.127" 3.815" 1.417 
‘  為’、、；• ；. ‘ ； (3.09) (0.79) (2.15) (2.72) (4.88) (1.56) 
1.216 -1.006 1.912* 1.831 1.781 -0.193 
… - :/〔:::： （1.31) (1.04) (2.03) (1.91) (1.88) (0.17) 
> Age 61 or above • , -10.463** -13.207" -4.272" -8.722" -8.212" -11.788" 
、 ’"？、•” ‘ (6.43) (7.77) (2.81) (5.28) (5.18) (6.76) 
Spouse's Age Groups 、-"：•‘’ •？ 
(Age 31-40 . 0.030 1.061 0.865 -0.532 -1.807** -0 721 
" f " … ( 0 . 0 5 ) (1.68) (1.33) (0.86) (2.88) (0.98) 
Age 41-50 ；. -0.954 0.642 0.208 -0.779 -2.830" -0.198 
" '、->，’’ > (1.27) (0.81) (0.26) (1) (3.62) (0.22) 
•為 Age 51-60 ‘广“‘ “ '二 ‘ -2.716" -1.111 -2.306* -4.264" -6.070“ -3.059" 
、二、‘ “；： (2.92) (1.15) (2.45) (4.45) (6.42) (2.82) 
'5:二, Age 61 or above .‘iK/:;:,,冗/一-々-6.449** -2.490 -8.560" -7.394" -7.742" -3.993* 
免 ' , V "：一t (3.96) (1.46) (5.62) (4.47) (4.88) (2.29) 
Number of Children 、〈 
No. of preschool children “ ' ‘ 0.549 -0.659 0.669 0.104 -1.347* -0 885 
• I (1 09) (1.24) (1.22) (0.19) (2.35) (1.21) 
；.No. of school-age children “ '"',；：1 0.774* 0.215 0.648 0.287 -0.924* -0 236 
键 ; 缺 够 辟 _ (2.26) (0.58) (1.72) (0.67) (2.13) (0.43) 
！;; No, of adolescent children 0.249 0.245 0.618* 0.531 -0 837* -o 651 
。 爛 场 , S 杀说 i〔，)销 (0.95) (0.86) (2.19) (1.7) (2.5) (1.55) 
No. Of adult Children - - /广） -3.693" -3.934" -3.923" -4.225" -6.144" -6 438" 
輕 吻 J 嫂 翻 ( 1 4 . 1 9 ) (15.4) (17.2) (16.21) (24.4) (21.51) 
Adult c o r e s i d e n t , , :、;r>:i':.:,! 
^^ ； Nc)' of male coresident adult -4.25" -3.721" -4.252" -5.197** -6.972** -6.292" 
- ^ - (5.81) (4.48) (6.05) (7.45) (9.58) (7.37) 
,:'、w No: offemale coresident adult .:..:』 -1.481" -1,469** -0.991* -1 455" -2 911" -2 144" 
《 麟 藥 (3.09) (3.09) (2.19) (2.94) (6.17) (3.64) 
Household endowments、！々；5 
Individual's educatiqnial level 象 
' f College or a b o v e . ：^  11.772" 11,045" 12.422" 12.639" 10.349" 8427" 
：礙 y ,丨扭 .保 '梅‘：，潘餘 ( 8 . 2 7 ) (6.7) (7.26) (6.13) (4.91) (3.09) 
.„,； Technical school ‘ ‘ •” 11.129" 10.818" 12.631" 12.63" 9 814" 8 426** 
• (7.87) (6.61) (7.42) (6.16) (4.67) (3.09) 
i^'Senior high school ~：：： P：; 10.723" 9.694" 11.108** 11.022" 7.616" 6 492* 
： 辩 , 變 戀 f l i p (7.65) (5.97) (6.56) (5.39) (3.63) (2.39) 
'-„. Junior high" school - 9.193" 8.065" 9.792" 9.490" 7.027** 5.109 
(6.68) (5.05) (5.86) (4.68) (3.37) (1.89) 
'^ ;>Primary school ^ 6.91** 5.161" 7.589" 7.522" 4 327* 2 516 
a m r m - m ^ ^ i ^ m i ((99) (3.23) (4.52) (3.7) (2.07) (0.93) 
Spouse's educational level 一 v : 
t^ fCollet or above - ： ‘ ： ‘ ‘ -4.751" -4.671" -4.974" -8.856** -5 416* -1 497 
(3.34) • (2.83) (2.91) (4.3) (2.57) (0.55) 
•：;jechnical school - ； ；••'；'. -5.300" -5.243** -6.310** -9.257** -5.950** -2.424 
； (3.75) (3.2) (3.71) (4.52) (2.83) (0.89) 
略：Senior high school;?, “ <•； -5.376" -4.384" -5.174** -9.087" "4.670* -0.955 
i : . — ! - • \ ' ' (3.83) (2.7) (3.05) (4.45) (2.23) (0.35) 
Junior high school -4.650" -4.098* -4.609" -8.376" -4.370* -0.530 
^ ‘。 ：乂“: 二了 ; J . (3.38) (2.57) (2.76) (4.13) (2.1) (0.2) 
Pnmaryschool -4.059" -2.789 -4.124* -6.642" -3 256 0 678 
• … ‘ . ' ' ' i (2.93) (1.75) (2.46) (3.27) (1.56) (0.25) 
In卯me ^ffegf ‘ ；«.：； 
V. Real femily non-labor income -0.007" -0.005** -0.006" -0.0049" -0.015" -0.015" 
(31.11) (27.03) (30.72) (25.18) (32.88) (26.33) 
Economic development .. 
Real GDP per capita -0.0003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0009 
“ “ (0.41) (1.21) (1.8) (1.33) (0.72) (1.1) 
、.-Square of real GDP per capita 0.0000001 -0.0000004 -0.0000004 -0.0000003 -0.0000002 -0.0000002 
' ' ’ ‘ (0.5) (1.35) (1.57) (1.04) (1.12) (1.27) 
Qqn t^ant ‘ > ‘ 35.996" 34.818" 33.343" 36.188" 41.543" 37.880" 
； - 、 / ‘  •‘ (18.65) (16.11) (14.88) (13.14) (13.91) (9.78) 
No of Obsen/ations •八 ^ 4932 4546 4994 5058 6506 5842 
R-square , ^ : 0.4459 0.4327 0.4657 0.4062 0.4645 0.4404 
Note: Absolute value of t-ratios are in parentheses 
•significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
Education is measured by discrete educational levels 
Tables 11 彳 
Continued Table 7.3 
二 • ： 1995 ^ ： 1996 — 1997 ：了 1998 1999 
Explanatory variables 
•• .-• 
Husband Dummy • 9.959“ 9.308” 10.021** 10.131" 9.455** 9.727** 
〜威: \ 厂、 (26.68) (24.35) (25.51) (24.06) (21.51) (20.6) 
Demographic Variables 
I门dividual s Age Groups ‘ ！ 
：A g e 3 M 0 - ^ ^ - v / z T 1 . 1 4 8 1.740* -0.874 0.289 0.427 1.256 
‘ (1.41) (2.07) (0.89) (0,27) (0.39) (1.07) 
Age 41-50 、•“ 、 1.970* 1.947 -0.184 2.273 1.838 3 488* 
• - . - (1.97) (1.88) (0.16) (1.81) (1.44) (2.49) 
.Age 51-60 :‘： 0.514 0.436 -3.144* -0.1742 0.262 -0.364 
' ' 、 ” - (0.42) (0.34) (2.26) (0.12) (0.17) (0.22) 
Age eror above :.、-.;‘• -12.301" -7.123" -15.245" -11.671" -12.141** -15.828** 
- J (6.55) (3.63) (6.95) (4.86) (5.07) (5.39) 
Spouse's Age Groups』：’-:" . 
Age 31"40 广 - -0.778 -0.991 1.985* 0.846 0.076 -0.700 
、、’识、 (0.96) (1.18) (2.02) (0.8) (0.07) (0.59) 
Age41-50 / , i -1.030 -0.511 1.925 -0.396 -0.615 -2.293 
赛 》 f e 祐 幾 (1 03) (0.49) (1.66) (0.31) (0.48) (1 64) 
Age 51-60 - , , ；• • ： -4.619" -3.029* -0.767 -4.363** -4.729" -6.487" 
‘‘/ , - , ‘ ‘ ^ (3.77) (2.38) (0.55) (2.91) (3.08) (3.84) 
Age61 or above -V-. l -4.333" -7.389" 2.888 -8.685" -9.091" -6 533* 
(2.31) (3.77) (1.32) (3.62) (3.8) (2.22) 
Number of Children ,. 
of preschool children '^r'' ； -0.756 -0.746 -0.826 -1.040 -0 039 -0 885 
• ； 攀 • 麵 ( 1 02) (0.95) (0.97) (1.17) (0.04) (0.86) 
of school-age children -0.248 -0.461 -0.400 -0.833 -0.097 -0 723 
� 丨 ( 0 . 4 3 ) (0.79) (0.62) (1.24) (0.14) (0.91) 
Of adolescent children ；my^f -0.185 -0.526 -0.608 -1.177* -0.030 -1 045 
(0.39) (1.04) (1.11) (1.96) (0.05) (1.53) 
. N o . of adult Children > -6.036" -6.856" -6.256** -5.731" -5.250" -5 657** 
：〜、々吟、……,,’ ’.：，Wy (17.88) (19.14) (16.29) (14.08) (11.35) (10.39) 
Adult coresident •?",。.’八？ 
No. of mala Coresident adult \ -6.767" -6.102" -6 048** -6 824** -8 321" -7 359** 
^ ‘ (7.11) (6.57) (5.72) (6.89) (8.33) (6.45) 
；jf；- No； Of female coresident adult -2.649" -2.555" -2.127" -1.997** -2 739" -2 043* 
. . ^ A (4.26) (3.85) (3.07) (2.9) (3.79) (2.44) 
_碎_ 9n{i(?wmentS 顿 續 
Individual's educational leveT: ‘弯_i：， 
-College or above tv；. 16.284" 10.448" 10.501" 3.232 7.865 12.464 
； ： 叛 i i l ^ ^ g i l (4.45) (2.95) (2.64) (0.66) (1.12) (1.21) 
-Technical school ‘ 16.329" 9.609" 10.917" 4.604 8 900 12 502 
必：礙 fe 弱 雜 ; ( 4 . 4 6 ) (2.72) (2.75) (0.93) (1.27) (1.21) 
Senior high school “ , 、 ？ 13,633" 7.503* 7.429 1.489 3.945 9.467 
丨 丨 ( 3 . 7 3 ) (2.13) (1.87) (0.3) (0.56) (0.92) 
J^； Junior high school y.；,^ / ；.v ^ ” .576" 5.046 5.504 -0.615 1.902 6.037 
(3.18) (1.44) (1.39) (0.13) (0.27) (0.59) 
Primary school 广 \ , 8.028* 2.523 3.519 -2.473 1.172 4.567 
’ ' • 、 八 ' . ‘ ‘ ’ ’ . 上 玄 ( 2 . 1 9 ) (0.71) (0.88) (0.5) (0.17) (0.44) 
Spouse's educational level •“ ’‘..、 
f：).. College or above , "rA fS. -10.743** -7.640* -13.795" 5.990 -3 853 7 281 
(2.94) • (2.16) (3.47) (1.21) (0.55) (0.7) 
,Technical school '之f;t《t>；;的-11.797" -7.710* -15.400" 4.213 <4.689 7.576 
• • • • , (3.22) (2.18) (3.87) (0.85) (0.67) (0.73) 
Senior high school 二,…’.'，-10.083** -5.945 -12.039" 7.657 -o 527 10 042 
-•‘， V ' / V J (2.76) (1.68) (3.04) (1.56) (0,08) (0 97) 
；,,,Junior high school , ‘ -8.843* -4.752 -11.1371" 9.582 0.957 13 375 
广 , 广 . 八 ‘ 与 （2.43) (1.35) (2.81) (1.95) (0.14) (1.3) 
Primary school ‘ ‘ “ ‘ f ““ -9.016* -4.493 -10.462" 9.103 1 036 13 163 
、• ： ；： ？：:识：::::':、:::、 （2.45) (1.27) (2.62) (1.84) (0.15) (1.27) 
Income effect ‘ ： ： 巧:， 
Real family non-labor income -0.012" -0.012" -0.012" -0.008" -0.007" -0.007" 
‘ ‘^ , ’ (22.89) (22.91) (22.41) (13.87) (14.58) (13.75) 
Economic development Vr 个、^ , 
严I GDP per capita . ：‘^；'；；‘‘/:"」 0.001 0.002* 0.001 -0.002* -0.002* -0.002" 
.二 v “ .-X::: • : (1.14) (2.37) (1.37) (2.07) (2.04) (2.7) 
Square of real GDP per capita j -0.0000002 -0.0000005* -0.0000002 0.0000002 0.0000002 0.0000003 
y、'二 ‘ ‘ i (1.04) (2.41) (1.2) (0.89) (1.02) (1.85) 
Qon^tant - . V ' X ' ' ‘ 38.140" 40.300" 45.810" 35.595" 41.086" 26 385 
‘ 、 ‘ (7.24) (7.85) (8.7) (5.01) (4.08) (1.8) 
•, • • ：^.... ’：：. -••'•：••.. "Ji''-''J‘ 
No. of Observations '"/'^J； , 5644 5742 5636 5640 5380 4946 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.7 to be continued 
Pooled OLS Regressions of the Economic Contribution to Family over Husbands and Wives with Husband 
Dummy in which Robustness is Control led, 1988-1999 
Dependent variables: Percentage share of husband's or wife's labor earnings in total family income 
Year: ' 19M 1”严~"1989 ，广 -歷… — • " • • � 1 £ 5 1 „ " "：了 . ： 一>：| 
Explanatory variables 
Husband Dummy -：“-.^ 8.504" 8.696** 8.505" 9.517" 9.512" 10.767** 
、 - ： 丄 ( 2 4 . 2 6 ) (23.38) (24.6) (25.04) (29.95) (29.51) 
Demographic Variables V' :、'W 
Individual's Age Groups:4；"^ :'::’.1>《:.:?:'’ 
Age 31-40 ： r ^ ^  0.536 -0.498 0.700 0.703 2.359" 0.167 
‘ - / (0.82) (0.76) (0.97) (1.02) (3.43) (0.22) 
Age 41-50 ‘ 0.494 -1.301 0.489 -0.124 2.883" -0.231 
(0-6) (1.55) (0.54) (0.13) (3.29) (0.24) 
Age51-60 " 广 ‘， ‘ -3.529** -5.175** -1.338 -3.743" -2.000 -4.404** 
. ’ / (3.28) (4.84) (1.16) (3.11) (1.79) (3.59) 
Age 61 or above : . -17.486" -17.832" -13.931" -17.137** -16.768** -18.595" 
:‘:':.;.,::::.,、::：. (12.07) (11.89) (9.08) (10.9) (11.96) (12.33) 
Spouse's Age Groups/..:、.: ‘ ' ' : : : :: 
• Age 31-40,. ’，… 、‘ ‘ 0.501 1.066 0.890 0.038 -1.594* -0.038 
• ： (0.78) (1.64) (1.28) (0.05) (2.33) (0.05) 
；Age 41-50 , ‘ 0.085 0.932 0.798 0.471 -2.154* 0.478 
‘ 、 . (0.1) (1.11) (0.91) (0.5) (2.46) (0.49) 
Age 51-60 . ：、 ‘，‘； -2.277* -2.162 -3.808" -4.757" -6.743" -4.776" 
«、 V (2.06) (1.93) (3.3) (3.89) (5.97) (3.84) 
Age 61 or above - ‘ -5.470" -6.576" -8.181" -7.747" -8.872** -6.65" 
“,‘厂,、，、•,-_、<,/:;'‘‘:.、:）. . ？、 （3.71) (4.42) (5.38) (4.83) (6.19) (4.37) 
Number of Children 今 ：/广 
No. of preschool children ,、 : /、 ‘ 0.572 -0.899 0.677 0.505 -1.276 -0 773 
” 人 l i i 斧 ' ' : � � ’ 缚 ( 0 . 9 2 ) (1.36) (1) (0.63) (1.98) (0.96) 
；,No. of school-age children 1.001* 0.635 1.017* 1.340* -0 541 0 361 
/ - ? 、 " : ： : ' ； 人 ” ‘ ( 2 . 3 1 ) (1.4) (2.17) (2.24) (1.03) (0.55) 
；^；； No,, of adolescent children . 0.615 0.843* 1.073" 1.415** -0.342 0.303 
. iUr 广！、’ ‘ （1.79) (2.36) (3.85) (3.51) (0.76) (0.57) 
: v No. of adult children ' ；,. -3.001** -2.961** -3.094** -2.860** -5.425" -5.313" 
办 … 人 ： • 'I (10.45) (10.84) (11.78) (9.98) (18.26) (16.39) 
Adult coresident 
No. of mate coresident adult \ -3.610" -3.026** -4.233" -4.399" -7 004" -6 208** 
； ‘ : , 飞 、 i v ' > (4-77) (3.1) (4.68) (4.7) (8.46) (6.27) 
,：No. of female coresident adult -1.073* -0.705 -0.499 -0 851 -3 113" -2 269** 
（1 96) (1.23) (0.95) (1.41) (6.24) (3.43) 
Household endowments ‘ ； . ' h . : -
Individual's educational level "-、—, 
\ College or above v ^ 14.462** 12.82" 15.208" 13.189" 11.783" 10.761 “ 
(12.56) (10.94) (13.4) (10.09) (8.71〉 （7.58) 
^^'Technical school - ' ^ " v^X i ^ r f f f i 13.698** 12.929" • 15.248" 13.296" 10.94" 10.867** 
… 、 、 丄 ( 1 2 . 2 7 ) (11.12) (13.74) (10.32) (8.11) (7.63) 
{ Senior high school 崎〜i ‘ ^ 12.601" 10.847** 13.541" 10.588" 8.457** 8 452" 
'丨 l iS 譯 絲 ( 1 1 - 4 7 ) (9.55) (12.35) (8.36) (6.31) (6.06) 
4；；； Junior high school,,^,,；'“‘ ^；； 10.778" 9.260" 11.631" 8.952" 7.574** 6.625" 
(10.19) (8.42) (11.09) (7.22) (5.75) (4.81) 
々 Primary schoo!•、八‘‘广.〜\、;： 6.818" 4.517" 7.137" 4.925" 2.757* 1.697 
耀 ( 6 . 6 2 ) (4.22) (6.97) (4.03) (2.11) (1.26) 
Spouse's educational l e v e l -
MConeqeor -3.262* -1.779 -2.401 -6.204" -3.305 -1.081 
丨 ( 2 . 1 5 ) (1.04) (1.48) (3.25) (1.9) (0.58) 
‘,Technical school ' - 4 . 1 6 4 " -2.727 -4.525" -7.011" -3.834* -2.160 
,、.：？：、. .:〈.t 广;‘'？、》一” (2.76) (1.6) (2.81) (3.68) (2.21) (1.16) 
Senior high school . ^ -4.408" -1.998 -3.328* -6.616** -3.103 -0.826 
' \ , , ； (2.95) (1.19) (2.07) (3.5) (1.79) (0.45) 
Junior high school,； ；；；；^；.； ' -3.671* -1.776 -2.583 -6.249" -2.516 -0 509 
“ (2.5) (1.08) (1.64) (3.33) (1.47) (0.28) 
Pri‘rparY school -， -2.510 -0.561 -1.275 -4.369* -1.201 1.102 
. … • • • . Q . 、 ： ： (1.74) (0.34) - (0.82) (2.34) (0.7) (0.61) 
Income effect , , : … … 
：‘^  Real family non-labor income -0.007" -0.006" -0.006" -0 005** -0 014" -0 013** 
； > “ (17.03) (19.61) (10.75) (8.26) (15.54) (17.72) 
Economic development .‘，'，；.；、 
Real GDP per capita 0.001 0.002 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002** 
, V ... .-.Q^.,：,；：,^：.：；,；J (1) (1.92) (2.55) (2.28) (2.1) (2.65) 
.Square of real GDP per capita -0.0000002 -0.0000006 -0.0000006* -0.0000005 -0 0000004* -0 0000005* 
(0.68) (1.56) (2.12) (1.54) (2.21) (2.35) 
Constant ,.”'•'-〜.’ ：31.322** 29.811" 26.749" 31.623** 36.129" 32.714" 
, … … 广 ’ ： : ^ ‘ (16.31) (13.65) (13.74) (12.76) (16.45) (13.28) 
No. Of Observation ’ 、 5884 5524 6096 6234 7846 7158 
R-square •、- - ：：:“ ‘ ： 0.5854 0.5778 0.5952 0.5506 0.601 0.5976 
Note: Absolute value of t-ratios are in parentheses 
'significant at 5% level： ** significant at 1% level 
Sample observations exclude families in which any one spouse is self-employed 
Education is measured by discrete educational levels 
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continued Table 5.9 
Year: 腿 1995 一 腿 — 舰 : ： 广 ： ； , 广 1999 
Explanatory variables 
Husband Dummy ‘ 11.913" 11.113** 11.499" 12.000" 11.780" 11.833** 
, (30.8) (27.58) (28.94) (27.76) (25.86) (24.97) 
Demoamohic Variables ‘ 
Individual's Age Groups 、.、:-.,.,.:. 
Age 31-40 1.118 1.231 0.563 2.355* 2.736* 1.852 
(1.27) (1.39) (0.51) (1.98) (2.18) (1.43) 
Age 41-50 1.107 0.299 1.178 3.508* 3.960" 3.605* 
； . . ' ‘ 、 • 〜’‘ (1.02) (0.27) (0.92) (2.5) (2.69) (2.32) 
"Age 51-60 ’ -2.527 -3.595" -3.898* -0.703 -0.424 3.550 
“ '、 ‘ 、 (1.87〉 (2.51) (2.53) (0.42) (0.25) (1.94) 
Age 61 or above -16.590" -17.718" -17.422" -14.868" -14.760" -18.364" 
- (10.56) (9.65) (9.86) (7.85) (7.57) (8.66) 
Spouse's Age Groups ； • 
.Age 31-40 … 、 • -1.129 -1.116 -0.102 -1.784 -2.877* -1.810 
X ,、、v (1.28) (1.24) (0.09) (1.5) (2.25) (1.37) 
：Age 41-50 ’ v., • • • / -0.860 0.025 -0.272 -2.513 -3.948** -3.728* 
、、 - . : :、 ‘ . , • (0.8) (0.02) (0.21) (1.8) (2.64) (2.38) 
；:Age 51-60 ' - ‘ , -7.376" -6.322" -5.632" -9.130" -11.252** -10.069" 
‘ ‘ (5.35) (4.3) (3.55) (5.48) (6.39) (5.37) 
V Age 61 or above ’... ；？ -9.220" -10.571** -6.668" -11.840" -14.065" -9.883" 
f (5.76) (5.69) (3.69) (6.3) (7.27) (4.55) 
Number of Children ' , ‘ ^ 
'；No. of preschool children . ‘ ‘ -0.135 0.184 -0.081 -0.919 0.458 -0.551 
麵 连 (0.16) (0.21) (0.09) (0.92) (0.44) (0.52) 
4 N o / o f school-age children , 0.674 1.001 0.846 -0.058 0.677 0.154 
（1.02) (1.54) (1.11) (0.08) (0.81) (0.17) 
’.份旧 o:』bf adole&ennihildrbh、卞益巧.:.:、 0.811 1.163* 0.839 -0.093 1 202 0 049 
(1.46) (2.01) (1.39) (0.15) (1.8) (0.07) 
o^ Na of adult children ；'：；'；. . / . M -5.177** -5.356" -5.256" -5.376" -4.327" •4.904" 
(15.55) (13.19) (14.31) (14.6) (11.09) (10.33) 
Adult coresident 
No. of male coresident adult 、绍-6.693" -6.077" -6.304" -6 107" -7 739" -7 202** 
；泛 Z ' r ' '' , ( 6 . 6 1 ) (6.16) (5.66) (6.21) (7.72) (6.14) 
No. of female coresident adult j -2.016" -2.920** -2.199" -2.466" -3.718** -2.629" 
“、 :、 7 ^二 , ‘ (3.2) (4.19) (3.13) (3.47) (4.93) (2.89) 
Household endowments ： , , 
individual's educational lever' 
College or a b o v e ' ' , 11.019** 10.041" 10.273" 6.209" 7.695" 9.510** 
V: , ‘ r / . f 人‘巧叫？々 '‘"^  -.^vr- 1 (7.41) (5.92) (6.66) (3.73) (4.9) (5.43) 
.. Technical school^, '^Js；.； 10.618" 8.736" 10.190" 7.588" 9.009" 9.431" 
(7.1) (5.92) (6.6) (4.54) (5.73) (5.35) 
7.602" 6.319" 6.596" 3.990* 3.532* 5.274* 
(5.17) (3.79) (4.37) (2.42) (2.28) (3.04) 
•H^HniorNgh school ...錄赞,<《./j 4.929** 3.376* 3.999* 1.182 0.931 1.134 
(3.45) (2.07) (2.72) (0.74) (0.62) (0.67) 
丄 微、:P l i f l ^ i ^ ^ i 0.853 0.155 0.586 -1.349 -0.344 -1.368 
(0.61) (0.1) (0.39) (0.84) (0.23) (0.81) 
Spouse's educational level ‘ , 
；College or above *： ：：； -1.129 -1.968 1.617 2.376 3.212 -3.681 
” ‘ 二 。 ： 〜 , ’ ’ \ (0.61) (1.94) (0.78) (1.07) (1.27) (1.26) 
i)； Technical school . -2.690 -1.705 0.103 0.416 1 669 -3 819 
灣 S:5;i|i|i_:�,::�(1.46) (0.81) (0.05) (0.19) (0.66) (1.31) 
.發:Senior Wgh school V“v, -0.875 -0.003 3.274 3.729 5.529* -0.952 
"•‘ • - >麵::::.::::、(0-48) (0) (1.6) (1.68) (2.19) (0.33) 
Junior high school .. : ; 0.319 0.772 4.352* 5.803" 7.547** 2.071 
, 丫 ” . 、？ (0.18) (0.38) (2.16) (2.66) (3.02) (0.71) 
Primary school , . 0 . 3 4 8 0.717 4.312* 4.589* 5.939" 1.278 
痛 磁 , ( 0 . 1 9 ) (0.35) (2.09) -(2.1) (2.37) (0.44) 
Income effect : .. 
„Real family non-labor income , -0.011" -0.009" -0.011" -0.008" -0.007 -0.007 
、 1 (19.9) (6.93) (19.05) (16.33) (14.56广 （9.21 广 
Economic develooment —i;”: 乂'「’ 
I^ Real GDP per capita 0.003** 0.003" 0.003" -0.0002 -0.00004 -0.001 
‘ ‘ ‘ - ‘ ! ：‘ (3.04) (3.76) (3.01) (0.23) (0.05) (0.8) 
.：、SqiiSre'of real GDF> per capita. -0.0000005" -0.0000006" -0.0000005* -0.00000007 -0 00000008 0 00000008 
' i l ^^W.：..^ , (2.38) (3.29) (2.4) _ (0.49) (0.51) 
Constant ； ； 广 . 3 0 . 9 6 6 " 31.565" 27.782" 33.338** 30.989" 37.159** 
二 力 。 ‘ （12.43) (10.79) (9.6) (10.92) (9.45) (10.14) 
No. of Observation ‘ «‘-':.」’' 、， 7180 7202 7214 7246 7138 6882 
R:square . ， . . , 0.5914 0.5535 0.5621 0.5097 0.5079 0.5101 
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Table 5.10 to be continued 
PooJed OLS Regressions of the Economic Contribution to Famify over Husbands and Wives with Husband Dummy 
in which Sample Observations restricted to Double-wage Earners Families and Robustness is Controlled , 1988-1999 
Dependent variables: Percentage share of husband's and wife's labor earnings in total famjiy income 
Year: I M ‘ 煙 . . . . . 1990 , ..：：1991； 丄遠“:，1993 
Explanatory variables 
Husband Dummy . -> V r^ 'Jp^  7.016" 6.949" 6.639** 7.365" 7.382" 9 022** 
. - r . ? •�'^； \ (23.52) (21.77) (22.32) (23.18) (26.45) (26.75) 
Demographic Variables ::飞驟 
Individual's Age Groups ‘ . -
0 、 •；二：：) 0.961 0.238 0.735 2.068" 2.481" 0.993 
h ' … ( 1 . 6 4 ) (0.4) (1.27) (3.31) (4.11) (1.36) 
-Age 41-50 . … - ： 2 . 3 2 3 " 0.625 1.693* 2.127" 3.815" 1.417 
、，、，-、’:V，々 ,二;‘：、（>;::. ‘ (3.08) (0.83) (2.32) (2.59) (4.97) (1.54) 
Age 51-60 • " ‘ ^ ^ < 1.216 -1.006 1.912* 1.831 1.781 -0 193 
… “ 、 、 / - : 、 • ? > (1.26) (1.05) (2.03) (1.73) (1.8) (0.17) 
.Age 61 or above -10.463" -13.207" -4.272" -8.722" -8.212" -11 788" 
(4.26) (5.96) (2.12) (3.63) (4,65) (6.51) 
Spouse's Age Groups •‘’冷坑:、:。） 
Age 31^0 ^ 、 0.030 1.061 0.865 -0.532 -1.807" -0.721 
‘ - ‘ (0.05) (1.8) (1.49) (0.85) (3.02) (0.97) 
Age41-50 ， … ， - 0 . 9 5 4 0.542 0.208 -0.779 -2.830" -0.198 
, , ' • . (1.3) (0.85) (0.28) (0.94) (3.7) (0.21) 
— 碟 I ： 驟 : - 2 . 7 1 6 " -1.111 -2.306* -4,264" -6.070" -3.059" 
: : 摩 : 錄 _ _ (2.86) (1.17) (2.43) (4.03) (6.16) (2.66) 
Age 61 or above "^ '^ '^ .^ i；；'； ' -6.449** -2.490 -8.560" -7.394" -7.742" -3.993* 
'-.«”：内*V》？ (3.06) (1.13) (4.34) (3.38) . (4.17) (2.07) 
Number of Children ‘ 
of preschool children ^  V 0.549 -0.659 0.669 0.104 -1.347* -0.885 
< 多 :〜、：二、次 ( 1 . 0 2 ) (1.16) (1.28) (0.17) (2.43) (1.23) 
% Na of school-age children 0.774* 0.215 0.648 0.287 -0 924* -0 236 
(2.11) (0.54) (1.58) (0.63) (2.1) (0.44) 
No. Of adolescent children 0.249 0.245 0.618* 0.531 -0 837* -0 651 
攀 f e 納 窗 ， 職 (0.86) (0.78) (2.03) (1.68) (2.26) (1.44) 
-3.693" -3.934" -3.923" -4.225" -6.144" -6.438" 
霸 纖 ( 謂 （ • ) (15.8) (15.21) (21.32) (21.35) 
‘ ‘ .No. of mate coresident adult ？：^  -4.25** -3.721** -4.252" -5.197" -6.972** -6 292** 
, , -- ^ (5.82) (4.36) (5.8) (6.1) (9.84) (6.9) 
No. of female coresident adult '' -j -1.481" -1.469" -0.991* -1 455** -2 91 r * -2144" 
華 ; ( 3 . 0 5 ) (3.05) (2.15) (2.69) (6.63) (3.38) 
Household sndowmBnts 
Individual's educational. 
V College or above' 11.772" 11.045" 12.422" 12.639" 10.349" 8.427" 
(6.24) (5.71) (5.71) (6.38) (5.03) (2.52) 
::单口?Chnicalyhooh^ 瑜 1 1 . 1 2 9 " 10.818" 12.631" 12.630" 9.814" 8.426" 
(6.01) (5.63) (5.84) (6.42) (4.78) (2.52) 
I Smor high S ^ o f f 10.723** 9.694" 11.108" 11.022" 7.616" 6.492 
嫌 丨 麵 s i f 够 J ! (5.81) (5.05) (5.15) (5.61) (3.71) (1.95) 
Junior high school ；v、?攻厂•《9.193** 8.065" 9.792** 9.490" 7.027" 5.109 
；'-u^-ki^： "v；； (5.04) (4.25) (4.57) (4.86) (3.45) (1.53) 
Primary school ” 崎 6.910" 5.161** 7.589" 7.522" 4 327* 2 516 
‘ “ 、 。 “ \ (3-8) (2.7) (3.54) (3.84) (2.11) (0 75) 
Spouse's educational level , I 
^^College or above -4.751 >4.671* -4.974* -8.856" -5 416 -1 497 
： ； 广 】 （ 1 . 9 5 ) . (2.2) (2.2) (4.11) (1.55) (0.53) 
,,Technical school ‘ ’‘丨.，、“ -5.300* -5.243* -6.310" -9.257" -5.950 -2.424 
； ,〜V . v l . J (2.18) (2.48) (2.8) (4.31) (1.71) (0.85) 
Senior high school 宏 ： - ' � . . - 5 . 3 7 6 * -4.384* -5.174* -9.087** -4 670 -0 955 
/ " -t：^- . ： ' ' (2.22) (2.07) (2.3) (4.24) (1.34) (0.34) 
• Junior high school / ； 二 -4.650 -4.098' -4.609' -8.376" -4.370 -0.530 
… -""V ； • V ‘ (1.93) (1.96) (2.06) (3.92) (1.26) (0.19) 
Pnmary whool ^ ；；'^.. ‘ -4.059 -2.789 -4.124 - 6 . 6 4 2 " -3.256 0.678 
M j t 〖 ； 打 : 够 ： (1.7) (1.32) (1.84) (3.09) (0,94) (0 24) 
In印me麵驟驗麵丨 -
flealfamil：^ non-labor incomi^  ‘. -0.007" -0.005" -0.006" -0 0039** -0 015" -0 015" 
？ ,〜‘- -” .丄： -、 ' : -•力、 ( 1 3 . 3 8 ) (17.21) (18.57) (6.83) (14.7) (17.45) 
Economic development 纖 
：.,Real GDP per capita ；^  -0.0003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0005 0 0009 
(0-41) (1.25) (1.77) (1.2) (0.72) (1.12) 
V Square of real GDP per capita < 0.0000001 -0.0000004 -0.0000004 -0 0000003 -0 0000002 -0 0000002 
(0.52) (1.4) (1.53) (0.92) (1.14) (1.32) 
Qon t^ant , 、 “ '丄‘ 35.996" 34.818" 33.343" 36.188" 41.543" 37.880" 
03.16) (11.79) (12.68) (10.78) (8.82) 
No. of Observations :•::‘？,拖'’.r^i 4932 4546 4994 5058 6506 5842 
R-squara ：.；：;^；^；^：；：； i： 0.4459 0.4327 0.4657 0.4062 0.4645 0.4404 
Note: Absolute value of t-ratios are in parentheses 
•significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
Education is measured by discrete educational levels 
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• 项 ’ ： 歴 “ : : , 1996 1997 1998 ： 1999 
Explanatory variables 
Husband Dummy - 9.959" 9.308" 10.021" 10.131" 9.455" 9.727" 
； ‘ ( 2 6 . 8 4 ) (24.65) (25.73) (23.86) (21.52) (20.7) 
Demoaraphic Variables、, ‘ 
Individual's Age Groups “ ‘ “ 
^ " Age 3t-40 ；•十卜？ - 1.148 1.740* -0.874 0.289 0.427 1.256 
> (1.41) (2.14) (0.99) (0.28) (0.4) (1.11) 
. Age 41-50 > .'v'/ ^ 1.97* 1.947 -0.184 2.273 1.838 3.488* 
‘^  ‘ (2.01) (1.94) (0.17) (1.84) (1.45) (2.55) 
Age 51-60 ’ ' ， … . . ' y r . 0 . 5 1 4 0.436 -3.144* -0.174 0.262 -0.364 
二二了T :广 (0.41) (0.34) (2.33) (0.12) (0.17) (0.22) 
Age 61 or above -12.301" -7.123" -15.245" -11.671** -12.141" -15.828" 
> ' / ‘ (5.97) (3.21) (7.04) (5.19) (4.78) (6.08) 
Spouse's Age Groups ‘ 
Age 31-40 ^ - ' , , -0.778 -0.991 1.985* 0.846 0.076 -0.700 
. . ， r 二 ’ 工 ( 0 . 9 7 ) (1.2) (2.21) (0.83) (0.07) (0.6) 
Age41-50 - f - : • v- ； -1.030 -0.511 1.925 -0.396 -0.615 -2.293 
^ - - ‘‘广 "V ‘ (1.06) (0.5) (1,79) (0.32) (0.49) (1.65) 
i巧"Ag6 51-60 r . "V〜 -4.619" -3.029* -0.767 -4.363" -4.729" -6.487" 
經 (3.75) (2.32) (0.57) (2.95) (3.07) (3.87) 
- A g e 61 or above ..^' -V：,^/ -4.333* -7.389" 2.888 -8.685" -9.091" -6.533* 
(2.08) (3.43) (1.36) (3.94) (3.72) (2.51) 
Number Of Children ‘ , r 、 > 
No. of preschool children； ；J；' /'' -'： -0.756 -0.746 -0.826 -1.040 -0.039 -0.885 
. - - f u s - ' ^ f l ^ C ^ ^ l ^ y ( 1 . 0 2 ) (0.98) (1.05) (1.16) (0.04) (0.92) 
‘ No. of school-age children * • -0.248 -0.461 -0.4 -0.833 -0.097 -0.723 
(0.41) (0,78) (0.59) (1.2) (0.13) (0.85) 
-：；? No of adolescCTt children -0.185 -0.526 -0.608 -1.177 -0.030 -1 045 
；“丄..••；‘ (0.36) (1.03) (1.09) (1.93) (0.05) (1.44) 
却 1 -！喊麟赃 : - 6 . 0 3 6 * * -6-856" -6.256" -5.731" -5.250" -5.657" 
V；：-' '-^-^；：； '"-；^：；^-^'-； (16.66) (17.85) (15.23) (13.35) (11.07) (9.55) 
〜ult coresident . -
^；‘"No/^ maie coresident adult-； ‘ ^ -6.767" -6.102" -6.048" -6.824" -8.321" -7.359" 
、厂：：；。：£-'”一 (7.24) (6.53) (5.36) (7.33) (8.89) (6.78) 
v No.pffemale coresident adult : -2.649" -2.555" -2.127" -1.997** -2.7389" -2.043*^  
(4.36) (3.91) (3.09) (3) (3.79) (2.19) 
Household endowments 
Individual's educational level^：^?.'^^ 
College or above : ‘ 16.284" 10.448" 10.501" 3.232 7.865** 12.464** 
‘ ^ ^ j T i . C (3.89) (3.05) (2.84) (1.24) (3.03) (7.74) 
T:. Technical.school 〜‘、;,：二、, J 16.329" 9.609" 10.917" 4.604 8.900" 12.502** 
： ‘ 厂 ; ( 3 . 9 1 ) (2.8) (2.95) (1.76) (3.42) (7.68) 
high SChool�|li^ ^爹縣為 13.633" 7.503* 7.429* 1.489 3.945 9.467" 
躺 滿 ( 3 . 2 6 ) (2.19) (2.01) (0.57) (1.53) (7.68) 
Junior high school 5 11.576" 5.046 5.504 -0.615 1.902 6.037** 
〜 气 : / 、 4 ‘ : 4 | y I (3.78) (1.48) (1.49) (0.24) (0.74) (5.9) 
二 . : . P n m a r y s c h o o 「 . 句 8 . 0 2 8 2.523 3.519 -2.473 1.172 4.567" 
(1.91) (0.74) (0.94) (0.93) (0.44) (3.91) 
Spouse's educational level 
^I^College or above 广’ -10.743 -7.640 -13.795** 5.990 -3.853 7.281-
. “ " ' 、 „ (1.76). (1.24) (3.66) (1.13) (1.12) (2.8) 
/ Technical school、，.综;::髮雜恕-11.797 -7.710 -15.400" 4.213 -4.689 7.576" 
(1.94) (1.25) (4.09) (0.79) (1.36) (2.87) 
=Senior high school , ：' -10.083 -5.945 -12.039** 7.657 -0.527 10.042" 
二 一 ’ c (1.65) (0.96) (3.2) (1.45) (0.15) (2.98) 
：必 Junior high ichoo丨 ： 广 . ； -8.843 -4.752 -11.137** 9.582 0.957 13.375" 
,…:‘.’丨 （1.45) (0.77) (2.96) (1.81) (0.28) (3.96) 
,,Primary school 二： - 9 . 0 1 6 -4.493 -10.462" 9.103 1.036 13.163" 
•X‘-“、 ’ ：::’；，卢 (1.47) (0.73) (2.74) (1,71) (0.3) (5.07) 
Income effect .、.化V-.•’;, . :銷 -
‘Real family non-labor income ' > ' -0.012" -0.012" -0.012" -0.008" -0.007" -0.007" 
• r ' . - - - - .〜 . ‘ ― • ‘ (13.15) (14.66) (12.99) (10.43) (11.52) (7.77) 
Economic development. ； 场 • .i 
Real GDP per capita -J.'； ； 0.001 0.002* 0.001 -0.002* -0.002* -0.002** 
' 广 i 0.15) (2.41) (1.4) (2.11) (2.1) (2.73) 
〜Square of real GDP per capi ta-0.0000002 -0.0000005* -0.0000002 0.0000002 0 0000002 0.0000003 
献 ’ 奴丨魏?？^巧丨均 (1.07) (2.51) (1.25) (0.94) (1.08) (1.91) 
Constant ‘ “ ： “ ；‘ ； 38.140" 40.300" 45.810" 35.595" 41.086" 26.385" 
，！， ， ( 5 . 1 2 ) (5.58) (9.2) (5.89) (9.07) (7.92) 
No.'of Observations : ‘ “ 5644 5742 5636 5640 5380 4946 
R-square - „ . ,> , , . : ‘H: ;v :S,# . : : 0.4089 0.3805 0.3706 0.3152 0.3235 0.3163 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7.1 to be continued 
Pooled OLS Regressions of the Economic Contribution to the family over Husbands and Wrves with Husband Slope Dummies, 1988-1999 
Dependent variables: Percentage share of husband's or wtfe's labor earnings in total family income 
I Year：! , 涵 ~ | . M S ~ l l f f i | I M 1 1 9 9 2 ~ | 
** . - . — - . V - V I w^^ ； • - >. , W ..-> 
Interaction wth IntarKtlon wHft Intwactlon wtti Interaction with Interaction wlti IntncHon wtli 
Explanatory variables HwlwniPMmmY .Bagbin；'Pummv Huibanajaumna Hmband Dummy HuHaml Dummy Huibind Dumm» 
Husband Dummy . . . . . . … 、 1 1 . 2 3 1 " “ 10.857** 11.699" i l w F i T s ^ 
、“ , ( (13.65) (12.73) (14.58) (15.72) (17.56) (15.5) 
Demoahohic Vanables , 
Individual's Age Groups 一 、 ; . 一 
<• Age 31-40 1.049 0.163 0.951 0.953 3.184" 1.144 
. . (1.37) ' (0.19) (1.08) (1.13) (4.05) (1.27) 
Age 41-50 、、 0.749 -0.568 1.014 0.067 4.104** 0.908 
, , 、 „ (0.79) (0.55) (0.98) (0.07) (4.3) (0.83) 
Age 51-60 ’了•^八,二 -3.900** -5.130** -1.516 -4.181" -1.847 -4.496** 
< "v / V ' > >  (3.51) (4.32) (1.28) (3.52) (1.67) (3.57) 
'Age 61 or above .:'.•‘:.'’：.’.:_ -16.934** -17.637** -14.283~ -17.183** -16.726~ -18.290** 
(12.37) (12.23) (10.11) (11.95) (12.49) (12.2) 
Spouse's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 ‘，._.•.〈..： -0.012 0.405 0.638 -0.213 -2.420** -1.015 
‘ (0.02) (0.47) (0.72) (0.25) (3.08) (1.13) 
Age 4 1 - 5 0 " ，，者 -0.171 0.199 0.272 0.278 -3.374- -0.661 
‘ ‘ > (0.18) (0.19) (0.26) (0.27) (3.54) ‘ (0.61) 
Age 51-60 •‘ -1.905 -2.207 -3.63** -4.318" -6.896** -4.683'* 
* ‘ 、*〜 (1.72) (1.86) (3.06) (3.63) (6.23) (3.72) 
Age 61 or above ；•’， -6.021" -6.772" -7.828** -7.702** -8.913** -6.955-
、-〜•、：，1 - (4.4) (4.7) (5.54) (5.36) (6.66) (4.64) 
Number Of Children 厂 >•• 
,,No. of preschool children -2.375" 5.894" -3.522~ 5.246** -2.218" 5.791~ -2.598** 6.207** -4.147** 5.743~ -4.028- 6.511** 
<3.26) (7.66) (4.37) (5.89) (2.65) (6.21) (3.12) (6.8) (5.08) (6.65) (4.05) (6.17) 
No. of school-age children' -1.702" 5.406** -1.856** 4.982** -1.212* 4.459" -1.654** 5.988*： -3.330** 5.578** -3.268** 7.259** 
- “ 广 ， ， ( 3 . 5 3 ) (11.07) (3.52) (9.56) (2.24) (8.68) (2.73) (10.65) (5.83) (10.99) (4.94) (12.91) 
：N'O. Of adolescent dliWrerU^S -1.384** 3.999** -1.097* 3,879" -0.746 3,637** -0.946* 4.723** -2.721** 4.758** -3,196** 6.997** 
A ' l s ' ^ l " 鄉 入 ' ( 3 - 5 4 ) (8.36) (2.56) (7.68) (1.74) (7.2) (2.04) (8.42) (5.78) (8.69) (5.8) (11.32) 
No. of adult Children -4.635" 3.269** -4.614** 3.307** -4.626** 3.065** -4.654~ 3.589** -8.169" 5.487** -8.420** 6.215** 
- (13.9) (7.58) (13.93) (7.71) (15.16) (7.84) (13.56) (8.19) (26.11) (14.65) (23.71) (14.68) 
Adult coresident ,. -、.:"!V.?. 
ft; No. of mate coresident adult -2.346 -2.529 -3.196* 0.341 -3.844** -0.777 -4.120** -0.557 -7.471 0.935 -7.293** 2.171 
A " (1.86) (1.42) (2.21) (0.17) (3.06) (0.44) (3.32) (0.32) (6.1) (0.54) (5.25) (1.11) 
No. of female coresident adult -1.991* 1.836 -0,326 -0.758 -0.8751 0.753 -1.780* 1.858 -3.385** 0.544 -2.598** 0.660 
(2.45) (1.6) (0.4) (0.66) (1.09) (0.67) (2.06) (1.53) (4.33) (0.49) (2.74) (0.49) 
"wwftgfefg喻wTOnfy 
Individual's educabonal level 
^College or above 勺14.430** 12.349** 14.670" 12.927" 10.950** 10.020** 
’ - :了： f r 广 ’ " - ( 1 3 . 8 9 ) (10.95) (13.53) (10.12) (8.62) (6.85) 
Technical school '‘ 7’,;, 13.692** 12.469** 14.695** 13.071- 10.046** 10.133" 
. ‘ ^ “ (13.45) (11.3) (13.83) (10.33) (7.95) (6.95) 
Senior high school -广-》； 12.556" 10.314- 12.909- 10.284- 7.457** 7.580** 
、叫、V> \ 乂tV" : (12.69) (9.62) (12.43) (8.3) (5.98) (5.29) 
'Jimior high school ^ v- \ f 10.768" 8.799- 11.093** 8.727** 6.705** 5.920** 
—if二- '^ W；^^  ^^ (11-5) (8.63) (11.25) (7.27) (5.52) (4.22) 
Primary school " 6.856** 4.205" 6.725" 4.810- 2.220 1.151 
：‘心 (7.47) (4.22) (6.94) (4.03) (1.84) (0.83) 
Spouse's educational level , , 
College or above ’，广 “ - 3 . 230 * * •• -1.309 -1.862 -5.942** -2.473 •0.340 
广 以 二 二 和 厂 - ( 3 1 1 ) (1-16) (1.72) (4.65) (1.95) (0.23) 
Technical sc^oof ‘ 、 . -4.158** -2.267* -3.971" -6.786** -2.941* -1.426 
‘ 、 , . ‘ ； r ‘ ‘ (4 08) (2.05) (3.74) (5.36) (2.33) (0.98) 
'Senipr high school ‘ - 4 , 3 6 3 * * -1.465 -2.697** -6.312** -2,101 Q.046 
(4.41) (1.37) (2.6) (5.09) (1.69) (0.03) 
Junior high school :"]:-、：-..、 -3.660** -1.315 -2.045" -6.023** -1.647 0.195 
- ’ “ r " (3-91) (1.29) (2.07) (5.02) (1.35) (0.14) 
Pnmaty school . -2.548" -0.249 -0.863 -4.254** -0.664 1.648 
(2.78) (0.25) (0.89) (3.56) (0.55) (1.19) 
Income effect " 
Real family non-labor income -0.007** 0.001 -0.007** 0.001** -0.007** 0.002** -0.005** 0.001** -0.016** 0.002** -0.014~ 0.003** 
< (26.5) (1.67) (24.77) (4.21) (26.75) (5.38) (23) (3.23) (30.02) (6.3) (26.6) (5.37) 
Economic devetoomant 
Real GDP per capita - ‘ 0.001 0.002 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002** 
.. (0.98) (1.93) (2.56) (2.35) (2.09) (2.59) 
Square of real GDP per capita -0.0000002 -0.0000006 -o.oooooos* -0.0000005 -o.ooooow -o.oooooos* 
\ ‘ (0-66) (1.65) (2.16) (1.59) (2.15) (2.25) 、 、 ’ 
’ (L* ‘ ‘‘ 
Ssas&nt ‘ ； ‘ • 、- 29.959** 28.730- 25.152" 29.971** 34.118** 31.153-
• ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ 卜 (18.67) (16.28) (14.48) (14.76) (17.84) (1379) 
No, of Observations 5884 5524 6096 6234 7846 7158 
R-square ‘ 0.5889 0.5799 0.5976 0.5532 0.6052 0.6012 
Jomt Tests " - , 
F-Staf; ™ , ' V 6.95 3.91 4.97 5.13 11.86 9.2 
Prob>F •： " " I 0 0.0003 0 p p p 
Noto: Absolute value of t-ratioa are in parentheses 
Sample observations exclude families in which anv one spouse is self-emptoyod 
Education Is measured by discrete educational levels 
Joint Tests are done on the null hypothesis that the coefficients on aH the interaction terms are zem. And the alternative hypothesis is that at least on« of the coefficients on the 
interaction terms are nonzero. 
"•significant at 5% Jevol: ~ sionificant at 1% level 
Tables I23 
Continued Table 7.1 
Year：!、 I S M ~ ~ I M | | H Z | iM | 
Interaction with Interaction with IntmcUon with Interaction with Intaraction with Intwaction with 
Explanatory variables JjMf<>«n<» PMfnmY DumiSlf Hv^ban^  pumipy MMT^I"' Pumirnr Hu»band Dummy Hu»b«nd Dummy 
HuabandDummv:. .，..>“‘?；•、 14.929** 14.723~ 15.395** 15.941~ 13.365- 12.510-
： " - , > t ‘ 、 • … ( 1 6 . 2 8 ) (15.63) (15.6) (15.4) (12.56) (11.28) 
Dernoaraphic Variabhs 
Individual's Age Groups :,—:-.，•/ 
Age 31-40 、‘ » 1.242 ““ 1.259 0.908 2.302 3,327* 1.600 
' ' ' “ ‘ ‘ “ (1.3) (1.23) (0.8) (1.9) (2.54) (1.14) 
":^Age:41-50, 1.375 0.676 1.732 3.471' 4.216~ 2.719 
% (1.19) (0.55) (1.32) (2.44) (2.79) (1.67) 
Age 51-60 -3,085' -4.032~ -4.292- -1.381 -0.443 -4.495* 
(2.3) (2,83) (2.85) (0.86) (0,26) (2.46) 
Age 61 or above -16.440" -17.804- -16.653** -14.268- -13.509~ -17.437-
i . ，， (10.49) (10.66) (9.53) (7.56) (6.87) (8.24) 
Spouse's Age Groups 秘,; 
,Age 31-40 、, ^ ' -1.253 -1.144 -0.448 -1.731 -3.469** -1.558 
“ (1.31) (1.12) (0.4) (1.43) (2.65) (1.11) 
Age 41-50；—么'.、二 . ' / 亡 - 1 . 1 2 8 -0.352 -0.827 -2.477 •4.204- -2,842 
. ‘ ^ ' ' ' ' ' ' (0.98) (0.29) (0.63) (1.74) (2.79) (1,75) 
Age 51-60 、 -6.818** -5.886" -5.237** -8.452'* -11.233” -9.125~ 
, . , ” , : ； • , ( 5 . 0 9 ) (4.13) (3.48) (5.25) (6.59) (4.98) 
Age 61 or above - -9.370** -10.484~ -7.436- -12.440** -15.315** -10.810** 
。 、 (5.98) (6.28) (4.25) (6.59) (7.79) (5.11) 
Number ot Children'、:、為;; 
No. of preschool chiidren ^ -5.225** 10.179** -4.408** 9.184** -4.109** 8.056** •6.374** 10.910** -4.268** 9.452** -6.288** 11.474** 
• 於 : 笼 ： 麵 ！ 娶 魏 ( 5 . 1 5 ) (9.23) (4.04) (7.44) (3.54) (6.02) (5.28) (7.69) (3.39) (6.12) (4,47) (6.91) 
^ N o . 0» school-age children '< -3.881** 9.110** -3.058" 8.119** -3.966** 9.624~ -5.068** 10.018** -4.608** 10.571 ~ -6.031 ~ 12.370" 
广、八•/'"^、 , • (5-45) (14.5) (4.14) (12,03) (5.02) (13.43) (6.15) (12.88) (5.26) (12.49) (6.39) (13.52) 
,No. 'of adolescent children. «； -3.089** 7.801** -2.635-* 7.596** -3.454** 8.586~ -5.176** 10.167** -4.594- 11.592~ -5.728** 11.553** 
. ( 4 . 9 2 ) (11.23) (4.02) (10.87) (5.13) (12.32) (7.06) (13.24) (5.96) (13.97) (7.02) (12.94) 
y No. "of adult c h i l d r e n - 8 . 3 2 9 * * 6.303** -8.463~ 6.216** - 8 . 8 1 7 . 1 1 0 * * -8.612** 6.472" -7.542** 6.429** -8.422** 7.035** 
(21.81) (13.63) (20.82) (12.92) (21.26) (14.63) (19.81) (12.75) (15.92) (11.82) (16.55) (12.03) 
.No. of male coresident adult -4.889- -3.608 -4.032** -4.09 -5.583~ -1.442 -5.080** -2.034 -6.921** -1.635 -8.410" 2.417 
• • » (3.18) (1.66) (2.71) (1.95) (3.4) (0.62) (3.31) (0.94) (4.65) (0,78) (5.13) (1.04) 
Of female coresident adult -2.131* 0.231 -3.377** 0.913 -1.459 -1.479 -2.142' -0,648 -2.227' -2.982 -0.249 •4.761** 
(2.17) (0.17) (3.27) (0.63) (1.4) (1) (2,1) (0.45) (2.05) (1.95) (0.2) (2.75) 
Individual's educational Iwer.:： '^: 
Col le t or above ：；^-!^：.^：： ^  10.788** 9.590** 10.164** 7.044** 8.704** 11.137** 
• (6.92) (5.64) (6) (3.32) (3.55) (4.54) 
球.Technical school v - x 10.332" 8.302** 9.965- 8.269- 9.880" 10 863** 
(6.61) (4.88) (5.87) (3.9) (4.03) (4.43) 
Senior high school " 7.397** 5.826~ 6,459- 4.664' 4.411 6.744~ 
々 ； ” “ (4.82) (3.47) (3,87) (2.23) (1.82) (2.77) 
,Junior high s c h o ? 丨 4 . 7 8 1 * * 2.991 3.888* 1.861 1,769 2.625 
(3.19) (1.82) (2.38) (0.9) (0.74) (1,09) 
Primary school , ' 1 ‘ ^ 0.857 0.021 0.634 -0.789 0.332 >0.180 
(001) (0.38) (0.38) (0.14) (0.07) 
educational lever ^ ；^ . 
Collage or above . • -0.898 -1.517 1,726 1.540 2.204 -5.307* 
.； (0.58) (0.89) (1.02) (0.73) (0.9) (2.16) 
J Technical school ‘ -2.404 -1.271 0.328 -0.266 0.799 -5.251* 
. ‘ (1.54) (0.75) (0.19) (0.13) (0.33) (2.14) 
• ' ^n j o r high school ' -0.670 0.490 3.412* 3.056 4 649 -2 422 
, , (0.44) • (0.29) (2.04) (1.46) (1,91) (1) 
"Junior high schod 0.467 1.156 4.463** 5.123* 6.710** 0.581 
'"•• . '.-、'?i-、.： . , : ‘ , . :> (0.31) (0.7) (2.73) (2.48) (2.79) (0.24) 
Primary school 0.343 0.852 4.263** 4.029 5.264' 0.090 
” ‘ , . “ - (0.23) (0.51) (2.57) (1.94) (2.18) (0.04) 
Inwm ffffgpt ,：4；：； •,：,. 
^ Real family notvlabor income -0.012” 0.003** -0.01- 0.003** -0.012" 0.003** -0,009** 0.002* -0.008** 0.003” -0.007~ 0.003 
(25.36) (5.22) (21.93) (4.3) (23.31) (3.5) (17.71) (2.42) (16.74) (3.25) (17.06) (1.87) 
Economic development 
.Rea» GDP per capita 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** -0.0002 •0.00004 -0.001 
“ ’ (3.01) (3.82) (2,98) (0.23) (0.04) (0.78) 
Square of real GDP per capita -0.0000005' -0.0000006** -0.0000005. -0.00000007 -0.0000001 0.0000001 
• (2.32) (3.24) (2.31) (0.37) (0.46) (0.48) 
• • * 、 ‘ . . . ，. 
Constant 29.458*^ 29760** 25.834- 31.366- 3 0 . 1 9 6 3 6 . 8 2 0 * * 
‘ ‘ 〜 … … (12.28) (11.18) (9.54) (9.77) (8.19) (9.89) 
No. of Observations , 7180 7202 7214 7246 7138 6882 
R-square - •‘ >> , 0.594 0.5564 0.5664 0.5134 0.5105 0.5141 
Joint Tests: ‘ -乂 —.、 
F-slat, ^ ？ 6.65 6.66 10.25 7.89 5.39 8.02 
Prob>F 。 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 7.2 to be continued 
Pooled OLS Regressions of the Economic Contribution to the family over Husbands and Wives with Husband Slope Dummies in which Robustness is 
controlled, 1988-1999 
Dependent variables: Percentage share of husband's or wife's labor earnings in total family income 
Y^ 1988 I ：：.  ； 1989 iHo 皿 | ； im T~ im 
IntirKtlonwtm kitmctton with kitKacVon wtth ' Intmclian wtOi MwicltonwW) kitmctfon wMi 
Explanatory variables HmtWltfPmfflY Jju^bwd pufiwiy Jig^ Oummv JHntetaggM Hu»i»nd Oammy 
Husband Dummy 11.231** 10 .857- 11.699"* 12.823~ 13.533** 13 .890-
. ” (9.82) (10.31) (8.31) (7 94) (12.34) (12.13) 
P^mpfjr^efv ••： 
Individual's Age Groups “ 
Aga 31-40 - 1.047 0.163 0.951 0.953 3.184~ 1.144 
‘ (1.57) (0.23) (1.27) (1,33) (4.57) (1.46) 
Age 41-50 . h 0.749 -0.568 1.014 0.069 4.104** 0.908 
、， （0.9) (0.65) (1.11) (0.07) (4,67) (0.92) 
Age 51-60 -3.900** -5.130** -1.516 -4.182- -1.847 -4.496~ 
(3.61) (4.74) (1.32) (3.5) (1.65) (3.62) 
Age 61 or above -16.934** -17.636** -14.283~ -17.183~ -16.726~ -18.290~ 
> (11 24) (11.38) (8.87) (9,73) (11.36) (11.86) 
Spouse s Age Groups 
Age 31-40 -0.012 0.405 0.638 -0.213 -2.420** -1.015 
' ^ (0.02) (0.58) (0.86) (0.3) (3 .49) ' (1.28) 
Age 41 50 , -0.171 0.199 0.272 0.278 -3.374- •0.661 
(0.21) (0.23) (0.3) (0.29) (3.84) (0.66) 
Age 51-60 ....:.._..• -1.905 -2.207 -3.630** -4.318- -6.896- -4.683** 
〜 (1.73) (1.94) (3.16) (3.58) (6.13) (3.75) 
Age 61 or above -6.021** -6.772** -7.828~ -7.702" ^.913~ -6.955~ 
• (3.99) (4.45) (5.01) (4.65) (6.09) (4.55) 
Number of Children „ 
No, of preschool children > r -2.375** 5.894** -3.522** 5.246** -2.218~ 5.791~ -2.598~ 6.207~ -4.147** 5.743~ -4.028** 6.511-
、 — (3.32) (7.55) (4.42) (5.82) (2.62) (6.02) (3.63) (6.89) (5.12) (6,67) (4.55) (6.27) 
No. of school-age children •.‘ … -1.702** 5.406** -1.856- 4.982** -1.212* 4.459~ -1.654** 5.988- -3.330** 5.578** -3.268** 7.259~ 
i 'vA ‘ . (3.54) (11.29) (3.61) (9.62) (2.31) (8.89) (2.71) (10.72) (5.36) (10.69) (4.84) (12.88) 
No, of adolescent chtldren ^ , -1.384** 3.999** -1.097* 3.879** -0.746 3.637” -0.946' 4.723** -2.721 ** 4.758** 6.997** 
(3.65) (8.55) (2.43) (7.71) (1.78) (7.23) (2.01) (8,56) (5.94) (8.72) (5.85) (11.52) 
No. of adult children 工C -4,635** 3.269** -4.614** 3.307- -4.626** 3.065" -4.654~ 3.589** -8.169~ 5.487~ •8.420~ 6.215** 
(13.86) (7.62) (13.56) (7.66) (15,12) (7.6) (13.82) (8.11) (26.13) (14.69) (23.52) (14.59) 
Adult coresident 
No. of male coresident adult . -2.346 -2.529 -3.196* 0.341 -3.844•* -0.777 -4.120** >0.557 -7.471 ~ 0.935 -7.293- 2.171 
'、 、 (1-94) (1.32) (2.34) (0.2) (3.22) (0.56) (3.35) (0.23) (6.1) (0.65) (5.65) (1.13) 
s No. of female coresident adult -1.991* 1.836 -0.326 -0.758 -0.875 0.753 -1.780* 1.858 -3.385" 0.544 .2.598" 0.660 
(2.51) (1.69) (0.45) (0.54) (1.21) (0.67) (2.11) (1.64) (4.59) (0.59) (2.98) (0.69) 
Household endowmants、：:、.： 
Individual's educational level : 、 
College or above o> 14.430** 12.349** 14.670~ 12.927~ 10.950~ 10.020** 
” " ^ (12.44) (10.45) (12.82) (9.85) (8.22) (7.1) 
Technical school : + 13.692** 12469- 14.695** 13.071- 10.046” 10.133** 
«. (12.08) (10.6) (13.08) (10.1) (7.56) (7.19) 
Senior high school 12.556~ 10.314'* 12.909~ 10.284** 7.456~ 7.580~ 
- A “ ' W v ‘ (11-22) (8.95) (11.54) (8.06) (5.63) (5.48) 
Junior hiflh school ；' 广 10.768** 8.799" 11.093- 8.727** 6.705- 5.920~ 
^ 广 〜 ( 9 . 9 8 ) (7.89) (10.34) (6.99) (5.17) (4.34) 
Primary school a ‘ " ^ 6.856- 4.205” 6.725~ 4.810~ 2.21 1.152 
^ (6.62) (3.91) (6.46) (3.97) (1.75) (0.88) 
Spouse's educational level ：.-> .•.•.•. 
College or above -3.220* -1.309 -1.862 -5.942** -2.473 •0.340 
* ^ ^ (211) (0.76) (1.14) (3.11) (1.41) (0.18) 
Technical schooJ j -4.158" -2.267 -3.971* -6.786~ -2.941 -1.426 
‘ « "•对〜/ 妒 ( 2 - 7 3 ) ( 1 - 3 2 ) ( 2 . 4 4 ) ( 3 . 5 5 ) ( 1 . 6 8 ) ( 0 . 7 7 ) 
Senior h �gh school ~4.363- -1.465 -2.696 ^ .312- -2.101 0.046 
, (2.9) ‘ (0.86) (1.66) (3,33) (1.2) (0.03) 
Junior high school -3.660* -1.315 -2.045 -1.647 0.195 
(2.47) (0.79) (1.28) (3 21) (0.95) (0.11) 
Primary school -2.548 -0.249 -0.863 -4.254' -0.664 1.648 
• ’ V- (1.76) (0.15) (0.55) (2.28) (0.38) (0.92) 
Income effect 
Real family non-labor income -0.007** 0.001 -0.007** 0.001** -0.007** 0.002" -0.005** 0.001” ^).016** 0.002" -O.OW 0.003" 
： (28.5) (1.62) (24.62) (4.39) (26,86) (5.02) (23.52) (3.64) (30.22) (6.33) (26.76) (5.57) 
Economic develooment 
Real GDP per capita _ 0.001 0.002 0,002' 0.002* 0.002* o,002~ 
(1.01) (1-93) (2.55) (2.29) (2.11) (2,66) 
Square of real GDP per capita -0.0000002 -0.000001 -o.ooooor .0.0000005 -o.oooooo4- -o.oooooos* 
(0-68) (1.58) (2.13) (1.54) (2.22) (2.36) 
..一、..• »•’•”-.•:••• •」".. 
P g 她 ftf 29.959- 28.730- 25.152- 29.971 •• 34.118- 31.153-
(15.14) (12.98) (12.22) (11.77) (15.26) (12.46) 
No. of Observations , 5884 5524 6096 6234 7846 7158 
R-square 0.5889 0.5799 0.5976 0.5532 0.6052 0.6012 
Joint Tests: ：：厂 
F-Btat 4.5 3.41 3.53 1.92 11.86 10.03 
Prob>F : I 0 0 0.0009 0.0616 0 Q 
Note: Absolute value of t-ratios are in parentheses 
•significant at 5% level： " significant at 1% hvel 
Sample observations exclude families in which any one spouse is self-employed 
Education is measured by discrete educational levels 
J。int Tosts am done on the null hypothesis that the coefficmnts on all the intemction terms are zero. And the aftemative hypottmsis is that at least one of the coeffidents on the 
interaction terms are nonzero. 
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Continued Table 7.3 
Year: I : 1994 - I 1995 I 19ft6 
Wife as base ‘ Husband as base** Wife as base ‘ Husband as base** Wife as base‘ Husband as base^  
Total M o n o i ^ c con t r ibu t ion d i f ferent ia l 1 2 . 4 8 1 5 1 2 . 4 8 1 5 1 1 . 9 9 6 3 1 1 . 9 9 6 3 1 2 . 1 5 7 6 1 2 . 1 5 7 6 
(C H - c w ) 
- P e r c c n l a f i c ‘ ( ^ j "^wj )Ph, Pcrccnlafic‘ '-"H -乏i^'P、 Pcrccntafic ’ ( ^J - ^ i , P e r c e n t a g e ' ' 乏 , P c r c c n l a c e ‘ i K i "^w, iPk, PcrccnUcc‘ 
Adjustment for husband-wtfe differences 
In th9 following characteristics: 
Individual's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 -0.0984 -0.788B -0.0082 -0.0656 -0.0800 •0.6668 -0.0101 -0.0838 -0.0615 -0.5063 0.0182 0.1498 
Age 41-50 0 . 0 0 5 2 0 . 0 4 1 5 0 .0071 0 . 0 6 6 8 - 0 . 0 0 0 8 -0 .0066 - 0 . 0 0 0 2 - 0 . 0 0 1 5 0 . 0 0 0 7 0 .0061 0 . 0 0 0 5 0 . 0 0 4 2 
Age 51-60 -0 .1511 - 1 . 2 1 0 9 - 0 . 0 1 5 3 -0 .1226 -0 .2852 -2 .3777 - 0 . 0 3 3 5 - 0 . 2 7 9 2 -0 .2636 - 2 . 1 6 7 8 -0 .0631 •0 .5194 
Age 61 or above -0.8026 -6.4305 -1.5124 -12.1168 -0.7417 -6.1827 -1.2864 -10.7234 -0.6455 -5.3098 -1.2088 -9.9430 
% of differential explained -8.3885 -12.2482 -9.2338 -11.0879 -7.9777 - •10.3084 
Simple average of the two estimates '10.3184 '10.1608 -9.1431 
Spouse's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 -0.0082 -0.0658 -0.1031 -0.8259 0.0267 0.2227 -0.1047 -0.8729 0.0772 0.6349 -0.0694 -0.5708 
Age 41-50 0.0021 0.0164 0.0093 0.0749 0.0014 0.0116 -0.0019 -0.0161 -0.0003 -0.0024 0.0006 0.0046 
Age 51-80 0 . 0 9 2 0 0 7 3 6 9 0 . 0 5 7 7 0 . 4 6 1 9 0 . 0 9 6 9 0 . 7 9 9 7 0 . 1 2 3 0 1 . 0 2 5 3 0.G972 0 . 7 9 9 5 0 .0602 0 . 4 9 5 3 
Age 61 or above 0.3061 2.4520 0.4769 3.8209 0.2993 2.4950 0.5303 4.4206 0.1668 1.3722 0.2860 2.3527 
%ordiff9mntial9xpiained 3.1396 3.5318 3.5290 4.5568 2.8041 2.2818 
Simpl9 average of ttm two estimates 3.3357 4.0429 2.5430 
Individuars educational tavel 
College and above 2.4831 19.8943 0.9150 7.3308 2.0563 17.1409 0.1863 1.5532 2.0828 17.1316 0.8810 7.2464 
Technical school -0.3834 -3.0715 -0.1194 -0.9567 -0.2158 - 1 7 9 9 0 0.0157 0.1306 -0.2023 -1.6639 -0.0637 -0.5238 
Senior high school -0.3000 -2.4037 •0.0770 -0.6170 -0.1959 -1.6330 0.0425 0.3542 -0.2833 -2.3305 -0.0852 -0.7009 
Junior high school -0.1935 -1.5502 -0.0423 -0.3390 -0.1502 -1.2519 0.0966 0.8054 -0.1711 -1.4075 -0.0407 •0.3348 
Primary school -0,1647 -1.3198 -0.0147 -0.1175 -0.0853 -0.7113 0.2334 1.9459 -0.0919 -0.7560 0.0105 0.0867 
% of dimrnntialexplained 11.5491 5.3006 11.7456 4.7893 10.9737 5.7736 
Simple average of the two estimates 8.4249 8.2675 8.3736 
Spouse's •ducBtloMl l«v*i 
College and abova -0.2615 -2.0953 0.8791 7.0428 -0.1340 -1.1170 0.7754 6.4636 0.0397 0.3262 0 2 7 3 6 2.2508 
Technical school 0.0336 0.2689 -0.1437 -1.1512 0.0197 0.1544 -0.0526 -0.4382 办0180 -0.1478 -0.0218 -0.1794 
Senior high school 0.0378 0.3027 -0.0769 -0.5162 0.0493 0.4107 -0.0189 办 1577 0.0000 0.0000 0.0962 0.8077 
Junior high school 0.0417 0.3339 -0.0322 -0.2577 0.0597 0.4980 0.0179 0.1489 0.0144 0.1181 0.1337 1.0999 
PrimBfy school 0.0350 0.2802 -0.0614 -0.4918 0.0204 0.1699 0.0273 0.2276 办 0204 -0.1677 0.2149 1.7680 
%of(imrm}tml9xplain9d -0.9096 4.5260 0.1261 6.2442 0.1288 5.7470 
Simph avwagg of the two estimates 1.8082 3.1851 2.9379 
Percentage of contribution differential that 
can ba txplained (%) 5.3906 1.1102 6.1669 4.5025 5.9288 3.4941 
Slmpl9 Avng^ of the two ostimafs (%} 3.2504 5.3347 4 7 1 1 5 
Percentage of tconomic contribution 
dHTerenttal that ara unexplainable (%) 9 4 . 6 0 9 4 9 8 . 8 8 9 8 9 3 . 8 3 3 1 9 5 . 4 9 7 5 9 4 . 0 7 1 2 9 6 . 5 0 5 9 
Slmpft Avrwg* of tfie two estfmafs (%) | 967496 | | | 94.6653 95.2885 
Year: ' V -： -；, - _ l 1998 -?.〜--.、-- j. - ^ j W - ' 
Wife as base' Husband as base^  Wife as base' Hasband as base" Wife as base* Hasband as base" 
^ Total economic contr ibut ion dif ferential 12.7323 12.7323 12.7931 12.7931 12.8692 12.8692 ( - Cw ) 
(乏,.芝—P、 PcrceoUfic ‘ ( h i -Zw, )Piij P c n x n U f i c ' 丨 、 P c r c c n U E c ' (、 j "^wj ^Ph, PCfccnURc* PcrccnUfic' ( ^ J - Z 9 , P c r c e n U e c ' 
Adjustment for husband-wife mffwnncBS 
In th9 following ctmnctvristlcs: 
Individuars Age Groups 
Afle 31*40 -0.1190 -0.9347 -0.0417 -0.3273 -0.1459 -1.1407 -0.0968 - 0 7 5 6 7 -0.1053 ^ . 8 1 8 4 0.0557 0.4326 
Age 41-50 -0.0172 -0.1350 -0.0166 -0.1303 -0.0117 -0.0911 -0.0181 -0.1418 -0.0310 -0.2408 0.0070 0.0640 
Afle 51-60 -0.2260 -1.7749 0.0105 0.0826 -0.2590 -2.0243 0.0589 0.4606 -0.2051 -1.5936 -0.2017 -1.5669 
Age 61 or above -0.5720 -4.4922 -1.2217 -9.5954 ^ . 5 2 1 7 -4.0781 -1.2361 -9.6625 -0.4866 - 3 7 8 3 0 -1.5907 -12.3601 
%0fdmr9ntlal9xplain9d -7.3368 -9.9704 -7.3341 -10.1003 -^.4358 -13.4404 
S/mp/» average of th9 two estimatas -8.6536 -8.7172 -9.9381 
Spouse's Age Qroupi 
Age 31-40 -0.0163 -0.1278 -0.0971 -07625 •0.0235 -0.1840 -0.2162 -1.5901 0.0353 0.2747 -O.OB83 -0.6864 
Age 41-50 -0.0132 -0.1036 -0.0106 -0.0835 -0.0080 -0.0624 -0.0215 -0.1684 0.0105 0.0818 -0.0387 -0.3008 
Age 51-60 0.2102 1.6507 0.0936 0.7354 0.2389 1.8676 0.2506 1.9589 0.1474 1.1455 0.1963 1.5251 
Aa»01 or above 0 . 4 6 6 9 3 . 6 6 7 0 0 . 4 0 4 7 3 . 1 7 8 8 0 . 5 2 4 9 4 . 1 0 2 9 0 . 5 8 3 0 4 . 5 5 6 8 0 . 3 3 9 3 2 . 6 3 6 4 0 . 4 5 7 9 3 . 5 5 8 0 
% ofdifhnntial exptainod €.0863 3.0682 5.7241 4.6572 4.1382 4.0960 
Simph BV9rag0 offhe fwo 9stima/9s 4.0772 5.1907 4.1171 
Individual's •ducational levtl 
College and above 1.8280 14.3570 2.2563 17.7212 2.1171 16.5490 1.0926 8.5409 2.1235 16.5003 2.3963 18.6201 
Technical school -0.1800 -1.4139 -0.2312 -1.8156 -0.3787 -2.9601 -0.1957 -1.5295 -0.3091 -2.4022 -0.3408 -2.5480 
SBniorhigh school -0.1161 -0.9043 -0.2150 -1.6888 -0.09S4 - 0 7 6 9 3 -0.0375 办 2928 -0.0294 办2281 •0.0464 -0.3604 
Junior high school - 0 . 1 8 5 9 - 1 . 4 5 9 9 -0 .6591 - 5 . 1 7 6 4 - 0 . 2 0 6 6 - 1 . 6 1 5 0 - 0 . 1 6 3 2 - 1 . 2 7 5 8 - 0 . 1 8 6 6 - 1 . 4 5 0 2 - 0 . 5 1 9 6 - 4 . 0 3 7 5 
Primary school -0.0277 -0.2172 -0.5587 -4.3883 ^ . 0 8 9 1 -0.6968 -0.1470 -1.1491 -0.0734 -0.5703 -0.4944 -3.8420 
% ofdiffer9ntial9xpfaimd 10.3618 4.6522 10.5079 4.2936 11.8495 7.7322 
Simph average of th9 two 9stimates 7.5070 7.4007 9.7909 
Spouse's eduoitional level 
College and above 0.1468 1.1533 0.4620 3.6289 -0.4203 -3.2855 0.4040 3.1578 -0.2092 -1.6258 1,4917 11.5912 
Technical school -0.0289 -0.2269 -0.0456 -0.3583 0.0754 0.5896 •0.0696 -0.5439 0.0473 0.3675 -0.1889 -1.4675 
Senior high school 0.0009 0.0072 0.0159 0.1252 0.0498 0.3893 0.0266 0.2097 0.0078 0.0603 ^ . 0 1 5 4 -0.1197 
Junior high school 0.0170 0.1334 0.2003 1.5731 0.2230 1 7 4 2 7 0.2640 2.0636 0.1749 1.3593 -0.0434 -0.3373 
Primary school -0.0504 -0.3957 0.1546 1.2146 0.1969 1.5544 0.2120 1.6574 0.2400 1.8548 -0.0863 -0.6705 
% ofdiffonntialvxpiained 0.6713 6.1835 0.9906 6.5444 2.0260 9.9962 
Simph ay/9ng9 oftho two estimates 3.4274 3.7675 5.5111 
Percentage of contribution differential that 
can b« explained (%) 8 7 8 2 5 3.9335 9.8885 5.3960 11,5779 7.3839 
S/mp/t Avwmg. of tfi> fwo wtfrnafs (%) 6.3560 7.6417 9.4809 
Percentage of economic contribution 
differential that are unexplalnabta (%) 91.2175 96.0665 90.1115 94.6050 88.4221 92.6161 
SImpf Avngu ofth9two estimafs (%) 93.6420 | 92.3563 90.5191 
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Table 7.3 to be continued 
Decomposition of the Husband-wife Economic Contribution Differential, 1988-1999 
Education Is measured by discrete educational levels 
Wife as base' Husband as base** Wife as base* Husband as base^ Wife as base^ Husband as base" 
Total ^ o n o i ^ c contribution differential 9 .2698 9.2698 9.3574 9.3574 9.5635 9.5635 
(C H - C w ) 
Ufi, Pcrccntaac‘(之hJ )吞H Percentage' ^n Pcrccniagc' U^j - Iv , Pcrccnlage" (^ n PcrccnUgc*^  t之hJ _之w(、钱H ftrcenUiic【 
A(^ustm»nt for hushMnd-wifB dlfferencBS “ 
In th9 following chanctaristics: 
Indh/idual's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 -0.0654 -0.7057 -0.0649 -0.6997 0.0055 0.0584 -0.0519 -0.5551 -0.0197 •0.2062 -0.0855 -0,8941 
Ags 41-50 -0.0021 -0.0223 0.0119 0.1286 -0.0141 -0.1502 0.0120 0.1279 -0.0025 -0.0258 0.0050 0.0519 
Age 51-60 -0.6372 -6.8740 0.0230 0.2486 -0.6718 -7.1795 0.0503 0.5376 -0.4488 -4.6929 0.1510 1.5786 
Age 61 or above -0.9073 -9.7880 -0.8865 -9.5632 -1.0044 -10.7336 -0.9157 -9.7854 -0.7347 -7.6819 -0.9644 -10.0645 
% of ^ fBntiai explained -17.3901 -9.8857 -18.0049 -9.6751 -12.6068 -9.3480 
Simple average of the two estimatBs -13.6379 -13.8400 -10 9774 
Spoust's Ag» Groups 
Age 31-40 0.0137 0.1478 -0.0309 -0.3333 0.0842 0.9000 -0.0623 -0.6660 0.1221 1.2770 -0.0303 -0.3166 
Age 41-50 0.0037 0.0399 0.0006 0.0066 -0.0048 -0.0510 0.0081 0.0863 -0.0023 -0.0245 0.0003 0.0027 
Age 51-60 0.1370 1.4782 -0.1351 -1.4573 0.0888 0.9493 -0.0415 -0.4442 0.1173 1.2270 -0.0005 -0.0053 
Age 61 or above 0.1027 1.1084 0.0882 0.9514 0.0930 0.9939 0.2750 2.9389 0.2772 2.8463 0.1900 1.9870 
% ofdiffemntiatexplained 2.7743 -0.8327 2.7923 1.9149 5.3256 1.6678 
Simple average of the two estimates 0.9708 2.3536 3.4967 
Individuars •ducational 丨 
College and abovs 1.7442 1B.8162 1.2980 14.0027 1.9009 20.3141 0.8977 9.5935 1.9822 20.7272 1.6933 17.7056 
Technical school 0.0090 0.0968 0.0066 0.0709 -0.0250 -0.2667 -0.0119 -0.1272 -0.1409 -1.4737 -0.1190 -1.2444 
Senior high school 0.0781 0.8427 0.0634 0.6841 0.1258 1.3442 0.0598 0.6395 0.0990 1.0347 0.0969 1.0133 
Junior high school -0.1643 -1.7722 -0.1586 -1.7112 -0.2936 -3.1374 -0.1627 -1.7384 -0.2483 -2.5965 -0.2737 -2.8623 
Primary school -0.2502 -2.8069 -0.3004 -3.2408 -0.2283 -2.4403 -0.0518 -0.5535 -0.3426 -3.5829 -0.4751 -4.9677 
% ofcmrentialoxplained 15.1766 9.8057 15.8140 7.8139 14.1089 9.6445 
Simpl9 average ofthe two estimates 12.4912 11.8139 11.8767 
Spouse's ttducational t«vel 
Coll»g» and above 0.6852 7.3920 0.3361 3.6258 0.9441 10.0894 0.1852 1.9796 0.5214 5.4518 0.4868 5.0907 
Technical school 0.0045 0.0482 0.0011 0.0122 -0.0145 -0.1549 -0.0010 -0.0108 -0.0473 -0.4950 -0.0433 -0.4529 
Senior high school 0.0507 0.5469 0.0090 0.0967 0.0909 0.9713 -0.0117 -0.1248 0.0407 0.4258 0.0184 0.1920 
Junior high school •O.ISSS •1.3902 -0.0083 -0.0890 -0.2860 -3.0563 0.0558 0.5968 -0.1369 -1.4310 -0.0189 -0.1977 
Primaryschool -0.4501 -4.8554 0.0678 0.7313 -0.4198 -4.4866 0.1057 1.1291 -0.2927 -3.0604 -0.0147 -0.1539 
Xofdiff^mntialexpiainsd 1.7415 4.3770 3.3630 3.5700 0.8913 4.4781 
Simph average of the two esfimafes 3.0593 3.4665 2.6847 
Percentage of contribution dm»rential that can 
tw •xplainsd (%) 2.3024 3.4644 3.9643 3.6238 7.7191 6.4424 
SImph Av9ng9 of tfie two wtffrwrea (%) 2.8834 3.7941 7.0807 
P»rc»ntag« of economic contribution 
dWirential that a r t unexplainable (%) 97.6976 96.5356 96.0357 96.3782 92.2809 93.5576 
Stmph Av9naB of tfw two estfmafes {%} | 97.1166 丨 | 96.2059 92.9193 | 
Year: I ‘ 1991 一 19S2 1993 
Wife as base' Husband as base^ Wife as base' | Husband as base'* Wife as base' | Husband as base" 
T o t a l j i c o n ^ i c contribution differential 10.4901 10.4901 10.2541 10.2541 11.1664 11.1664 
(Ch - Cyy ) 
(Z^ ftrccntagc'= (4 j )Ph, ftrccnlase。（乏,-乏PferccnUgc* PcrccnUse' (Z, Pbrccntage' ？accni^' 
Atiiustment for /lUsband-kWfe dlfTenncBs 
In ih» following chancteristlcs: 
Individuars Ag» Groups 
Ago 31-40 -0.0236 -0.2251 -0.1311 -1.2494 -0.1706 -1.6641 -0.1177 -1.1478 -0.0471 -0.4219 0.0180 0.1609 
Ag® 41-50 -0.0143 -0.1365 0.0209 0.1986 0.0071 0.0693 0.0136 0.1323 -0.0014 ^ .0125 0.0018 0.0163 
Age 51-60 -07215 -6.8781 0.1997 1.9041 -0.3636 -3.5456 0.1093 1.0657 -0.3165 -2.8344 -0.0516 -0.4617 
Age 61 or above -0.9399 -8.9596 -0.8597 -8.1950 -0.8411 -8.2021 -1.1477 -11.1922 -0.8317 -7.4481 -1.4610 -13.0843 
% of <mr9ntialexplained -16.1995 -7.3415 -13.3425 -11.1420 -10.7169 -13.3688 
Simple avorage ofth，two (wrtma^ss - -11.7705 -12.2422 -12.0429 
SpouM's Ag« Qroups 
Age 31-40 -0.0224 -0.2133 -0.0629 -0.5997 -0.0702 -0.6844 -0.1469 -1.4330 0.0762 0.6821 -0.0932 -0.8348 
Aoe 41-50 0.0042 0.0401 0.0017 0.0166 0.0068 0.0663 0.0111 0.1087 -0.0042 -0.0372 0.0043 0.0385 
Aob 51-60 0.2606 2.4847 0.0179 0.1709 0.2450 2.3896 0.1026 1.0007 0.0591 0.5290 0.0701 0.6278 
Age 61 or above 0.2518 2.4958 0.2446 2.3319 0.3388 3.3038 0.2505 2.4434 0.1887 1.6895 0.2443 2.1878 
* of dUferentiai 9xptaln9d 4.8073 1.9196 5.0753 2.1197 2.8635 2.0191 
Simple average of tho two estimates 3.3635 3.5975 2.4413 
Indh/idual's vducational ltv«l 
College and abova 2.0755 19.7853 0.7557 7.2044 1.8508 18.0498 1.4023 13.6755 2.1343 19.1133 1.1604 10.3915 
Tochnical school -0.0917 -0.8737 -0.0358 -0.3409 -0.0587 -0.5722 -0.0475 -0.4636 -0.1902 -17030 -0.1032 -0.9239 
Senior high school -0.14B2 -1.4129 -0.0593 -0.5654 •0,1382 -1.3478 -0.1533 -1.4946 -0.3039 •2.7217 -0.2040 -1.8271 
Junior high school -0.0106 -0.1013 -0.0043 -0.0412 -0.1379 -1.3451 -0.1814 -1.7695 -0.0702 -0.6291 -0.0553 -0.4955 
Prtmaryschool -0,2943 -2.8057 -0.0884 -0.8428 -0.0920 -0.6968 -0.4267 -4.1611 -0.1413 -1.2652 -0.1816 -1.6266 
% ofdtfrenntialexplained 14.5917 5.4142 13,8877 5.7868 12.7943 5.5184 
Simple average of the two estimatss 10.0029 9.8372 9.1564 
Spouse's educational Itvtl 
College and above 0.5145 4.9042 0.9002 8.5813 -0.2608 -2.5437 0.9061 8.8361 0.3774 3.3799 0.6780 6.0718 
Technical school -0.0283 -0.2703 -0.0386 -0.3679 -0.0084 0.0816 -0.0259 -0.2527 -0.0465 -0.4167 -0.0467 -0.4185 
Senior high school -0.0691 -0.6585 -0.0719 -0.6851 0.0279 0.2716 -0.0583 -0.5684 •0.0999 -0.8949 -0.0252 -0.2257 
Junior high ®chool -0.0062 -0.0594 -0.0059 -0.0562 0.0356 0.3471 -0.0602 -0.5876 -0.0326 -0.2919 -0.0033 -0.0294 
Primafvschool -O.SSOS -2.3881 -0.2509 •2.3918 0.0937 0.9137 -0.1361 -1.3270 -0.2303 -2.1342 0.0918 0.8218 
% of(MenntialBxplBin9d 1.5280 5.0803 -0.9297 6.1005 -0.3579 6.2199 
Simph ev9rage oftho two ostimates 3.3042 2.5854 2.9310 
Percentage of contribution differential that can 
bm explained (%) 4.7275 5.0726 4.6906 2.8649 4.5829 0.3886 
Simple Avemg* of Of two •sdnmtBs (%} 4.9001 3.7779 2.48SB 
Perctntag* of •conomic contribution 
dtfftrtntlal that are unaxptainabt* (%) 95.2725 94.9274 95.3092 97.1351 95.4171 99.6114 
Sfmpfa 4vwigt of tfw two •stimates fX> 95.0999 | 96.2221 | 97.5142 ] 
Notes: 
丄.•Wife as base”ivfcn to the asswnpdca thai the email wife's ecomvnic ccntributian stmcture mxi/JaJso jpply to hiKbsnJ 
b: "Husbandis tme"refers to the ussumpdon lhat the cmrcnt husband's axMuic ojntribuUon stivctm am i/so Apply to wife 
c: .Aiijustinenl is expressed is a percwfji^ of the total economic contribvo'cn tUffaailiai 
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Continued Table 7.3 
Year: | 1994 | 199S | 1996 
Wife as base ‘ Husband as base ^ Wife as base * Husband as base" Wife as base * Husband as base ^ 
Total ^ o n o m i c contribution differential 12.4815 12.4815 11.9963 11.9963 12.1576 12.1576 
(Ch - C^v ) 
Pcrccnlafic’ (^J "^wj )Ph, Pcrccntaiic' PcrccnUcc’ l ^ j -Zw, )Ph, PcrccnUcc‘ - 乏 P c r c c n t a c c ’ UhJ IPh, PcrccoUfic' 
Adjustment for husband^wife dtfftnncBs 
In thB following charact9rtstics: 
Individual's Age Groups 
Ago 31-40 -0.0984 -0.7886 -0.0082 -0.0656 -0.0800 -0.6668 -0.0101 -0.0838 -0.0615 -0.5063 0.0182 0.1496 
Age 41-50 0.0052 0.0415 0.0071 0.0568 -0.0008 -0.0066 -0.0002 -0.0015 0.0007 0.0061 0.0005 0.0042 
Age 51-60 -0.1511 -1.2109 -0.0153 -0.1226 -0.2852 -2.3777 >0.0335 •0.2792 -0.2636 -2.1678 -0.0631 -0.5194 
Age 61 or above -0.8026 -6.4305 -1.5124 -12.1168 -0.7417 -6.1827 -1.2864 -10.7234 -0.6465 -5.3098 -1.2088 -9.9430 
% of differential explained -8.3885 -12.2482 -9.2338 -11.0879 -7.9777 -10.3084 
Simple average of the two estimates -10.3184 -10.1608 -9.1431 
Spouse's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 -0.0082 -0.0658 -0.1031 -0.8259 0.0267 0.2227 -0.1047 -0.8729 0.0772 0.6349 •0.0694 -0.5708 
Age 41-50 0.0021 0.0164 0 .0093 0.0749 0.0014 0.0116 ^ . 0 0 1 9 -0.0161 -0 .0003 -0.0024 0.0006 0.0046 
Age 51-60 0.0920 0.7369 0.0577 0.4619 0.0959 0.7997 0.1230 1.0253 0.0972 0.7995 0.0602 0.4953 
Age 61 or above 0.3061 2.4520 0.4769 3.8209 0.2993 2.4950 0.5303 4.4206 0.1668 1.3722 0.2860 2.3527 
% of diffonntial explained 3.1396 3.5318 3.5290 4.5568 2.8041 2.2818 
Simph average of the two estimates 3.3357 4.0429 2.5430 
Individual's educatjonal level 
College and above 2.4831 19.8943 0.9150 7.3308 2 .0563 17.1409 0 .1863 1,5532 2 .0828 17.1316 0.8810 7.2464 
Technics 丨 school -0.3834 -3.0715 -0.1194 -0.9567 -0.2158 -1.7990 0.0157 0.1306 -0 .2023 -1.6639 -0.0637 -0.5238 
Senior high school -0.3000 -2.4037 -0.0770 -0.6170 -0.1959 -1.6330 0.0425 0.3542 -0 .2833 -2.3305 -0.0852 - 0 7 0 0 9 
Junior high school -0.1935 -1.5502 -0 .0423 -0.3390 -0.1502 -1.2519 0.0966 0.8054 -0.1711 -1 .4075 -0.0407 -0.3348 
PrimaiY school -0.1647 -1.3198 -0.0147 -0 .1175 -0.0853 -0 .7113 0.2334 1.9459 -0.0919 •0.7560 0 .0105 0.0867 
%ofdifr^ntiafexplain9d 11.5491 5.3006 11.7456 4J893 10.9737 5.7736 
S/mpte average of th9 two estimates 8.4249 8.2675 8.3736 
Spouse's educational levtl 
College and above -0.2615 -2 .0953 0.8791 7.0428 -0.1340 -1.1170 0.7754 6.4636 0 .0397 0.3262 0.2736 2.2508 
Technical school 0 .0336 0.2689 -0.1437 -1.1512 0.0197 0.1544 -0.0526 -0.4382 -0.0180 -0.1478 -0.0218 -0.1794 
Senior high school 0 .0378 0.3027 -0.0769 -0,6162 0 .0493 0.4107 >0.0189 -0.1577 0.0000 0.0000 0.0982 0.8077 
Junior high school 0 .0417 0.3339 -0.0322 -0.2577 0.0597 0.4980 0.0179 0.1489 0.0144 0.1181 0.1337 1.0999 
Primary school 0 .0350 0.2802 -0.0514 -0.4918 0.0204 0.1699 0.0273 0.2276 -0 .0204 -0.1677 0.2149 1.7680 
% of difftsmntiaiexplained -0.9096 4.5260 0.1261 6.2442 0.1288 5.7470 
Simph average of the two gsrfmatos 1.8082 3.1851 2.9379 
Psrcantags of contribution diffftrtntial that 
can be explained (%) 5.3906 1.1102 6.1669 4 .5025 5 .9288 3.4941 
Slmpl9 Avnngt of tfi> two wt fmafs (%} 3.2504 5.3347 4.7115 
P«rc*ntage of economic contribution 
difrarential that are unexptainable (%) 94.6094 98.8898 93.8331 95 .4975 94.0712 96.5059 
Simph Avrmjim of th9 two e s t f m a f s (%} | 96.7496 | | 94 .6653 95 .2865 
“ - Yean I • 1997 | 1998 | 1999 
" Wife as base* Husband as basc^  Wife as base' Husband as base" Wife as base* Hasband as base^  
Tota l jconqmic contribution differential 12.7323 12.7323 127931 12.7931 12 8692 12 8692 
( c „ - C ^ ) 
(乏n -ZnjiPij PcrcenUfic' IZhJ -之w,)钱均 PcrccnUfic‘ PcrccnUfic' (ZhJ -乏w, PtrccnUfic'(乏,Ptrccnt^fic' (^i PtcccnU£e' 
j^ djustment for husbsnd-wife d/fferenc«s 
/ n f / i e following chancteriMtics: 
Individual's Age Groups 
-0.1190 -0.9347 -0.0417 -0.3273 -0.1459 -1.1407 -0.0968 -0.7567 -0.1053 办 8184 0.0557 0.4326 
Aoe 41-50 -0.0172 -0,1350 -0.0166 -0 .1303 -0.0117 -0.0911 -0.0181 >0.1418 -0 .0310 -0 .2408 0 .0070 0.0640 
A 卯 Sl^eo -0.2260 -1.7749 0.0105 0.0826 -0.2590 -2 .0243 0.0589 0 .4606 -0.2051 -1 .5935 -0.2017 -1.5669 
Age 61 or above -0.5720 -4.4922 -1.2217 -9.5954 -0.5217 -4.0781 •1.2361 -9 .6625 -0 .4868 -3.7830 -1.5907 -12.3601 
% of differential explained -7.3368 -9.9704 -7.3341 -10.1003 -6.4358 -13.4404 
Simple averago oftho two estimatBs -8.6536 -8.7172 -9.9381 
Spousa's Age Groups 
Afl« 31-40 -0.0163 •0.1278 -0.0971 -07625 -0.0235 -0.1840 -0.2162 -1.6901 0.0353 0.2747 -0.0883 •0.6864 
Age 41-50 -0.0132 -0.1036 -0.0106 -0.0835 -0.0080 -0.0624 ^ . 0 2 1 5 •0.1684 0 .0105 0.0818 -0.0387 -0.3008 
Afle 51-60 0.2102 1.6507 0.0936 0 7 3 6 4 0.2389 1.8676 0.2506 1.9589 0.1474 1.1455 0 .1963 1.5251 
Age 61 or above 0.4669 3.6670 0 .4047 3 .1788 0.5249 4 .1029 0.5830 4 .5568 0 .3393 2.6364 0.4579 3.5580 
% 0fdiff9r9ntial9xplain9d 5.0863 3.0682 5.7241 4.6572 4.1382 4.0960 
Simph average of the two estimatos 4.0772 5,1907 4 1171 
IndividiMl's educational IcvbI 
College and above 1.8280 14.3570 2 .2563 17.7212 2.1171 16.5490 1.0926 8.5409 2 .1235 16.5003 2 .3963 18.6201 
Technical school -0.1800 -1.4139 -0.2312 -1.8156 -0.3787 -2.9601 •0.1957 -1 .5295 •0.3091 -2.4022 -0.3408 -2.6480 
Senior high school -0.1151 -0 ,9043 -0.2150 -1.6888 -0.0984 -0 .7693 -0.0375 -0 .2928 -0.0294 "0 2281 •0 0464 -0 3604 
Junior high school -0 .1859 -1.4599 -0.6591 -5.17S4 •0.2066 -1.6150 -0.1632 -1 .2758 -0.1866 -1.4502 -0.5196 -4.0375 
Primary school -0.0277 -0.2172 -0.5687 -4 .3883 -0.0891 -0.6968 -0.1470 -1.1491 -0.0734 ^0.5703 -0.4944 -3.8420 
% ofdiffemntialexplairmd 10.3618 4.6522 10.5079 4.2936 11.8495 7.7322 
Simph average oftlw fwo estimates 7.5070 7.4007 9.7909 
Spouse's educational (avel " 
College and above 0.1468 1.1533 0.4620 3.6289 -0.4203 -3.2855 0.4040 3 .1578 -0.2092 -1 .6258 1.4917 11.5912 
Technical school -0.0289 -0.2269 -0.0456 -0 .3583 0.0754 0.5896 •0.0696 -0 .5439 0 .0473 0 .3675 -0.1889 .1 .4675 
Senior high school 0.0009 0.0072 0.0159 0.1252 0 .0498 0 .3893 0 .0268 0 .2097 0 .0078 0 .0603 •0.0154 -0.1197 
Junior high school 0 .0170 0.1334 0 .2003 1.5731 0.2230 1.7427 0.2640 2 .0636 0 .1749 1.3693 -0.0434 •0.3373 
Primary school -0 .0504 -0.3957 0.1546 1.2146 0.1989 1.5544 0.2120 1.6574 0 .2400 1.8648 -0.0863 -0.6705 
% of difforentialexplained 0.6713 6.1835 0.9906 6.5444 2.0260 8.9962 
Simple awmgg oftho two estimates 3.4274 3.7675 5.5111 
Percentage of contribution differentia, that 
can be explained {%) 8 7 8 2 5 3.9335 9.8885 5.3960 11.5779 7.3839 
Stmpl9 Avrmg€ ofthQtwo estimafs (%) 6.3580 7.6417 9.4B09 
Percentage of aconomlc contribution 
dmtrentlal that are unexplainable (%) 91.2175 96.0665 90.1115 94.6050 88.4221 92.6151 
Stmpl9 Avwwge of the two BstinutBS (%) j 93.6420 | | | 92.3583 | 90.5191 | | | 
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Graph 5.1 
Distributions of the shares of husbands' and wives' labor income to total 
family income 
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Average share of husbands' and wives' labor income by life cycle stages 
Graph 5.2a: Life cycle stage 1 
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Graph 5.2b: Life cycle stage 2 
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Graph 5.2c: Life cycle stage 3 
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Coefficients Associated with Husband Intercept Dummy for the Pooled 
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Graph 7.1 
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Flow Chart 3.1 
Flow Chart to Summarize the Flow of Analyses 
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Appendix 3.1 
Educational System in China 
After establishing the People's Republic of China (PRC), Mao used political means to 
alleviate the oppression of women. The government expanded the education to women 
and encouraged women to participate in economic production. However, traditional 
social norms were still obstmcters to the education of women in China at that time. 
Before the social and economic reform in 1980s, the economic and political 
disturbances hindered the development of the educational system in China. People did 
not go to school until the age of 8. Despite the obstacles, primary and secondary 
education in China composed of three stages. These were primary school, junior high 
school and senior high school. The length of study in primary schools was five years. 
And, the length of study in junior high school was 3 years. Moreover, the length of 
study in senior high school, vocational school and college was just two years. And, the 
study length for university was generally four years. 
The social and economic reform started in 1978 in China. After continuous reforms and 
adjustments, an educational system comprehending all disciplines has taken to fit in 
. w i t h the national economic and social development. Since then, primary and junior high 
school is compulsory. Where junior high school education is universal, students who 
have graduated from primary schools will, without examination, advance to the 
appropriate junior high schools. Junior high school graduates may enter senior high 
schools after passing examinations set by the local education authorities. Children who 
have reached the age of six are able to enter primary schools. The length of study in 
primary schools and senior high school are extended to six years and three years 
respectively. And the length of study in junior high school remains to be three years. So, 
there are twelve years of study altogether in primary school, junior high school and 
senior high school. 
Additionally, governments at all levels have actively promoted nine-year compulsory 
education, and made remarkable achievements after the issuing of the Compulsory 
Education Law of the PRC in 1986. Since then, senior high school education is virtually 
universal in large and medium-sized cities and the coastal areas. 
China's vocational education is mainly composed of advanced vocational schools, 
technical secondary schools, skilled worker's schools, vocational middle schools, 
vocational training centers and other technical training schools for adults and training 
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institutions run by social organization or individuals. Active developments of vocational 
schools began in the early 1980s, and these developments were adapted to the economic 
development of China. The length of study in vocational school generally has been 
extended to three years since then. 
With the deepening of reform in the organization of higher education, the scale of 
college and university was greatly developed. The benefits from higher education to the 
nation are enhancing over time. Despite little change in the length of study in college 
and university, the courses that are provided have been improved and institutions of 
higher learning continuously provide society with a great number of top-grade 
specialists. 
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Appendix 5.1 to be continued 
Pooled OLS Regressions of the Economic Contribution to Family over Husbands and Wives with Husband Dummy, 
1988-1999 
Appendix 5.1a: Education is measured by years of schooling with measurement 1 
Dependent variables: Percentage share of husband's or wife's labor earnings in total family income 
Year: 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Explanatory variables 
Husband Dummy 8.967" 8.953" 8.800 9.825 9.708" 10.852" 
(25.27) (23.98) (25.22广 （26.29广 （29.38) (29.54) 
Demoaraphic Variables 
Individual's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 0.503 -0.371 0.788 0.716 2.388" 0.126 
(0.68) (0.46) (0.94) (0.9) (3.16) (0.15) 
Age 41-50 0.253 -1.167 0.468 -0.064 2.913" -0.233 
(0.27) (1.18) (0.47) (0.06) (3.13) (0.22) 
Age 51-60 -4.075" -5.294" -1.657 -3.753" 二2.132 -4.501" 
(3.7) (4.53) (1.42) (3.21) (1.94) (3.62) 
Age 61 or above -18.108" -18.040" -14.468" -17.032" -17.057" -19.025" 
(13.35) (12.73) (10.35) (12.01) (12.9) (12.87) 
Spouse's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 0.776 1.163 1.064 0.071 -1.518' 0.006 
(1,06) (1.45) (1.27) (0.09) (2.01) (0.01) 
Age 41-50 0.606 1.154 1.079 0.680 -2.024* 0.521 
(0.66) (1.16) (1.07) (0.69) (2.17) (0.49) 
Age 51-60 v -1.825 -1.931 -3.554" -4 .55" -6 .652" -4.823" 
(1.66) (1.65) (3.04) (3.89) (6.05) (3.87) 
Age 61 or above -5.552" -6.839" -8.610" -7.848" -8.955" -6.860" 
y r “C: , (4.09) (4.8) (6.16) (5.54) (6.77) (4.64) 
Number of Children " 、 
No. of preschool children 0.439 -0.961 0.522 0.466 -1.413* -0.913 
；二 . ‘ (0.72) (1.45) (0.76) (0.68) (2.07) (1.1) 
No. of school-age children 0.964* 0.627 0.963* 1.269* -0.556 0.310 
.、力‘ (2.33) (1.38) (2.04) (2.4) (1.1) (0.52) 
No. of adolescent children : 0.609* 0.819* 1.037" 1.396** -0.377 0.280 
^ (1.98) (2.39) (3.03) (3.83) (1) (0.62) 
• No. ofaduU children , . 二 , -3.060** -3.000" -3.135" -2.888" -5.496** -5.359" 
, ' - ‘ ‘ (12.13) (12.02) (13.52) (11.1) (22.23) (19.02) 
Adult coresident <• ‘ 
‘ N o . of male coresident adult -3.721** -3.052** -4.261" -4.330" -7.018** -6.156" 
、 (4.18) (3) (4.82) (4.99) (8.2) (6.34) 
No. of female coresident adult -1.053 -0.680 -0.547 -0.833 -3.146" -2.280" 
;，:":：. (1.84) (1.2) (0.97) (1.38) (5.76) (3.45) 
Household endowments 
Individual's educational level , 
Individual's years of schooling , 2.835" 3.301" 3.413" 2.761" 2.184" 2.779" 
- 、 ： : ( 8 . 5 8 ) (9.51) (10.32) (7.93) (6.1) (6.84) 
Square of individual's schooling -0.093** -0.112" -0.117" -0.087" -0.059" -0.085" 
, 一 ,5：', (6.24) (7.23) (7.95) (5.62) (3.6) (4.56) 
Spouse's educational level 
Spouse's years of schooling -1.322** -1.046** -1.603" -1.779" -1.449" -1.547" 
(4) (3.01) (4.85) (5.11) (4.05) (3.8) 
Square of spouse's schooling 0.056** 0.043" 0.067** 0.073" 0.058" 0.063" 
(3.78) (2.77) (4.55) (4.69) (3.55) (3.39) 
Income effect 
Real family non-labor income -0.007" -0.006" -0.006** -0.005" -0.014" -0.012'* 
(32.63) (28.64) (29.36) (27.56) (33.39) (29.32) 
Economic development 
Real GDP per capita 0.001 0.002 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002" 
- (0.94) (1.92) (2.48) (2.16) (2.25) (2.69) 
Square of real GDP per capita -o.ooooool -0.0000006 -0.0000006* -o.oooooos -o.oooooo4* -0.0000005* 
(0.6) (1.64) (2.04) (1.44) (2.28) (2.33) 
Constant 27.176" 22.079" 22.892" 26.631" 33.710" 29.094" 
• ：；,：•；；；• (11.08) (8.5) (9.01) (10.11) (12.77) (9.56) 
No. of Observation 5884 5524 6096 6234 7846 7158 
R-square 0.5806 0.5751 0.5904 0.5467 0.5994 0.5966 
Note: Absolute value of t-ratios are in parentheses 
•significant at 5% level： ** significant at 1% level 
Sample observations exclude families in which any one spouse is self-employed 
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continued Appendix 5.1a 
Year: 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Explanatory variables 
Husband Dummy 11.813** 11.014** 11.344" 11.780" 11.434** 11.597" 
(30.16) (27.16) (27.91) (27.03) (25) (24.2) 
Demographic Variables 
Individual's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 1.182 1.314 0.710 2.512* 2.833* 1.714 
(1.27) (1.36) (0.65) (2.18) (2.34) (1.29) 
Age 41-50 1.194 0.479 1.575 3.693" 4.372" 3.544* 
(1.05) (0.4) (1.23) (2.69) (3.07) (2.27) 
Age 51-60 -2.674* -3.587* -3.614* -0.496 0.442 -3.431 
(2.01) (2.56) (2.42) (0.31) (0.27) (1.91) 
Age 61 or above -17.096** -17.92" -17,548" -15.077" -14.333" -18.405 
(10.99) (10.88) (10.1) (8.05) (7.43) (8.77)" 
Spouse's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 -1.094 -1.205 -0.311 -1.982 -3.080* -1.796 
(1.18) (1.25) (0.29) (1.72) (2.55) 1.36 
Age 41-50 -0.776 -0.109 -0.62 -2.620 -4.26" -3.702 
(0.69) (0.09) (0.48) (1.91) (2.99) (2.37)* 
Age 51-60 -7.319** -6.480" -6.183" -9.369" -12.080" -10.208 
(5.49) (4.62) (4.15) (5.89) (7.3) (5.67)" 
Age 61 or above -9.132" -10.631** -7.195" -12.013" -14.911** -9.971 
(5.87) (6.46) (4.14) (6.42) (7.73) (4.75)" 
Number of Children 
No. of preschool children -0.228 0.087 -0.221 -0.953 0.391 -0.635 
(0.27) (0.1) (0.24) (0.98) (0.39) (0.56) 
No. of school-age children 0.580 0.972 0.779 -0.081 0.619 0.069 
(0.92) (1.5) (1.12) (0.11) (0.81) (0.08) 
No. of adolescent children 0.772 1.148* 0.805 -0.077 1.161 -0.052 
(1-6) (2.1) (1.41) (0.12) (1.79) (0.08) 
No. of adult children -5.247** -5.377" -5.288" -5.367** -4.319** -4.922" 
... (17.51) (16.66) (15.89) (15.34) (11.15) (11.83) 
Adult coresident "" 
No. of male coresident adult -6.680" -6.109" -6.382" -6.140" -7.699" -7.227" 
’ 、. (6.23) (5.88) (5.55) (5.69) (7.3) (6.22)" 
No. of female coresident adult -2.020** -2.892** -2.215** -2.488** -3.728" -2.614** 
(2.95) (4.01) (3.01) (3.46) (4.86) (3.01 广 
Household endowments 
Individual's educational level -
Individual's years of schooling 2.022** 1.220** 1.785" 2.323" 1.443" 2.257** 
(4.54) (2.58) (3.69) (4.39) (2.62) (3.9广 
Square of individual's schooling -0.041* -0.003 -0.031 -0.066" -0.02 -0.043 
‘ ‘ ’ (2) (0.12) (1.41) (2.73) (0.8) (1.63) 
Spouse's educational level . 
Spouse's years of schooling -0.971* -0.048 -0.669 -0.457 -0.271 -0.49 
(2.18) (0.1) (1.38) (0.86) (0.49) (0.85) 
Square of spouse's schooling 0.034 -0.014 0.015 0.003 -0.008 -0.011 
(1-7) (0.64) (0.69) (0.11) (0.31) (0.41) 
Income effect 
Real family non-labor income -0.011" -0.009" -0.010" -0.008" -0.007** -0.007" 
(27.83) (24.6) (25.78) (19.97) (18.1) (19.43) 
Economic development ‘ 
Real GDP per capita 0.003" 0.003** 0.003" -0.0001 -0.000007 -0.001 
(3.15) (3.87) (3.17) (0.12) (0.01) (0.79) 
Square of real GDP per capita -0.0000006* -0.0000007" -o.oooooos* -0.00000009 -0.00000009 0.00000008 
(2.45)* (3.3)" (2.48) (0.46) (0.5) (0,49) 
Constant 26.664" 26.407" 26.900" 28.148" 30.952" 28.861" 
(8.06) (7.35) (7.24) (7.34) (7.63) (6.79) 
No. of Observation 7180 7202 7214 7246 7138 6882 
R-square 0.5896 0.5525 0.5581 0.504 0.499 0.5042 
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Appendix 5.1 to be continued 
Pooled OLS Regressions of the Economic Contribution to Family over Husbands and Wives with Husband Dummy, 
1988-1999 
Appendix 5.1b: Education is measured by years of schooling with measurement 2 
Dependent variables: Percentage share of husband's or wife's labor earnings in total family income 
Year: 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Explanatory variables -
Husband Dummy 8.947** 8.925 8.780 9.770 9.639" 10.787** 
(25.17) (23.86)** (25.08广 （26.03广 (29.07) (29.22) 
PemociraDhic Variables 
Individual's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 0.436 -0.448 0.710 0.675 2.411** 0.154 
(0.59) (0.56) (0.85) (0.85) (3.19) (0.18) 
Age 41-50 0.209 -1.189 0.459 -0.087 2.968** -0.202 
(0.23) (1.2) (0.46) (0.09) .(3.19) (0.19) 
Age 51-60 -4.116" -5.298" -1.619 -3.783" -2.068 -4.463" 
(3.74) (4.53) (1.39) (3.24) (1.88) (3.58) 
Age 61 or above -18.132" -18.034" -14.395" -17.077" -16.977" -18,964" 
(13.36) (12.72) (10.3) (12.04) (12.85) (12.82) 
Spouse's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 0.783 1.155 1.038 0.077 -1.557* -0.027 
(1 07) (1.44) (1.24) (0.1) (2.06) (0.03) 
Age 41-50 0.635 1.129 1.026 0.687 -2.088* 0.475 
(0.69) (1.14) (1.02) (0.69) (2.24) (0.45) 
Age 51-60 -1.756 -1.917 -3.607" -4.522** -6.677" -4.832" 
(1.59) (1.64) (3.09) (3.87) (6.08) (3.88) 
Age 61 or above -5.424** -6.768" -8.611" -7.795" -8.945** -6.808** 
'' (4) (4.77) (6.16) (5.5) (6.77) (4.6) 
Number of Children 
No. of preschool children 0.466 -0.924 0.557 0.484 -1.374* -0.863 
(0.76) (1.39) (0.81) (0.71) (2.02) (1.04) 
No. of school-age children 0.964* 0.646 0.973* 1.25* -0.547 0.313 
(2.34) (1.42) (2.07) (2.37) (1.08) (0.53) 
No. of adolescent children 0.620* 0.838* 1.048** 1.387" -0.370 0.282 
, (2.02) (2.44) (3.06) (3.8) (0.98) (.63) 
No. of adult children -3.054" -2.987" -3.123** -2.885" -5.483** -5.352" 
(12.11) (11.96) (13.46) (11.09) (22.18) (19) 
Adult coresident 
No. of male coresident adult -3.722" -3.028** -4.264" -4.367" -7.016** -6.187" 
‘ (4.19) (2.98) (4.83) (5.03) (8.21) (6.37) 
No. of female coresident adult -1.037 -0.683 -0.536 -0.827 -3.138" -2.256" 
(1.81) (1.2) (0.95) (1.37) (5.75) (3.41) 
Household endowments 
Individual's educational level " 
Individual's years of schooling 3.061" 3.572** 3.674" 3.031** 2.481" 3.078** 
(9) (9.96) (10.75) (8.41) (6.73) (7.34) 
Square Of individual's schooling -0.113** -0.137" -0.143** -0.108" -0.075" -0.105" 
(6.4) (7.45) (8.16) (5.87) (3.86) (4.76) 
Spouse's educational level 
Spouse's years of schooling -1.368" -1.105" -1.638" -1.882" -1.551** -1.657" 
(4.02) (3.08) (4.79) (5.22) (4.21) (3.95) 
Square of spouse's schooling 0.067" 0.052" 0.079" 0.088" 0.071" 0.078** 
(3.81) (2.83) (4.54) (4.77) (3.67) (3.53) 
Income effect 
Real family non-labor income -0.007** -0.006" -0.006" -0.005" -0.014** -0.012" 
(32.67) (28.65) (29.4) (27.55) (33.41) (29.33)-
Economic development 
Real GDP per capita 0.001 0.002 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002" 
.‘ (0.9) (1.88) (2.43) (2.14) (2.21) (2.63) 
Square of real GDP per capita -0.0000001 -0.0000006 -0.0000006* -0.0000005 -0.0000004* -0.0000005* 
(0.58) (1.61) (2) (1.45) (2.26) (2.29) 
Constant 27.488" 22.777" 23.224" 26.709" 33.32" 29.14" 
(12.25) (9.54) (9.9) (10.98) (13.81) (10.44) 
No. of Observation 5884 5524 6096 6234 7846 7158 
R-square 0.5807 0.5752 0.5904 0.5466 0.5999 0.5966 
Note: Absolute value of t-ratios are in parentheses 
•significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
Sample observations exclude families in which any one spouse is self-employed 
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continued Appendix 5.2b 
Year: 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Explanatory variables " 
Husband Dummy 11.800" 10.990** 11.347" 11.851" 11.497" 11.652** 
(30) (26.98) (27.79) (27.11) (25.05) (24.22) 
Demographic Variables 
Individual's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 1.189 1.357 0.754 2.509* 2.846* 1.700 
(1.28) (1.4) (0.69) (2.17) (2.35) (1.28) 
Age 41-50 1.160 0.491 1.555 3.563" 4.314" 3.424* 
(1.02) (0.41) (1.21) (2.59) (3.03) (2.19) 
Age 51-60 -2.669* -3.533* -3.576* -0.554 0.505 -3.440 
(2) (2.52) (2.4) (0.35) (0.3) (1.91) 
Age 61 or above -17.057" -17.841" -17.495" -15.086" -14.214" -18.356" 
(10.96) (10.83) (10.06) (8.05) (7.36) (8.73) 
Spouse's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 -1.120 -1.262 -0.330 -1.971 -3.079* -1.771 
(1.2) (1.31) (0.3) (1.71) (2.54) (1.33) 
Age 41-50 -0.782 -0.190 -0.610 -2.512 -4.212" -3.599* 
(0.69) (0.16) (0.48) (1.83) (2.96) (2.3) 
Age 51-60 -7.320" -6.563" -6.192" -9.300" -12.124" -10.178" 
(5.49) (4.68) (4.15) (5.84) (7.32) (5.64) 
Age 61 or above -9.063** -10.671" -7.125" -11.918" -14.935" -9.929" 
(5.82) (6.48) (4.1) (6.36) (7.73) (4.72) 
Number of Children 
No. of preschool children -0.194 0.102 -0.209 -0.953 0.393 -0.624 
(0.23) (0.11) (0.22) (0.98) (0.4) (0.55) 
No. of school-age children 0.593 1.002 0.809 -0.070 0.629 0.096 
(0.94) (1.55) (1.16) (0.1) (0.82) (0.12) 
No. of adolescent children 0.763 1.154* 0.812 -0.077 1.156 -0.017 
” （1.48) (2.11) (1.42) (0.12) (1.79) (0.02) 
No. of adult children ‘ -5.232" -5.359" -5.279" -5.364** -4.320" -4.918" 
, ‘ (17.45) (16.59) (15.85) (15.32) (11.14) (11.8) 
Adult coresident 
No. of male coresident adult -6.711** -6.105" -6.333" -6.126" -7.693" -7.213" 
(6.26) (5.87) (5.5) (5.67) (7.29) (6.2) 
No. of female coresident adult -1.996" -2.875" -2.210" -2.483" -3.722** -2.606" 
(2.91) (3.99) (3) (3.45) (4.85) (3) 
Household endowments _ 
Individual's educational level 
Individual's years of schooling 2.321** 1.513** 2.077" 2.543" 1.698" 2.627** 
(5.05) (3.1) (4.15) (4.64) (2.97) (4.38) 
Square of individual's schooling -0.053* -0.009 -0.043 -0.082" -0.031 -0.061 
(2.22) (0.35) (1.63) (2.88) (1.04) (1.94) 
Spouse's educational level 
Spouse's years of schooling -1.002* -0.114 -0.714 -0.465 -0.297 -0.611 
(2.18) (0.23) (1.43) (0.85) (0.52) (1.02) 
Square of spouse's schooling 0.042 -0.014 0.02 0.004 -0.007 -0.008 
(1.73) (0.55) (0.75) (0.14) (0.24) (0.27) 
Income effect 
Real family non-labor income -0.011" -0.009** -0.011" -0.008" -0.007" -0.007" 
(27.84) (24.58) (25.8) (19.96) (18.1) ' (19.4) 
Economic development 
Real GDP per capita 0.003" 0.003" 0.003" -0.0001 -0.00002 -0.001 
(3.07) (3.78) (3.13) (0.15) (0.02) (0.79) 
Square of real GDP per capita -o.oooooos" -0.0000006" -0.0000005* -0.00000008 -0.00000008 0.00000008 
(2.4) (3.24) (2.46) (0.44) (0.49) (0.49) 
Constant 26.204" 26.278" 26.476" 28.375" 30.625" 28.891" 
(8.63) (7.95) (7.72) (8.02) (8.15) (7.31) 
No. of Observation 7180 7202 7214 7246 7138 6882 
R-square 0.5893 0.5521 0.5575 0.5031 0.4979 0.5025 
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Pooled OLS Regressions of the Economic Contribution to Family over Husbands and Wives with Husband 
Dummy and Sample Observations restricted to Double-wage Earners Families, 1988-1999 
Appendix 5.2a: Education is measured by years of schooling with measurement 1 
Dependent variables: Percentage share of husband's and wife's labor earnings in total family income 
Year: 1988 1989 1991 1993 
Explanatory variables 
Husband Dummy 7.122" 7.030" 6.684" 7.442" 7.519" 9.082" 
(23.28) (22.3) (22,82) (23,78) (25.7) (26.8) 
Demographic Variables 
Individual's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 0,963 0.261 0.795 2.076" 2.507" 0.973 
(1.63) (0.41) (1.22) (3.35) (3.98) (1.32) 
Age 41-50 2.247" 0.699 1.754* 2.226" 3.863" 1,408 
(2.99) (0.89) (2.22) (2.85) (4.94) (1.55) 
Age 51-60 1.141 -0.982 1.890' 1.920' ‘1.731 -0,285 
(1,23) (1.02) (2.01) (2) (1.83) (0.26) 
Age 61 or above -11.142" -13.349" -4.180" -8.373" -8,191" -12.177" 
(6,87) (7.85) (2.75) (5.06) (5.18) (7.03) 
Spouse's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 0.132 1.050 0.926 -0.529 -1.794" -0.694 
(0.22) (1.66) (1.42) (0.85) (2.85) (0.94) 
Age 41-50 -0.781 0.632 0.259 -0.710- -2.824" -0.208 
) (1.04) (0.8) (0.33) (0.91) (3.61) (0.23) 
Age 51-60 -2,697** -1.105 -2.254* -4.205" -6.083" -3.122" 
' 、 (2.9) (1.15) (2.39) (4.39) (6.42) (2.82) 
Age 61 or above -6.174" -2.458 -8.976" -7.731" -8.007" -4.199* 
(3.8) (1.44) (5.9) (4.67) (5.06) (2.42) 
Number of Children 
No. of preschool children 0.506 -0.662 0.613 0.093 -1.404* -0.969 
(1.01) (1.25) (1.12) (0.17) (2.45) (1.33) 
No. of school-age children 0.764* 0.214 0.608 0.225 -0.934* -0.291 
.… (2.22) (0.58) (1.61) (0.52) (2.15) (0.53) 
No. of adolescent children 0.247 0.236 0.593* 0.523 -0.863* -0.682 
(0.95) (0.83) (2.1) (1.67) (2.57) (1.62) 
No. of adult children , . -3.712** -3.943" -3.938" -4.230" -6.201" -6.483" 
‘ ) (14.25) (15.44) (17.22) (16.2) (24.61) (21.65) 
Adult coresident 
- N o . of male coresident adult -4.270" -3.706" -4.245" -5.211" -6.984" -6.245" 
(5.82) (4,45) (6.02) (7.46) (9.58) (7.31) 
No. of female coresident adult -1.491" -1,471" -0.995* -1.447" -2.938" -2.172" 
(3.1) (3.09) (2.19) (2.92) (6.21) (3.69) 
Household endowments -
Individual's educational level 
Individual's years of schooling 1.621" 2.017" 1.715" 1,494" 1.098" 1.451" 
(5.46) (6.42) (5.83) (4.79) (3.17) (3.47) 
Square of individual's schooling -0.050" -0.064" -0.054" -0.043" -0.023 -0.037* 
(3.83) (4.68) (4.26) (3.13) (1.46) (1.99) 
Spouse's educational level 
Spouse's years of schooling -0.821" -0.978" -0.907" -1.447" -1.183" -1.377" 
(2.77) • (3.12) (3.09) (4.64) (3.42) (3,29) 
Square of spouse's schooling 0.033* 0.036" 0.036** 0.056" 0.045** 0.054" 
(2.49) (2.65) (2.78) (4.09) (2.9) (2.86) 
Income effect 
Real family non-labor income -0.007" -"0.005" -0.006" -0.004" -0.015" -0.015" 
(31.02) (27.02) (30.67) (25.14) (33) (26.4) 
Economic development 
Real GDP per capita -0.0003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0,001 0.001 
(0.38) (1.24) (1.84) (1.18) (0.83) (1.14) 
Square of real GDP per capita 0.0000001 -0.0000004 -0.0000004 -0.0000003 -0.0000002 -0.0000003 
(0.49) (1.4) (1.59) (0.95) (1.22) (1.3) 
Constant 34.502" 31.679" 32.530" 36.059" 42.704" 40.352" 
(15.47) (13.65) (14.47) (15.31) (16.7) (12.93) 
No. of Observations 4932 4546 4994 5058 6506 5842 
R-square 0,4423 0.4303 0.4611 0.402 0.4617 0.4389 
Note: Absolute value of t-ratios are in parentheses 
"significant at 5% level： ** significant at 1% level 
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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
B^lanatory variables .. 
Husband Dummy 9.919" 9.280" 10.074" 10.007" 9.315" 9.612" 
(26.48) (24.22) (25,47) (23.57) (20.96) (20.22) 
Demoaraphic Variables 
Individual's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 1.156 1.797* -0.770 0.395 0.495 1.140 
(1.42) (2.14) (0.78) (0.37) (0.45) (0.96) 
Age 41-50 1.986* 2.050* 0.053 2,361 2.131 3.394* 
(1.98) (1.98) (0.05) (1.87) (1.65) (2.41) 
Age 51-60 0.377 0.391 -2.951" -0.135 0.861 -0.447 
(0.31) (0.31) (2.11) (0.09) (0.56) (0.26) 
Age 61 or above -12.909" -7.309" -15.234" -12.274" -12.371" -16.313" 
(6.86) (3.73) (6.92) (5.11) (5.14) (5,53) 
Spouse's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 .. ' ： -0.733 -1.053 1.863 0.764 -0.033 -0.625 
(0.9) (1.25) (1.89) (0.72) (0.03) (0.53) 
Age 41-50 -0.944 -0.583 1.659 -0.458 -0.882 -2.185 
‘ 丄 : , 、 . . 、 . ‘ ， （0.94) (0,56) - (1.43) (0.36) (0.68) (1.55) 
Age 51-60 • - ' ‘ -4.573" -3.075* -1.070 -4.470" -5.31" -6,391" 
(3.72) (2.41) (0.77) (2.97) (3.43) (3.77) 
Age 61 or above -4.025* -7.238" 2.761 -8.607" -8.89" -6.336* 
(2.14) (3.7) (1.25) (3.58) (3.69) (2.15) 
Number of Children 
No. of preschool children . -0.842 -0.786 -0.825 -1.082 -0.074 -0.922 
、 , - ' 、 • (1.13) (1) (0.97) (1.21) (0.08) (0.9) 
No. of school-age children . -0.328 -0.482 -0.365 -0.854 -0.112 -0.784 
；•；. (0.57) (0.83) (0.56) (1.27) (0.16) (0.99) 
No. of adolescent children -0.225 -0.538 -0.564 -1.150 -0.055 -1.120 
, , , (0.47) (1.07) (1.03) (1.91) (0.09) (1.63) 
HU； No. of adult children -6.097" -6.876" -6.224" -5.741" -5.254" -5.687" 
(18.01) (19.2) (16.17) (14.05) (11.28) (10.4) 
Adult coresident .一 
No. of male coresident adult -6.759" -6.102" -6.069" -6.830" -8,298" -7.384" 
:,‘ (7.08) (6.57) (5.72) (6.86) (8.23) (6.44) 
No. of female coresident adult -2.643" -2.556" -2.155" -2.010** -2.729" -2.036* 
’” (4.24) (3.86) (3.1) (2.9) (3.75) (2.42) 
Household endowments ‘ 
Individual's educational level 
Individual's years of schooling 1.964" 1.352** 1.590" 2.052** 1.343* 2.229" 
• (4.04) (2.67) (2.92) (3.37) (2.15) (3.23) 
Square of individual's schooling -0.048* -0.019 -0.034 -0.062* -0.02 -0.053 
(2.2) (0.83) (1.41) (2.28) (0.71) (1.74) 
Spouse's educational level 
Spouse's years of schooling -0.864 -0.595 -1.603" -1.206* -1.172 -1.247 
(1.78) (1.17) (2.94) (1.98) (1.87) (0.81) 
Square of spouse's schooling 0.025 0.007 0.053* 0.031 0.023 0.015 
(1.17) (0.31) (2.18) (1.14) (0.82) (0.5) 
Income effect 
‘ Real family non-labor income -0.012" -0.012" -0.012" -0.008" -0.007" -0.007" 
(22.87) (22.97) (22.24) (13.87) (14.53) (13.76) 
Economic development 
Real GDP per capita 0.001 0.002* 0.001 -0.002* -0.002* -0.002" 
(1.32) (2.45) (1.38) (1.98) (2.05) (2.67) 
Square of real GDP per capita -0.0000003 -0.0000005* -0.0000002 0.0000002 0.0000002 0.0000003 
(1.19) (2.49) (1,2) (0.82) (1.02) (1.82) 
Constant 32.231"* 34.609" 38.661" 39.069" 42.314" 39.923** 
(8.91) (9.03) (9,51) (8.91) (9.28) (7.96) 
No. of Observations 5644 5742 5636 5640 5380 4946 
R-square 0.4044 0.3779 0.363 0.3071 0.3105 0.3091 
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Pooled OLS Regressions of the Economic Contribution to Family over Husbands and Wives with Husband Dummy 
and Sample Observations restricted to Double-wage Earners Families, 1988-1999 
Appendix 5.2b: Education is measured by years of schooling with measurement 2 
Dependent variables: Percentage share of husband's and wife's labor earnings in total family income 
Year: 1988 1989 1990 1992 1993 
Explanatory variables 
Husband Dummy 7.125" 7.023" 6.687" 7,420" 7.487" 9.054" 
(23.26) (22.24) (22.76) (23.62) (25.53) (26.63) 
Demographic Variables 
Individual's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 0.919 0.207 0.750 2.043" 2.523" 0.988 
(1.55) (0.33) (1.15) (3,29) (4.01) (1.34) 
Age 41-50 2.220" 0.684 1.752* 2.198" 3.900** 1.423 
(2.96) (0.87) (2.22) (2.81) (4.99) (1.57) 
Age 51-60 . . . . . 1.113 -1.000 1.918* 1.888* 1.757 -0.275 
(1.2) (1.04) (2.03) (1.97) (1.85) (0.25) 
Age 61 or above -11.183" -13.355" -4.142" -8.434" -8.165** -12.141" 
(6.89) (7.85) (2.72) (5.09) (5.16) (7) 
Spouse's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 .::—:“:：.,.：•;..,:-•:.: 0.142 1.054 0.914 -0.515 -1.817" -0.711 
… ： 广 . . . : : . ( 0 . 2 4 ) (1.67) (1.4) (0.83)- (2.89) (0.97) 
Age 41-50 V;.,^..：-：；-0.760 0.622 0.227 -0.694 -2.861" -0.223 
(1.01) (0.79) (0.29) (0.89) (3,66) (0.25) 
Age 51-60 .••、：：：.’： -2.650 -1.085 -2.294* -4.179" -6.097" -3.121" 
(0.85) (1.13) (2.43) (4.36) (6.43) (2.82) 
Age 61 or above -6.099** -2.448 -8.989** -7.700** -7.98" -4.133* 
...，:--. (3.76) (1.44) (5,91) (4.65) (5.04) (2.38) 
Number of Children 、: 
No. of preschool children 0.521 -0.638 0.629 0.102 -1.381* -0.943 
二 .!:;:.?:;」: (1.04) (1.2) (1.15) (0.18) (2.41) (1.29) 
No. of school-age children 0.766" 0.225 0.614 0.217 -0.926* -0.287 
=• (2.23) (0.61) (1.62) (0.5) (2.14) (0.53) 
^ No. of adolescent children 0.257 0.246 0.602* 0.520 -0.854* -0.679 
(0.98) (0.86) (2.12) (1.66) (2.55) (1.62) 
No. of adult children .;、_..,.., -3.71" -3.937" -3.931" -4.228" -6.190" -6.478" 
• ‘ I :」:.：二 (14.24) (15.41) (17.17) (16.18) (24.56) (21.62) 
Adult coresident 
No. of male coresident adult -4.273" -3.696" -4.249" -5.233" -6.983" -6.263" 
(5.83) (4.44) (6.02) (7.49) (9.58) (7.33) 
No. Of female coresident adult -1.479" -1.472" -0.989* -1.445" -2.933" -2.155" 
’ ‘ _  (3.08) (3.1) (2.18) (2.92) (6.2) (3.66) 
Household endowments 
Individual's educational level 
Individual's years of schooling 1.775** 2.228** 1.873" 1.669** 1.355** 1,708" 
. (5.76) (6.79) (6.1) (5.11) (3.77) (3.92) 
Square of individual's schooling -0.062" -0.081** -0.068** -0.054** -0.034 -0.051* 
,. (3.99) (4.92) (4.43) (3.34) (1.82) (2.28) 
Spouse's educational level 
Spouse's years of schooling -0.840" -1.060" -0,914" -1.547** -1.295" -1.497" 
(2.73) (3.23) (2.98) (4.74) (3.6) (3.43) 
Square of spouse's schooling 0.039* 0.045** 0.042" 0.068" 0.057" 0.067" 
(2.48) (2.75) (2.72) (4.18) (3.05) (3) 
Income effect 
Real family non-labor income -0.007" -0.005" -0.006" -0.004" -0.015" -0.015** 
...... (31.03) (27.01) (30.67) (25.11) (32.97) (26.39) 
Economic development 
Real GDP per capita -0.0003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.42) (1.2) (1.79) (1.16) (0.8) (1.11) 
Square of real GDP per capita 0.0000001 -0.0000004 -0.0000004 -0.0000003 -0.0000002 -0.0000003 
(0.5) (0.38) (1.55) (0.95) (1.2) (0.28) 
Constant 34.475"" 31.886" 32.462- 35.850" 41.949" 39.776" 
(16.81) (14.85) (15.56) (16.37) (17.8) (13.76) 
No. of Observations 4932 4546 4994 5058 6506 5842 
R-Square 0.4421 0.4299 0.4606 0.4014 0.4619 0.4387 
Note: Absolute value of t-ratios are in parentheses 
'significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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- 1994 1996 mr 1999 
Explanatory variables 
Husband Dummy 9.905" 9.265** 10.072" 10.036" 9.324" 9.630" 
(26,38) (24,12) (25.41) (23.59) (20.94) (20.2) 
Demographic Variables 
Individual's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 1.160 1.832* -0.742 0.387 0.507 1.134 
(1.42) (2.18) (0.75) (0.36) (0.46) (0.96) 
Age 41-50 1.961 2.067* 0.030 2.258 2.091 3.313' 
(1.95) (1.99) (0.03) (1.79) (1.62) (2.35) 
Age 51-60 0,362 0.427 -2.956* -0.185 0.916 -0.438 
(0.29) (0.33) (2.11) (0.12) (0.59) (0.26) 
Age 61 or above -12.934" -7.252" -15.282" -12.374" -12.407" -16.215" 
(6.87) (3.7) (6,93) (5.14) (5.15) (5.48) 
Spouse's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 -0.748 -1.096 1.843 0.771 -0.042 -0.614 
.,;�.？:•:..::::.,." (0.92) (1.3) (1.87) (0.72) (0.04) (0.52) 
Age 41-50 -0.927 -0.628 1.677 -0.357 -0.85 -2.099 
’. (0.92) (0.61) (1.44) (0.28) (0.66) (1.49) 
Age 51-60 -4.544" -3.120* -1.057 -4.413" -5.368" -6.388" 
(3.69) (2.44) (0.76) (2.93) (3.46) (3.76) 
Age 61 or above -3.878* -7.216" 2.860 -8.433" -8.841" -6.380* 
(2.06) (3.68) (1.3) (3.51) (3.67) (2.16) 
Number of Children /• 
No. of preschool children -…-.:,.:.. -0.821 -0.778 -0.813 -1.080 -0.065 -0.919 
、—W: "•；；•： (1.1) (0.99) (0.95) (1.21) (0.07) (0.89) 
No, of school-age children -0.313 -0.463 -0.348 -0.847 -0.103 -0.778 
•V；'"',； (0.56) (0.8) (0.54) (1.25) (0.14) (0.98) 
No. of adolescent children -0.221 -0.534 -0.560 -1.142 -0.053 -1.111 
(0.46) (1.06) (1.02) (1.9) (0.08) (1.62) 
No. Of adult children -6.083" -6.862** -6.217" -5.731" -5.251" -5,681" 
... ....‘ ，、.. ~.、W-_;、.f戈乂.•；y. «、’‘sv*-
. 实 婚 : ‘ . : ‘ " ％ . i (17.96) (19.14) (16.13) (14.01) (11.25) (10.37) 
Adult coresident 
No. of male coresident adult -6.770** -6.102" -6.043" -6.824** -8.303** -7.377" 
(7.09) (6.57) (5.69) (6.85) (8.23) (6.43) 
No. of female coresident adult -2.633** -2.546" -2.153" -2.008" -2.727" -2.033* 
办 ’ 打 了 (4.22) (3.84) (3.09) (2.9) (3.74) (2.41) 
Household endowments 
Indlvidusrs educational level 
Individuars years of schooling 2.343" 1.707" 1.927" 2.302** 1.682* 2.677** 
. … . , I (4.61) (3.22) (3.37) (3.59) (2.53) (3.63) 
Square.of individual's schooling -0.067" -0.033 -0.051 -0.08* -0.034 -0.077* 
(2.58) (1.2) (1.73) (2.46) (1.03) (2.1) 
Spouse's educational level 
Spouse's years of schooling -0.913 -0.710 -1.773" -1.303* -1.422 -1.538* 
(1.79) (1.34) (3.1) (2.03) (0.14) (2.09) 
Square of spouse's schooling 0.031 0,012 0.068* 0.039 0.035 0.028 
(1.19) (0.44) (2.33) (1.19) (1.06) (0,75) 
Income effect 
Real family non-labor income -0.012" -0.012" -0.012" -0.008** -0.007" -0.007" 
(22.85) (22.94) (22.21) (13.86) (14.5) (13.73) 
Economic development 
Real GDP per capita 0.001 0.002* 0.001 -0.002* -0.002* -0.002" 
(1.25) (2.38) (1.34) (1.98) (2.05) (2.66) 
Square Of real GDP per capita -0.0000003 -0.0000005* -0.0000002 0.0000002 0.0000002 0.0000003 
: : : : (1.14) (2.43) (1.17) (0.82) (1.03) (1.81) 
Constant 31.435" 34.056" 37.867" 38.838" 42.015" 39.809" 
、 (9.35) (9.53) (9.98) (9.45) (9.77) (8.33) 
No. of Observations 5644 5742 5636 5640 5380 4946 
R-square 0,4038 0.3771 0.362 0.3058 0.3089 0.3067 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 7.1 to be continued 
Decomposition of the Husband-wife Economic Contribution Differential, 1988-1999 •‘ 
Appendix 7.1a: Education is measured by years of schooling with measurement 1 
Year: I 1968 | 1969 | 199Q “ 
Wife base • Husband as base" Wife as b a s e ‘ Husband as base " — Wife as b a s * ' “ Husband a i bas>-
Total economic cont r ibu t ion d i f ferent ia l 9 .2698 9 .2698 9 .3574 9 .3574 9 .5635 9 .5635 
(C„ - c,v) 
t^ n -Zwjipwj Percentage ‘(之 HJ IPm, Percantag* ‘ Percentag* ‘ '^ h)々 v, Pemntage ‘ Percentage ‘ (^hJ -之 w, P^h, Pcrcvntage ‘ 
Adjustment for husband'Wife differences 
/n th9 following characteristics: 
Indiv idual 's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 - 0 . 0 7 5 8 - 0 . 8 1 7 4 - 0 . 0 7 0 7 - 0 . 7 6 2 3 - 0 . 0 0 6 2 -0 .0660 - 0 . 0 6 1 9 - 0 . 6 6 2 0 - 0 . 0 3 7 7 - 0 . 3 9 4 7 -0 ,0918 办 9 6 0 4 
Age 41-50 - 0 . 0 0 1 7 - 0 . 0 1 8 9 0 . 0 1 3 0 0 . 1 4 0 1 - 0 . 0 1 2 2 -0 .1300 0 . 0 1 2 9 0 . 1 3 7 5 - 0 . 0 0 1 6 -0 .0171 0 .0051 0 0 5 3 6 
Age 51-60 - 0 . 6 6 3 5 - 7 . 1 5 7 6 0 . 0 2 8 7 0 . 3 0 9 4 - 0 . 6 7 1 5 - 7 . 1 7 6 2 0 . 0 5 5 1 0 . 5 8 8 6 - 0 . 4 4 6 9 - 4 . 6 7 2 9 0 . 1 5 5 6 1 .6270 
Age 61 or above - 0 . 9 6 9 6 - 1 0 . 4 6 0 2 - 0 . 8 9 3 3 - 9 . 6 3 6 9 • 1 . 0 2 7 9 - 1 0 . 9 8 4 4 - 0 . 9 2 0 8 - 9 . 8 3 9 9 - 0 7 8 2 6 - 8 . 1 8 3 7 -0 .9915 - 1 0 . 3 6 7 4 
% ofdiffenntialoxplained -18.4540 - 9 . 9 4 9 7 -18.3565 -97758 -132683 -9 6472 
Simple average of the two estimates -14.2019 .14.0662 -11.4577 
Spouse 's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 0 . 0 2 5 6 0 . 2 7 5 5 - 0 . 0 3 2 9 - 0 . 3 5 5 1 0 . 0 8 3 6 0 . 8 9 3 8 - 0 . 0 6 0 6 - 0 , 6 4 7 8 0 . 1 1 7 6 1 .2300 - 0 . 0 2 6 3 - 0 . 2 7 4 8 
Age 41-50 0 . 0 0 1 4 0 . 0 1 5 3 0 . 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 5 - 0 . 0 0 5 7 - 0 . 0 6 0 5 0 . 0 0 8 5 0 . 0 9 0 4 - 0 . 0 0 2 5 - 0 . 0 2 6 5 0 . 0 0 0 7 0 . 0 0 7 3 
Age 51-60 0 . 1 2 1 7 1 .3133 - 0 . 1 1 8 3 - 1 . 2 7 6 6 0 . 0 7 6 7 0 . 8 1 9 8 - 0 . 0 2 3 9 - 0 . 2 5 5 8 0 . 1 1 5 4 1 .2063 0 . 0 1 6 4 0 .1714 
Age 61 or above 0 . 0 7 9 7 0 . 8 6 0 2 0 . 1 1 4 3 1 .2331 0 . 0 8 9 5 0 . 9 5 6 9 0 . 3 1 5 6 3 . 3 7 3 2 0 . 2 8 9 0 3 . 0 2 1 5 0 . 1 9 1 9 2 . 0 0 6 8 
% of dtfTermitialexplained 2.4643 -0.3882 2.6101 2.5600 5.4312 1.9107 
Simple average ofth9 two estimates 1.0381 2.5B50 3.6710 
Ind iv idua l 's educat ional lovel 
Individual's years of schooling (method 1) 2 . 9 9 2 1 3 2 . 2 7 7 9 1 .0540 1 1 . 3 7 0 7 2 . 8 8 0 0 3 0 . 7 7 8 4 2 . 3 7 1 1 2 5 . 3 3 9 0 2 . 9 4 1 9 3 0 7 6 1 9 1 .7820 18 .6336 
Square of schooling (method 1) - 1 . 7 5 3 4 - 1 8 . 9 1 5 2 - 0 . 5 2 0 7 - 5 . 6 1 6 7 - 1 . 5 4 6 0 - 1 6 . 5 2 2 1 - 1 . 7 1 1 0 - 1 8 . 2 8 5 5 - 1 . 7 5 0 9 - 1 8 . 3 0 8 4 - 1 . 1 9 7 3 - 1 2 . 5 1 9 7 
% ofdiffonntialexplaineii 13.3627 5.7540 14.2563 7.0535 12.4535 6.1139 
Simp/9 average ofth9 two estimates 9.5583 10.6549 9.2837 
Spouse 's educa t i ons� level 
Spouse's years of schooling (method 1) - 0 . 0 7 3 7 - 0 . 7 9 5 2 0 . 6 6 7 4 7 . 2 0 0 0 0 . 2 5 1 4 2 . 6 8 7 1 - 0 . 4 0 9 4 - 4 . 3 7 5 6 0 . 3 6 0 2 7 3 0 1 3 . 7 6 7 2 0 . 5 4 4 2 5 . 6 9 0 2 
square of schooling (method 1) - 0 . 1 1 6 4 - 1 . 2 5 5 7 - 0 . 2 3 6 3 - 2 . 5 4 9 4 •0 .3492 - 3 . 7 3 1 7 0 . 8 4 3 2 9 . 0 1 1 3 - 0 . 5 3 2 7 ^ . 5 7 0 5 - 0 . 0 1 7 1 - 0 . 1 7 8 8 
% ofdiffenmtiatexptain^d -2.0510 4.6506 -1.0446 4.6358 -1.8033 5.5113 
S/mph avorago of the two estimates 1.2998 1.7956 1.8540 
Percentage of con t r ibu t ion d i f ferent ia l that can b« Bxplained (%� 43782 0.0666 -07392 4.4735 4.6671 3.8887 
Simple Avngw of rfte two estimates (%} - 1 . 6 5 5 8 1 .8671 4 2 7 7 9 
Pvrcantags of economic con t r i bu t i on 
di f rerent ia l that ar« unexpla inable {%) 1 0 3 . 3 7 8 2 9 9 . 9 3 3 4 1 0 0 . 7 3 9 2 9 5 . 5 2 6 5 9 5 . 3 3 2 9 9 6 . 1 1 1 3 
Slmpl9 Avng* of t f t t two ostlmataa (%) | 1 0 1 . 6 5 5 6 | | | 9 8 . 1 3 2 9 | 9 5 . 7 2 2 1 
Y抑 r I I 1»92 I 19M 
— W i f a a s b a s e 丨 | HusbamI as base** _ Wife as base* | Husband as base** _ Wtfe as base* | Husband as base" 
Tota l w o n o m i c ^ c o n i r i b u t i o n d inerent ia l 10 .4901 10 .4901 10.2541 10 .2541 ” ‘ 1 6 6 4 1 1 1 6 6 4 
“ ( C H - C w ) 
'.之_ . 艺 - Z * , PrntHmg(Z, -Z^tfi^ Pmrcmnugt' (ZHJ "^Wj P»rc»ntao«mZ, PwcMtag(ZHJ PtrcMtag 
Adjustmnt for fiusbantt-wif^ differences 
in th» Mbwing c/t蘗nctarfstics: 
, Ind iv idua l 's Age Groups 
A 卯 31-40 - 0 . 0 4 3 1 - 0 . 4 1 0 7 - 0 . 1 3 5 5 - 1 . 2 9 1 9 - 0 . 1 8 1 3 - 1 . 7 6 8 5 - 0 . 1 1 8 4 - 1 . 1 5 4 4 - 0 . 0 4 4 3 � 3 9 6 5 0 . 0 1 1 3 0 . 1 0 1 1 
Age 41.50 - 0 . 0 1 1 1 • 0 . 1 0 5 8 0 . 0 2 1 3 0 . 2 0 3 0 0 . 0 0 8 0 0 . 0 7 8 4 0 . 0 1 3 2 0 . 1 2 8 3 - 0 . 0 0 1 2 - 0 . 0 1 0 5 0 . 0 0 1 7 0 . 0 1 5 6 
Ag» 51-60 - 0 . 7 0 1 4 - 6 . 6 8 6 7 0 . 2 0 6 8 1 .9713 - 0 . 3 5 3 6 - 3 . 4 4 8 0 0 . 0 9 8 8 0 . 9 6 3 6 - 0 . 3 1 2 4 • 2 . 7 9 8 0 办 0 5 5 1 - 0 . 4 9 3 6 
Age 61 or above - 0 . 9 6 5 5 - 9 . 1 0 8 9 - 0 . 8 4 7 8 - 8 . 0 8 2 0 - 0 . 8 4 8 2 - 8 . 2 7 1 8 - 1 . 1 7 0 1 - 1 1 . 4 1 0 6 - 0 . 8 5 5 9 - 7 . 6 6 5 4 •1 .4836 - 1 3 . 2 8 6 5 
%of(mtf9ntia•一 ifwd -16.3121 -7.1996 -13.4100 -11.4732 -10.8704 -13.6634 
Simple average offhe two ostimotes -11.7559 -12.4416 -12.2669 
Spousa 's Age Groups 
Age31_40 -0.0462 -0.4401 -0.0633 -0.6030 -0.0749 -0.7302 -0.1467 -1.4308 0.0707 0.6334 -0.0906 -0.8116 
Age 0 . 0 0 5 2 0 . 0 4 9 4 0 . 0 0 1 9 0 . 0 1 8 3 0 . 0 0 6 4 0 . 0 6 2 2 0 . 0 1 1 4 0 . 1 1 0 9 • 0 . 0 0 4 4 - 0 . 0 3 9 1 0 . 0 0 4 4 0 . 0 3 9 7 
Age 51-60 0 . 2 7 8 6 2 . 6 6 5 5 0 . 0 1 1 9 0 . 1 1 3 7 0 . 2 4 4 1 2 . 3 8 0 6 0 . 1 0 5 2 1 . 0 2 5 6 0 . 0 6 0 9 0 . 5 4 5 3 0 . 0 7 4 9 0 . 6 7 0 5 
Age 61 or above 0 . 2 6 8 0 2 7 4 5 9 0 . 2 1 7 5 2 . 0 7 3 6 0 . 3 5 0 9 3 . 4 2 2 4 0 . 2 2 5 7 2 . 2 0 1 1 0 . 2 0 1 9 1 . 8 0 7 8 0 . 2 5 9 8 2 . 3 2 6 7 
% ofdiffenntial 9xplain9d 5.0107 1.6026 5 . 1 3 5 0 1.9067 2.9473 2.2254 
Simp/9 averogo of ttw two estimates 3.3067 3,5209 2 5863 
Ind iv idua l 's ttducational level 
IndlvWuflfs years of schoolino (method 1) 2 . 6 0 3 2 2 4 . 8 1 6 2 1 . 3 4 3 4 1 2 . 8 0 6 8 1 .4067 1 3 . 7 1 8 6 - 0 . 1 4 4 4 - 1 . 4 0 8 6 1 . 9 8 5 3 1 7 . 7 7 8 9 0 . 6 1 6 2 5 . 5 1 8 6 
Square of schooling (method 1) - 1 . 2 0 7 5 • 1 1 . 5 1 0 9 - 0 . 8 5 1 9 - 8 . 1 2 0 8 - 0 . 0 7 4 7 -0 .7281 0 . 5 5 6 8 5 . 4 3 0 3 - 0 . 6 4 5 1 - 5 . 7 7 6 9 � 0 8 8 1 - 0 7 8 8 8 
%ofdmmnttiil9xptamed 13.3053 4.6860 12.9905 4.0218 12.0020 4.7298 
Slmph av9rag9 of ttye two estimates 8.9957 8 .5061 8 3 6 5 9 
Spousa's tducational levtl 
Spouse's years of schooling (method 1) 1 .3526 1 2 . 8 9 3 8 0 . 7 5 0 1 7 . 1 5 1 0 0 . 2 6 0 1 2 . 5 3 6 9 - 0 . 4 0 1 5 - 3 . 9 1 5 7 0 . 2 4 5 0 2 . 1 9 4 4 0 . 0 1 0 7 0 . 0 9 6 0 
Square of schooling (method 1) - 1 . 3 8 0 1 - 1 3 . 1 5 6 0 - 0 . 3 3 7 4 - 3 . 2 1 6 7 • 0 . 3 6 1 6 - 3 . 5 2 6 6 0 . 9 6 6 4 9 . 4 2 4 8 - 0 . 4 0 6 7 - 3 . 6 4 2 1 0 . 6 5 9 7 5 . 9 0 7 5 
%ofdiffW9ntiat9xptained -0.2622 3.9342 '-0.9896 5.5091 -1.4477 6.0034 
S/mpte average of the two estimates 1.8360 2.2597 2 2779 
Percentagft o f con t r ibu t ion d i fTannt ia l that 
can b« exp la ined (%) 3 . 5 7 7 7 3 . 0 2 3 3 5 . 9 8 5 6 - 0 . 0 3 5 6 4 . 9 0 9 1 - 0 . 7 0 4 9 
S/mp/t ^ ytfigt of th9 two •sWrnafs (%) 3.3005 2.9750 2.1021 
Perctntaga of economic contribution “ "‘ 
di f ferent ia l that are u n t x p l a i n a b i * (%) 9 6 . 4 2 2 3 9 6 . 9 7 6 7 9 4 0 1 4 4 1 0 0 . 0 3 5 6 9 5 . 0 9 0 9 1 0 0 . 7 0 4 9 
Slmpl9 Av9rag9 of the two •stimafs | 9 6 . 6 9 9 5 丨 | | 9 7 . 0 2 5 0 9 7 . 8 9 7 9 
"Wife as base' refers to the assumption that the current wife's economic contribution structure would also apply to husband 
b: •Husband as base' refers to the assumption thai the current riusband's economic contribution structure can atso apply to wife 
c: Adjustment is expressed as a percentage of the total economic contribution differential 
Appendix 7.1 149 
Continued Appendix 7.1a 
Year: I I 1995 I ^996 
" W i fe as b a s e • | H u s b a n d as b a s e " “ W t f e a s b a s t * | H u s b a n d as base*^ — Wi fe as b a g « ' | H u s b a n d as b a s e " 
ro ta f e c o n o m i c c o n t r i b u t i o n d i f fe ren t ia l 1 2 . 4 8 1 5 1 2 . 4 8 1 5 1 1 . 9 9 6 3 1 1 9 9 6 3 1 2 . 1 5 7 6 1 2 . 1 5 7 6 
( C j i - ) 
(Zh，Percentage ‘(之jJ -Z j^ )Phj Porcentage (乏场Percentage (ZhJ -^ v, P^hj Percentage 乏场Percentage ‘‘ (ZhJ -Z j^ Percentage ‘‘ 
Adjustment for husband-wtfe differencos 
in the following characteristics: 
n d l v i d u a l ' s A g e G r o u p s 
Age 31-40 - 0 . 1 0 6 3 - 0 . 8 5 1 6 - 0 . 0 1 2 2 - 0 . 0 9 7 4 - 0 . 0 8 4 0 - 0 7 0 0 2 - 0 . 0 1 7 7 - 0 . 1 4 7 5 - 0 . 0 6 5 1 - 0 . 5 3 5 3 0 . 0 0 4 1 0 . 0 3 3 9 
Age 41-50 0 . 0 0 6 8 0 . 0 5 4 2 0 . 0 0 6 7 0 . 0 5 3 6 - 0 . 0 0 1 1 - 0 . 0 0 9 5 - 0 . 0 0 0 4 - 0 . 0 0 3 6 0 . 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 8 2 0 . 0 0 0 8 0 . 0 0 6 5 
Age 51-60 - 0 . 1 4 8 2 - 1 . 1 8 7 3 - 0 . 0 2 1 7 - 0 . 1 7 4 0 - 0 . 2 7 7 4 - 2 , 3 1 2 0 - 0 . 0 3 5 8 - 0 . 2 9 8 3 - 0 2 5 4 6 - 2 . 0 9 3 9 • 0 . 0 5 9 8 - 0 . 4 9 1 9 
Age 61 or above - 0 . 8 2 2 9 - 6 . 5 9 3 2 - 1 . 5 4 1 0 - 1 2 . 3 4 6 1 - 0 . 7 3 6 8 - 6 . 1 4 2 3 - 1 . 2 9 7 0 - 1 0 . 8 1 1 6 - 0 , 6 3 7 8 - 6 . 2 4 5 8 - 1 . 2 1 1 4 - 9 . 9 6 4 2 
% of dimrential explained -8.5780 -12.5636 -9.1639 -11.2609 -7.8669 -10.4158 
Simph average of the Avo estimates -10.5708 -10.2124 -9.1413 
Spouse 's A g e G r o u p s 
Age 31-40 - 0 . 0 1 3 3 - 0 . 1 0 6 5 - 0 . 1 0 1 2 - 0 . 8 1 0 4 0 . 0 2 1 2 0 . 1 7 6 6 - 0 . 1 0 9 2 - 0 . 9 1 0 0 0 . 0 6 5 4 0 . 5 3 7 7 - 0 . 0 7 9 1 - 0 . 6 5 0 3 
Age 41-50 0 . 0 0 1 1 0 . 0 0 9 0 0 . 0 0 9 4 0 . 0 7 5 3 0 . 0 0 1 3 0 . 0 1 0 4 - 0 . 0 0 2 2 - 0 . 0 1 8 4 - 0 . 0 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 0 0 8 0 . 0 0 0 8 0 . 0 0 7 0 
Age 51-60 0 . 0 9 1 8 0 7 3 5 9 0 . 0 5 7 5 0 . 4 6 0 3 0 . 0 9 7 5 0 . 8 1 2 9 0 . 1 3 0 9 1 . 0 9 1 3 0 . 1 0 8 3 0 . 8 9 0 9 0 . 0 7 4 2 0 . 6 1 0 6 
Age 61 or above 0 . 3 1 8 9 2 . 5 5 4 8 0 . 4 7 8 6 3 . 8 3 4 2 0 . 3 0 0 5 2 . 5 0 5 3 0 . 5 4 5 6 4 . 5 4 8 1 0 . 1 9 0 2 1 . 5 6 4 5 0 . 3 2 9 1 2 . 7 0 6 6 
% of differential explained 3.1932 3.5593 3.5052 4.7111 2.9923 2.6736 
Simple average of the two estimates 3.3763 4.1082 2.6330 
I nd i v idua l ' s e d u c a t i o n a l leve l 
Individual's years of schooling (method 1) 1 7 4 6 2 1 3 . 9 9 0 5 - 0 . 4 4 8 5 - 3 . 5 9 3 6 0 . 5 0 5 6 4 . 2 1 4 5 - 0 . 6 1 7 8 - 5 . 1 4 9 9 1 . 7 7 0 7 1 4 . 5 6 4 8 - 0 . 2 7 3 4 - 2 . 2 4 8 9 
Square of schooling (method 1) - 0 . 2 0 9 7 - 1 . 6 7 9 7 1 . 1 4 2 7 9 1 5 5 2 1 . 0 4 8 9 8 7 4 3 9 1 . 3 3 0 8 1 1 . 0 9 3 6 - 0 . 3 6 7 0 - 3 , 0 1 8 9 1 . 0 1 2 8 8 . 3 3 0 7 
% of differential explained 12.3108 5.5615 12.9584 5.9437 11.5458 6.0819 
Simple average of the two estimates 6.9362 9.4510 8.S138 
Spouse ' s e d u c a t i o n a l leve l 
Spouse's years of school ing (method 1) - 0 . 2 7 7 8 - 2 . 2 2 6 0 - 0 . 3 6 9 2 - 2 . 9 5 7 9 - 0 . 9 8 6 1 - 8 . 2 2 0 2 - 1 . 3 3 4 7 - 1 1 . 1 2 6 0 0 . 3 9 1 0 3 . 2 1 6 2 - 1 . 2 7 2 5 - 1 0 . 4 6 6 6 
Square of schooling (method 1) 0 . 2 0 4 1 1 . 6 3 4 8 1 . 0 9 5 6 8 . 7 7 6 7 1 . 0 1 5 6 8 . 4 6 5 8 2 . 1 9 9 5 1 8 . 3 3 5 2 - 0 . 3 7 7 7 - 3 . 1 0 5 4 2 . 1 7 4 7 1 7 . 8 8 7 6 
% of differential explained -0.5912 5.8188 0.2457 7.2093 0.1096 7.4211 
Simple average of the two estimates 2.6138 3.7275 3.7654 
Percen tage o f c o n t r i b u t i o n d i f f e ren t ia l t ha t 
can be e x p l a i n e d (%丨 8 . 9 4 8 7 2 . 3 7 6 1 1 1 . 2 7 2 9 6 . 6 0 3 2 1 0 . 5 4 6 5 5 7 6 1 0 
Simph AvBmy of the two Bstimates (%) 5 . 6 6 2 4 8 . 9 3 8 0 3 . 1 5 3 7 
Percen tage o f e c o n o m i c c o n t r i b u t i o n 
d W e r e n t i a l tha t are u n e x p l a i n a b l e (%) 9 1 . 0 5 1 3 9 7 . 6 2 3 9 8 8 . 7 2 7 1 9 3 . 3 9 6 8 8 9 . 4 5 3 5 9 4 . 2 3 9 0 
Simple AvBng9 of the two estimatBs (%) | 94 . 3376 I ] | 91 . 0620 1 | ] 9 1 . 8 4 6 3 | | 
“ Yean j 1997 | 1998 | 1999 
Wi fe as b a s e ' H u s b a n d as b a s e " Wi fe as b a s e * H u s b a n d as b a s e ^ ‘ W i fe as b a s e * _ H u s b a n d as b a s e " 
To ta l e c o n o m i c c o n t r i b u t i o n d m e r e n t i a l 1 2 . 7 3 2 3 1 2 . 7 3 2 3 1 2 . 7 9 3 1 1 2 . 7 9 3 1 1 2 . 8 6 9 2 1 2 . 8 6 9 2 
( C h - Cw ) 
(乏H ' Percentage { l^ j -之wj )轻h, Percentag* = i^ w Percentage ( ^ j 々Wj )样Hj Pwcentage ^ (乏,-Zw,)P», Percentage ’ {Z„j -Z^j Percentage' 
Af^ustment for husband-wife differences 
/n the fo/towing chancteristics: 
Individual's Age Groups 
Aoe31_4D - 0 , 1 2 6 6 - 0 . 9 9 4 1 - 0 . 0 6 0 9 - 0 . 4 7 8 5 - 0 . 1 5 4 9 - 1 . 2 1 1 0 - 0 . 1 1 0 8 - 0 . 8 6 6 4 - 0 . 0 9 3 8 - 0 . 7 2 9 2 0 . 0 6 3 1 0 . 4 1 2 7 
Age 41-50 - 0 . 0 1 9 9 - 0 . 1 6 6 4 - 0 . 0 1 9 7 - 0 . 1 5 4 9 - 0 . 0 1 4 4 - 0 . 1 1 2 6 - 0 . 0 2 0 5 - 0 . 1 6 0 0 ^ . 0 3 0 3 - 0 . 2 3 5 6 0 . 0 0 6 5 0 . 0 5 0 7 
Age 51-6D - 0 . 2 1 2 2 - 1 . 6 6 6 9 0 . 0 1 8 8 0 . 1 4 7 9 - 0 . 2 2 6 2 - 1 7 6 8 1 0 . 0 7 5 4 0 . 5 8 9 0 - 0 . 2 0 3 6 - 1 . 5 8 1 7 - 0 . 2 0 6 6 - 1 . 5 9 7 8 
Age 61 or above - 0 . 5 5 0 6 - 4 . 3 2 4 8 - 1 . 2 1 3 1 - 9 . 5 2 8 1 - 0 . 4 7 3 5 - 3 . 7 0 1 2 - 1 . 2 3 3 4 - 9 . 6 4 1 0 - 0 . 4 8 1 9 - 3 . 7 4 4 5 - 1 . 6 0 6 6 - 1 2 . 4 8 3 9 
% of differentia/explained -7.1422 -10.0135 -6.7926 -10.0784 -6.2911 -13.6184 
S/mpte average of the two estimatos -8.5779 -8.4356 -9 9547 
S p o u s e ' s Age G r o u p s 
Aoe 31-40 - 0 . 0 3 5 2 - 0 . 2 7 6 7 - 0 . 1 0 7 4 - 0 . 8 4 3 2 - 0 . 0 4 2 0 - 0 . 3 2 8 1 - 0 . 2 2 9 6 - 1 . 7 9 4 7 0 . 0 2 4 8 0 . 1 9 3 1 ^ . 0 7 8 7 ^ . 6 1 1 4 
Age 41-50 - 0 . 0 1 5 8 - 0 . 1 2 4 0 - 0 . 0 1 2 9 - 0 . 1 0 1 1 - 0 . 0 1 0 3 ^ 0 . 0 8 0 2 - 0 . 0 2 3 6 - 0 . 1 8 4 3 0 . 0 0 8 6 0 . 0 6 6 7 - 0 . 0 3 7 1 - 0 . 2 8 8 1 
Ase 51-60 0 . 2 2 0 0 1 . 7 2 7 6 0 . 1 0 8 5 0 . 8 5 2 3 0 . 2 5 7 1 2 . 0 0 9 6 0 . 2 8 2 6 2 . 2 0 9 1 0 , 1 4 9 1 1 . 1 5 8 7 0 . 1 9 3 5 1 . 5 0 3 3 
Age 61 or above 0 , 4 8 0 2 3 7 7 1 8 0 . 4 6 8 3 3 . 6 7 8 3 0 . 5 4 3 6 4 . 2 4 9 3 0 . 6 6 6 7 5 . 2 1 1 8 0 . 3 3 6 7 2 . 6 1 6 6 0 . 4 6 8 4 3 . 6 3 9 6 
% of diffemntial explained 5.0968 3.5863 5.8506 5.4419 4.0351 4.2433 
S/mpte average of the two esfinwtes 4.3425 5 . 6 4 6 3 4 1392 
Individual's educational lev«l 
Individual's years of schoolir>g (method 1) 1 . 2 4 6 6 9 7 9 0 7 0 . 7 2 0 6 6 . 6 5 9 5 1 . 4 1 8 9 1 1 . 0 9 1 5 - 0 . 6 3 1 9 • 4 . 9 3 9 2 1 . 3 7 0 2 1 0 . 6 4 7 2 1 . 1 8 8 6 9 . 2 3 6 3 
Square of school ing (method 1) 0 . 2 6 1 7 2 . 0 5 5 4 - 0 . 3 2 6 0 - 2 . 5 6 0 3 0 . 1 5 5 3 1 . 2 1 3 8 1 . 1 6 8 5 9 . 1 3 3 7 0 . 3 5 0 1 2 , 7 2 0 7 - 0 . 3 3 3 4 - 2 . 5 9 0 3 
% of dmmntfa/explained 11.8462 3.0991 12.3053 4.1944 13.3680 6.6460 
S / m p t e average ofth9 two estimates 7.4727 8.2499 10.0070 
S p o u s e ' s e d u c a t i o n a l leve l 
Spouse's years of school ing (method 1) - 0 . 5 7 6 7 - 4 . 5 2 9 8 - 0 . 7 3 7 4 - 5 . 7 9 1 3 - 0 . 2 5 7 5 - 2 . 0 1 2 9 - 0 . 8 9 6 7 - 7 . 0 0 9 6 0 . 7 0 3 6 5 . 4 6 7 5 - 1 . 3 4 6 9 - 1 0 . 4 5 8 0 
Square of schooling (method 1) 0 . 6 8 9 8 5 . 4 1 7 6 1 . 7 5 8 2 1 3 . 8 0 8 7 0 . 4 0 7 6 3 . 1 8 6 3 2 . 0 3 6 5 1 5 . 9 1 8 6 - 0 , 4 1 4 8 - 3 . 2 2 2 9 2 . 7 3 1 9 2 1 . 2 2 8 4 
% of difhmntial explained 0.8879 8.0174 1.1734 8 9090 2.2446 107704 
Simph average of the two estimates 4.4527 5.0412 6.5075 
Percentag® o f c o n t r i b u t i o n d i f f e ren t i a l t h a t “ 
can be e x p l a i n e d (%) 1 5 . 1 4 3 2 4 . 6 8 9 4 1 7 . 5 7 7 6 8 4 6 7 0 1 9 . 8 6 4 2 8 . 0 4 1 4 
Simple Avenge of fhe two wttmates (%) 9.9163 13.0223 13.9528 
Percen tage o f e c o n o m i c c o n t r i b u t i o n “ 
d i f f e ren t i a l t ha t are u n e x p l a i n a b l e (%) 8 4 . 8 5 6 8 9 6 . 3 1 0 6 8 2 . 4 2 2 4 9 1 5 3 3 0 8 0 . 1 3 5 8 9 1 9 5 8 6 
Simp/e Avenge of the two estimates (%) | 90.0837 | ^ | 86.9777 | | | 86.0472 | | 
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Appendix 7.1 to be COntinued 
Decomposition of the Husband-wife Economic Contribution Differential, 1988-1999 
Appendix 7.1b: Education Is measured by years of schooling with measurement 2 
Vear: 1988 1989 1990 
Wife as base' Husband as base ' Wife as base ' Husband 8S base ' Wife as base' Husband as base ' 
Total economic contribution differential .. 9.2698 9.2698 9.3574 9.3574 9.5635 9.5635 
(CH -Cw ) 
(I ", - l w, lPw, PercentAge C (l llj -zw, )P", Percentage C (Z .. -lw,) ; .. Percentage C (l,,) - lw, )P I~ Percent8ge c (Z ~ -Z'l )P 'I P..-centage C (Z"j -l" )P", Percentage : 
Adjustment for husband-wife differences 
In the following characteristics: 
Individual's Age Groups 
Age 31-.0 -0.0709 -0.7648 -0.0686 -0.7400 0.0001 0.0011 -0.0596 -0.6366 -0.0289 -0.3025 -0.0912 -0.9533 
Age 41-50 -0.0023 -0.0250 0.0126 0.1363 -0.0125 -0.1334 0.0128 0.1370 -0.0017 -0.0176 0.0052 0.0547 
Age 51-60 -0.6647 -7.1707 0.0260 0.2809 -0.6711 -7.1718 0.0548 0.5857 -0.4456 -4.6596 0.1594 1.6665 
Age 61 or above -0.9681 -10.4432 -0.8944 -9.6489 -1.0239 -10.9422 -0.9199 -9.8310 -0.7791 -8.1469 -0.9839 -10.2881 
" of differential explained -18.4037 -9.9717 -18.2463 -9.7450 -13.1266 -9.5202 
Simple average of the two estimates -14.1877 -13.9957 -11 .3234 
Spouse's Age Groups 
Age 31-.0 0.0248 0.2672 -0.0315 -0.3397 0.0822 0.8780 -0.0594 -0.6352 0.1156 1.2092 -0.0249 -0.2601 
Age .1-50 0.0010 0.0106 0.0008 0.0082 -0.0055 -0.0587 0.0085 0.0904 -0.0024 -0.0249 0.0008 0.0079 
Age 51-60 0.1173 1.2652 -0.1199 -1 .2931 0.0767 0.8199 -0.0248 -0.2652 0.1199 1.2542 0.0168 0.1753 
Age 61 or above 0.0737 0.7953 0.1126 1.2147 0.0894 0.9557 0.3131 3.3463 0.2925 3.0584 0.1922 2.0093 
" of differential explained 2.3383 -0.4100 2.5948 2.5364 5.4968 1.9323 
Simple average of Ihe two estimates 0.9642 2.5656 3.7146 
Individual's educational level 
Individual's years of schooling (method 2) 2.8398 30.6347 1.1106 11 .9806 2.7700 29.6026 2.3876 25.5153 2.8477 29.7769 1.8126 18.9532 
Square of schooling (method 2) -1 .5544 -16.7680 -0.5555 -5.9929 -1.3948 -14.9056 -1 .7020 -18.1892 -1.6117 -16.8531 -1 .2168 -12.7234 
" of differential axplained 13.8667 5.9877 14.6970 7.3261 12.9238 6.2299 
Simple average o( the two estimates 9.9272 11.0115 9.5768 
Spouee's .ducatlonallevel 
Spouse's years of schooling (method 2) -0.1466 -1.5816 0.6615 7.1363 0.2342 2.5027 -0.3077 -3.2881 0.3155 3.2989 0.5363 5.6075 
Square of schooling (method 2) -0.0670 -0.7226 -0.2102 -2.2671 -0.3397 -3.6305 0.7469 7.9824 -0.4967 -5.1936 -0.0262 -0.2736 
" o( differential explained -2.3042 4.8692 -1.1278 4.6943 -1.8947 5.3339 
Simple average o( Ihe two estimates 1.2825 1.7832 1.7196 
Percentage of contribution differential that 
can be explained (%1 -3.2204 0.4752 -0.2991 4.8118 5.1190 3.9760 
Simple Average ofth. two estlmat •• (%) 
-1.3726 2.2563 4.5475 I 
Percentage of economic contribution 
differential that are unexplainable (%1 103.2204 99.5248 100.2991 95.1882 94.8810 96.0240 
Simple Averag. ofttr. two utlmate. (%J 101 .3726 97.7437 95.4525 
Vear: '. ' 1991 • 11192 1993 
Wife as base' Husband as base' Wlfea. base' Husband as base • Wife as base' Husband as base ' 
Total economic contribution differential 10.4901 10.4901 10.2541 10.2541 11 .1684 11 .1684 
( C H -Cw ) 
(ZIt - ZWj)~.; Percent •• c: (ZH j - ZWj )PHj Pen:entag. ' (Z" - Z"i)~"i Pen:entag. ' (Z"j - Zw; )PHj Pen:entag. ' (Z_ -Z1j IP III Pen:entag. ' (l,.j -Zw, )PHj Pen:entIJge , 
Adjustmant for hlnband-wlfe dlfl'llrencu 
In th. follow/nil chlracterlal1cs: 
Individual's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 
-0.0368 -0.3507 -0.1346 -1 .2827 -0.1810 -1 .7648 
Age 41-50 
-0.0115 -0.1100 0.0212 0.2021 0.0081 0.0793 
Age 51-60 
-0.7046 -6.7171 0.2053 1.9567 -0.3518 -3.4306 
Age 61 or above 
-0.9563 -9.1161 -0.8498 -8.1011 -0.8431 -8.2225 
.. 
" o( differential explained -16.2939 -7.2250 -13.3385 
Simple average o( the two esllmates -11 .7594 -12.3969 
Spouse's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 -0.0433 -0.4126 -0.0622 -0.5929 -0.0751 -0.7326 
Age 41-50 0.0049 0.0467 0.0018 0.0169 0.0065 0.0638 
Age 51-60 0.2754 . 2.6249 0.0102 0.0970 0.2431 2.3711 
Age 61 or above 0.2841 2.7078 0.2171 2.0693 0.3459 3.3732 
" o( differential explained 4.9669 1.5904 5.0754 
Simple IJverage o( Ihe two estlmales 3.2787 3.5095 
Individual's educatlon.llevel 
Individual's years 01 schooling (method 2) 2.6427 25.1923 1.3943 13.2912 1.4365 14.0090 
Squire of schooling (method 2) 
-1.1661 -11 .1158 -0.8769 -8.3593 0.0054 0.0524 
" o( difrorrlntlal explained 14.0765 4.9319 14.0614 
Slmpla average o( the two estimates 9.5042 9.2162 
Spouse's educltlonal level 
Spouse's years of schooling (method 2) 1.3157 12.5419 0.7620 7.2641 0.1913 1.8655 
Square of schooling (method 2) 
-1 .3348 -12.7241 -0.3193 -3.0441 -0.2918 -2.8459 
" o( differenlllll explained -0.1822 4.2200 -0.9804 
Simple average o( Ih& two estimates 2.0189 2.4461 
Percentage of contribution differential that 
can b. explained (%) 4.5863 3.5173 7.2640 
Simple Averag. of ttr. two estimate. (%) 4.0518 3.9979 
Percentage of economic contribution 
differential that are unexplainable (%1 95.4137 96.4827 92.7360 
Simple Avantge of th. ~ estIm.tw (%) 95.9482 96.0021 
Notes: 
a: "WIle 8S base" refers to the assumption that the current wife's IIccllomlc ccntributlon strudure would also apply to husband 
b: "Husband as base' refers 10 Ihe assumption that the current husband's economic contribution strudure can also apply to wife 
c: Adjustment is expressed as a percentage of the totll economic contribution differential 
Appendix 7.1 
-0.1189 -1 .1599 -0.0448 -0.4010 0.0112 0.1005 
0.0133 0.1294 -0.0012 -0.0106 0.0018 0.0157 
0.0991 0.9667 -0.3125 -2.7989 -0.0561 -0.5028 
-1.1681 -11 .3915 -0.8507 -7.6188 -1 .4849 -13.2983 
-11.4552 -10.8293 -13.6849 
-12.2571 
-0.1476 -1 .4395 0.0716 0.6408 -0.0919 -0.8227 
0.0115 0.1117 -0.0044 -0.0390 0.0045 0.0400 
0.1058 1.0317 0.0582 0.5214 0.0750 0.6721 
0.2297 2.2397 0.1915 1.7146 0.2626 2.3515 
1.9436 2.8377 2.2408 
2.5393 
0.0235 0.2291 1.9951 17.8669 0.7456 6.6771 
0.4247 4.1420 -0.5469 -4.8979 -0.1733 -1.5520 
4.3711 12.9690 5.1252 
9.0471 
-0.2563 -2.4997 0.1683 1.5071 0.1354 1.21 25 
0.8585 8.3722 -0.3455 -3.0943 0.5917 5.2992 
5.8725 -1.5873 6.5116 
2.4622 
0.7319 5.8523 0.1927 
3.0225 
99.2681 94.1477 99.8073 
96.9775 
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— Yean | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 
Wifa as base• Husband as base^ Wife as base* Husband as b«s«° 一 Wif« as base* | Husband as base' ' 
Tota l economic cont r ibu t ion d i f ferent ia l 12 .4815 12 .4815 11.9963 11.9963 12 .1576 12.1576 
( C H - C w ) 
f 乏n Percntage ‘ (2„j -Z*, Perc»ntagi = (Z^  Perc»ntag« ‘ (Z„._ -Zw, )t»H, Per«ntag» ‘ 骞.iP.,， Pwcvntag* ‘ (Z„j -Z,, Ptfcentag* = 
AdjustmBnt for husbsnd-wifn differences “ “ 
In the following chanctBristics: 
Ind iv idua l 's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 - 0 . 1 0 5 7 - 0 . 8 4 6 9 - 0 . 0 1 2 8 - 0 . 1 0 2 3 - 0 . 0 8 4 8 - 0 7 0 7 1 - 0 . 0 1 9 8 - 0 . 1 6 6 4 - 0 . 0 7 1 3 - 0 . 5 8 6 2 0 .0034 0 . 0 2 7 7 
Age 41-50 0 . 0 0 6 4 0 . 0 5 1 3 0 . 0 0 6 8 0 . 0 5 4 2 -0 0 0 1 1 .0 0 0 9 0 - 0 , 0 0 0 5 - 0 . 0 0 4 5 0 . 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 8 4 0 .0008 0 . 0 0 6 5 
Age 51-60 - 0 . 1 4 9 0 - 1 . 1 9 4 1 - 0 . 0 2 1 9 - 0 . 1 7 5 5 - 0 . 2 7 7 5 -2 3 1 3 6 - 0 . 0 3 4 4 - 0 . 2 8 6 8 - 0 . 2 5 3 8 - 2 . 0 8 7 6 -0 .0593 -0 .4880 
Age 61 or above - 0 . 8 1 7 3 - 6 . 5 4 7 7 - 1 . 5 4 2 8 - 1 2 . 3 6 0 4 - 0 . 7 3 1 0 - 6 . 0 9 3 3 - 1 . 2 9 4 8 - 1 0 . 7 9 3 0 - 0 . 6 3 5 0 - 5 . 2 2 3 1 -1 .2124 - 9 . 9 7 2 7 
% of dlfferontial explained -8.5375 -12.5841 -9.1230 -11.2497 - -7.8886 -10 4265 
Simple average of th9 two estimatos -10.5608 -10.1864 -9.1575 
Spouse 's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 - 0 . 0 1 2 8 - 0 . 1 0 2 2 - 0 . 1 0 2 3 - 0 . 8 2 0 0 0 . 0 1 9 7 0 . 1 6 3 9 - 0 . 1 1 1 3 - 0 . 9 2 7 8 0 . 0 6 3 1 0 . 5 1 9 0 -0 .0823 - 0 . 6 7 6 8 
Age 41-50 0 . 0 0 1 3 0 . 0 1 0 7 0 . 0 0 9 3 0 . 0 7 4 4 0 . 0 0 1 1 0 . 0 0 9 0 - 0 . 0 0 2 3 • 0 . 0 1 8 8 - 0 . 0 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 0 0 6 0 . 0 0 0 9 0 . 0 0 7 0 
Age 51-60 0 . 0 9 0 9 0 , 7 2 8 1 0 . 0 5 7 2 0 . 4 5 8 3 0 . 0 9 8 6 0 . 8 2 2 2 0 . 1 3 2 6 1 .1053 0 . 1 0 8 1 0 . 8 8 9 5 0 . 0 7 5 3 0 . 6 1 9 1 
Age 61 or above 0 . 3 0 9 3 2 . 4 7 8 4 0 . 4 7 8 6 3 , 8 3 4 4 0 . 3 0 1 0 2 . 5 0 9 0 0 . 5 4 9 5 4 . 5 8 0 3 0 . 1 8 4 4 1 .5164 0 . 3 2 8 3 2 . 7 0 0 6 
% ofdiffemntialexpiained 3.1150 3.5472 3.5041 4.7391 2.9244 2.6499 
Simph avenge of the two estimates 3.3311 4.1216 2.7872 
Indrv iduars educat ional level 
Individual's years of schooling (method 2) 1 .7632 1 4 . 1 2 6 4 - 0 . 2 3 7 6 - 1 . 9 0 3 8 0 . 6 4 0 8 5 . 3 4 1 9 - 0 . 3 7 0 3 - 3 . 0 8 6 9 1 . 7 6 8 4 1 4 . 5 4 5 5 - 0 . 0 4 0 0 - 0 . 3 2 9 4 
Square of schooling (method 2) - 0 . 1 1 2 4 - 0 . 9 0 0 4 0 . 9 5 3 7 7 . 6 4 0 5 0 . 9 8 2 7 8 . 1 9 1 6 1 .1102 9 . 2 5 4 2 - 0 . 2 9 7 B - 2 . 4 4 9 7 0 . 8 0 1 0 6 . 5 8 8 8 
% of<iiff^ntial9xplain9d 13.2260 5.7367 13.5335 6.1674 12.0958 6.2594 
Simph avwago oftf)» two estimates 9.4814 9.8504 9.1776 
Spouse 's educat ional level 
Spouse's years of schooling (malhod 2) - 0 .3731 - 2 . 9 8 8 9 - 0 . 2 4 2 2 - 1 . 9 4 0 2 - 0 . 9 7 0 8 - 8 . 0 9 2 3 - 1 . 0 9 8 8 - 9 . 1 5 9 7 0 . 2 7 1 1 2 . 2 3 0 2 - 1 . 0 5 5 7 - 8 . 6 8 3 6 
Square of schooling (method 2) 0 . 2 7 3 9 2 . 1 9 4 6 0 . 9 8 9 0 7 . 9 2 3 5 0 . 9 7 4 3 8 . 1 2 1 8 1 .9955 1 6 . 6 3 4 1 - 0 . 2 8 9 5 - 2 . 3 8 1 2 1 .9712 16 .2135 
%ofdiff9nnttalexptain9d -0.7943 5.9833 0.0295 7.4744 - 0 . 1 5 0 9 7.5299 
Simple average ofttm two estimatBS 2.5945 3.7520 3 . 6 8 9 5 
Percentage o f con t r ibu t ion d i f rsrsnt ia l tha t 
can b« t x p l a i n e d ( * � 9 . 6 0 3 8 2 . 6 8 3 0 11 .6960 7 . 1 3 1 1 1 0 . 6 7 0 2 6 . 0 1 2 8 
Slmpl9 Avwngt of th9 two •stfnwifes (%) 6 . 1 4 3 4 9 . 4 1 3 6 8 . 3 4 1 5 
Percsn tag* of economic con t r ibu t ion 
d i f ferent ia l that are unexpla lnabla (%) 9 0 . 3 9 6 2 9 7 . 3 1 7 0 8 8 . 3 0 4 0 9 2 . 8 6 8 9 8 9 . 3 2 9 8 9 3 9 8 7 2 
S i m p / t Av9ng9 of t r t - two •s t in ia fes (%) | 9 3 . 8 5 6 6 | 1 | 9 0 . 5 6 6 4 | | | 9 1 . 6 5 8 5 | | 
Y 抑 r| 1997 , 、 I 1998 | ” 1999 一 
“ Wtfa as base • | Husband as t » s > " “ W i f t «8 b«»« _ | Hu«b«nd aa b a s » " 一 V W t as b i s « • I Husband as base ** 
Tota l economic con t r ibu t ion d i f forent ia l 12 .7323 12 .7323 “ 1 2 . 7 9 3 1 12 .7931 12 .8692 12.8692 
( C „ - C w ) 
Perctotag.‘ (Z„j -Z*, J^ hi P r^cniUge^  (Z^  P»rc*nUg.: fZ„j JtS^ j P*runt«g*‘ (Z^  Perc«nta9«= P»fcmUg«' 
Adjustm9nt for husband-wif9 d/Cfersnces " " " " " " " 
in th9 following chanct&ristics: 
Ind iv idua l 's Ag« Groups 
Ag® 31-40 • 0 . 1 2 8 3 - 1 . 0 0 8 0 - 0 . 0 6 2 2 - 0 . 4 8 8 7 - 0 . 1 5 7 1 - 1 . 2 2 7 8 - 0 . 1 1 3 4 - 0 . 8 8 6 8 - 0 . 0 9 2 0 - 0 . 7 1 4 7 0 . 0 5 3 1 0 . 4 1 2 8 
Age 41-50 - 0 . 0 1 9 1 - 0 . 1 4 9 8 - 0 . 0 1 9 7 - 0 . 1 5 4 5 - 0 . 0 1 4 0 - 0 . 1 0 9 7 - 0 . 0 2 0 9 - 0 . 1 6 3 1 - 0 . 0 2 8 2 - 0 . 2 1 9 2 0 . 0 0 7 1 0 . 0 5 5 2 
Ab» 51-60 -0.2157 -1.6939 0.0200 0.1568 -0.2265 -1.7627 0.0806 0.6301 -0.2081 -1.6169 -0.2053 -1.5951 
Ago 61 or above - - 0 . 5 5 5 4 - 4 . 3 6 2 3 - 1 . 2 1 0 7 - 9 . 5 0 9 2 - 0 . 4 6 8 2 - 3 . 6 5 9 6 - 1 . 2 2 4 1 - 9 . 5 6 8 3 - 0 . 4 8 4 1 - 3 . 7 6 1 7 - 1 . 6 0 5 4 - 1 2 . 4 7 4 7 
% ofdiffontntialexplttin^d -7.2140 -9.9955 -6.7598 -9.9880 -6.3124 -13.6019 
Simph average of ttw two 9stimat9s -8.6047 -8.3739 -9.9572 
Spouse 's Age Groups 
Age 31-40 - 0 . 0 3 6 7 - 0 . 2 8 8 6 - 0 . 1 0 8 7 - 0 . 8 5 3 4 - 0 . 0 4 4 1 - 0 . 3 4 4 5 - 0 . 2 3 1 9 - 1 . 8 1 2 9 0 . 0 2 6 0 0 . 2 0 2 2 •0 0 7 7 3 •0 .6005 
Age 41-50 - 0 . 0 1 5 8 . - 0 . 1 2 3 8 - 0 . 0 1 2 3 - 0 . 0 9 6 7 - 0 . 0 1 0 5 - 0 . 0 8 2 4 - 0 . 0 2 3 5 - 0 . 1 8 3 4 0 . 0 0 9 7 0 . 0 7 5 6 - 0 . 0 3 5 8 - 0 . 2 7 7 9 
Age 51-60 0 . 2 1 9 4 1 . 7 2 2 9 0 . 1 0 6 6 0 . 8 3 7 3 0 . 2 6 1 1 2 . 0 4 0 9 0 . 2 8 4 1 2 . 2 2 0 9 0 . 1 4 6 5 1 . 1 3 8 2 0 . 1 9 1 0 1 .4844 
Age 61 or above 0 , 4 7 4 8 3 7 2 B 9 0 . 4 6 3 2 3 . 6 3 8 2 0 . 5 4 7 2 4 . 2 7 7 3 0 . 6 6 9 9 5 . 2 3 6 3 0 3 2 9 8 2 . 5 6 3 1 0 . 4 6 6 7 3 . 6 2 6 8 
% of diffbnntM explained 5.0394 3,S253 5 . 8 9 1 3 5A609 3.9791 4.2328 
Simph average of the two ®sHma/es 4.2824 5.6761 4.1059 
Ind iv idua l 's educa t i o ru l level 
Individual's years of schooling (method 2) 1 .2791 1 0 . 0 4 5 7 0 . 7 8 4 5 6 . 1 6 1 1 1 .5227 11 .9021 - 0 . 3 7 9 1 - 2 . 9 6 3 1 1 . 5 1 0 0 1 1 . 7 3 3 6 1 3 6 9 3 1 0 . 6 3 9 8 
Square o( schooling (method 2) 0 . 2 6 8 6 2 . 1 0 9 4 -0 3 9 9 9 - 3 . 1 4 0 5 0 . 0 6 7 1 0 . 5 2 4 6 0 . 9 0 5 9 7 . 0 8 1 2 0 . 2 2 7 0 1 . 7 6 4 1 - 0 . 5 0 6 6 -3 9 3 6 5 
% ofdiffttntntialexptained 12,1551 3.0207 12.4267 4.1181 13.4977 6.7033 
Simple avenge of the two astimates 7.5879 8.2724 10.1005 
Spouse 's educat iona l level 
Spouse's years Df schooling (method 2) - 0 . 5 6 7 5 - 4 . 4 5 7 2 - 0 . 5 5 0 4 - 4 . 3 2 2 7 • 0 . 2 1 9 4 - 1 . 7 1 4 7 - 0 . 6 5 3 9 - 5 . 1 1 1 2 0 . 6 7 6 9 5 . 2 6 0 0 - 1 . 0 0 7 9 - 7 . 8 3 1 6 
Square of schooling (method 2) 0 . 6 5 1 7 5 . 1 1 8 7 1 . 5 4 6 0 12 .1421 0 . 3 3 8 4 2 . 6 4 4 9 1 . 7 6 4 4 1 3 . 7 9 1 5 ^ . 4 1 4 8 - 3 . 2 2 3 0 2 . 3 9 4 4 18 .6054 
% ofdifhrvntiat 9xpiain»d 0.6614 7.8194 0.9302 8.6803 2.0369 10.7738 
Simph awrage ofth9 fwo estimates 4.2404 4.8052 6.4054 
Percentogs of con t r i bu t i on d i f ferent ia l that 
can be expMiinad (%) 1 4 . 8 8 2 5 4 . 3 6 9 9 1 7 . 2 9 3 6 8 . 2 7 1 2 1 9 . 6 0 6 6 8 . 1 0 8 1 
Slmpl9 Avngw of th9 two estim9t9s (%) 9 . 6 2 6 2 1 2 . 7 8 2 4 13 8 5 7 4 
Percentage of economic con t r ibu t ion 
dWerent ia l that are unexp lamab l * (%) 8 5 . 1 1 7 5 9 5 . 6 3 0 1 8 2 . 7 0 6 4 9 1 . 7 2 8 8 8 0 . 3 9 3 4 9 1 , 8 9 1 9 
Slmpl9 Av9ng9 of the two estimates (%) | 90.3738 I | 1 87.2176 I 1 | 86.1426 | ] 
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